Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

53. Memorandum of Minutes of the 490th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, August 8, 1961, 10–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Panofsky Report¹

The meeting opened with an extensive summary of his panel’s report by Dr. Panofsky. One point to which he gave particular emphasis was that the party which is engaged in concealment can always succeed if a sufficient effort is made. In summary, Dr. Panofsky made four points:

1. A ban on testing does impose limitations on our development;

2. Such limitations can in large measure be compensated for by improvements elsewhere in our technology.

3. In the long run, nevertheless, such limitations will impair our strength.

4. In the short run, the matter is not critical.

The President asked Dr. Panofsky to comment on the remarks of the JCS about his report.² Dr. Panofsky replied that he could not make any intelligent comment because the criticisms of the Joint Chiefs were not spelled out.

Dr. Seaborg remarked that the Soviet Union may well be testing in the laboratory, with a much higher limit on what would be classed as a laboratory explosion. Dr. Seaborg wanted a higher limit on U.S. laboratory tests, and the President appeared to agree.

(After the meeting, the President authorized Dr. Seaborg to conduct laboratory tests up to a limit of one-ton TNT equivalent.)³

Mr. McCloy reported Khrushchev’s remark that, in a discussion of chemical explosions, “it all depends on what you mean by testing.” He also reported that Khrushchev had told him that he was receiving pressure from the military not in technical but in strategic areas. Khrushchev had mentioned 100-megaton bombs as the economical way of using his large rockets.

General Lemnitzer said that the main concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was with the lack of intelligence on what the Soviets are doing and on the character and strength of Soviet weapons and the Soviet stockpile. The Joint Chiefs were further concerned about what the Soviet Union might have done since 1958. The Joint Chiefs were not currently advocating atmospheric testing. They objected strongly to the notion that there was no tactical doctrine for the use of atomic weapons. General Lemnitzer asserted that the Chiefs definitely do have such a doctrine. They did not object to a “reasonable delay” but the meaning of this phrase turned on definition. There would be a great disadvantage if we were confronted by the Soviets with their possession of a serious new weapon.

The President asked if under the doctrine of the JCS we could have a tactical nuclear war. General Lemnitzer’s answer was in the affirmative but he recognized that many people would disagree.

There followed a careful discussion of the need for testing in connection with the development of the so-called neutron bomb. In this discussion it became clear that while tests would not be needed in the near future for the neutron bomb itself, they would be helpful in the area of “staging experiments” which might turn out to be a limiting factor upon the development of a neutron bomb as an effective weapon, if in fact such a device proves practicable. General Taylor strongly supported the need for the neutron bomb.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that there were not yet any good studies of the precise effects of such a weapon, but Mr. Foster replied that certain of its qualities were very clear, notably that the radius of effectiveness was very sharply defined.

The President asked what we could learn by testing in 1962 and Dr. Panofsky replied that we could pre-test the staging principle, move toward cleaner strategic warheads, and save time in the development of the neutron bomb, if the staging principle proved to be the most difficult problem. We could also test the weapon arrow, which would be useful on the assumption that we were using tactical weapons in great quantity, and we could substantially reduce the weight of a 100 kiloton weapon.

We could test for improved safety, and for unknown forms of vulnerability in our own weapons systems.

The President then asked what would happen if we should test underground while the Soviet Union tested in the atmosphere. This question received no decisive answer, although there was much sentiment to the effect that our own initial tests could be underground as well as not in any case.

Speaking in general support of testing, General Taylor argued that testing means progress and that progress means more to us than to the Soviet Union. At this point Director Dulles entered a strong defense of our intelligence on atomic matters, asserting that we know much more than General Lemnitzer supposed about the quality and content of the Soviet stockpile. The President stated that there ought to be a clarification of the differences between the JCS and others on this point, and he asked General Taylor to consult with General Lemnitzer, Mr. Dulles and Dr. Panofsky in order to define the disagreements and narrow them if possible.⁴

Mr. McCloy believed that as a practical political matter we ought to wait until 1962 to test because of the UN General Assembly. As he read the Panofsky report, such a postponement was acceptable in technical terms. The President remarked that we have here a major political problem. We should clearly resume testing fairly soon, but the UN problem is a serious one. We would now have to emphasize the finding of our blue ribbon panel if we cannot prove that the Soviet Union is not testing. He would make a statement on this on Wednesday or Thursday.⁵

McGeorge Bundy⁶

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1961. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on September 5. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book, which indicates 30 people attended. (Ibid.) Attendees included all statutory members except Rusk, who was represented by Ball. For another account of the meeting, see Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, pp. 75-76.
1. Document 42.
2. Document 48.
3. See footnote 8, Document 48. Kennedy had written Bundy a note favorable to Seaborg’s request on August 7. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 7/16-8/10/61) See the Supplement. After the NSC meeting, Kennedy also explored with Seaborg and others the problem of ensuring test readiness in advance of a decision to resume testing. See Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, pp. 71-73, and memoranda from Bundy to Seaborg, August 8, and Seaborg to Bundy, August 10, in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 7/16-8/10/61 and 8/10-8/30/61, respectively. Both memoranda are in the Supplement.
4. In NSAM No. 69, dated August 15, addressed to Taylor, Bundy repeated the “President’s request that you prepare a report” on disagreements on the intelligence aspects of the Panofsky Report revealed at the NSC meeting. If disagreements among the Panel, CIA, and JCS were “basic,” the President wanted a statement of each position within 2 weeks. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.12, 5 May-3 Nov 61)
5. He made the statement on August 10; see footnote 4, Document 46. NSC Action No. 2437, August 8, records that the Council: “Received the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1961)
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.