Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

349. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy⁰

Washington, July 24, 1963, 6–6:50 p.m.

Harriman Instructions

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Rusk
• Under Secretary Ball
• Ambassador Thompson
• Mr. William Foster
• Mr. Alexis Johnson
• Director Murrow
• Mr. Benjamin Read
• Mr. Bundy
• Mr. Bromley Smith

The President was handed a copy of a cable reporting Mrs. Gromyko’s comment on the test ban treaty made during a dinner in Moscow (copy attached).¹ The President lightly expressed his hope that the views of Mrs. Kennedy given at social occasions did not receive comparable circulation in government reports.

There was a discussion of the problem created by the phrase “or any other nuclear explosion” in Article I of the treaty. The phrase might be misconstrued by opponents of the treaty to mean that in war we could not use nuclear weapons without violating the test ban treaty.²

Under Secretary Ball said it would be hard for the U.S. delegation to ask now for a change in the treaty language. Secretary McNamara felt that even if the treaty negotiations had to be extended by two days, this time would be well spent if we could get the wording changed to avoid the ambiguity of the phrase. Mr. Ball replied that he thought an exchange of notes with the Russians on this point would be satisfactory, or, alternatively, we could state our understanding of this wording in the communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of the test ban treaty negotiations.

The President left for his office to give the contents of the treaty to former President Truman on the telephone. A copy of the draft treaty had already been sent to Independence, Missouri.

Mr. Ball expressed his fear that some on the Hill will point to the ambiguity of the “or any other nuclear explosion” phrase and conclude that the Administration had agreed to a poorly drafted treaty, and, therefore, could not be trusted to draft any treaty. Their argument would be that the title of the treaty, as well as the preamble, could be interpreted to mean that the treaty provisions applied even in the case of war.

Secretary Rusk said we could either decide to ride through the Congressional criticism or explain our interpretation in the communiqué. He said we could say in the communiqué that nothing in the test ban treaty limited the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. He suggested that we make this proposal to the Russians and get their response. If they oppose inclusion of this idea in the communiqué, we would go no farther. If they agree to accept inclusion of this idea, we would go along. He felt that the point, however, had to be raised with the Soviets.

The President agreed that we should so proceed. He said we could explain to the Hill that we had chosen to include the explanation in the communiqué in preference to drafting a separate protocol to the treaty which would cover this point.

Mr. Ball said that he did not believe oral agreement with the Russians on this point was sufficient. The President said he felt, however, that it was adequate.

Secretary Rusk read the draft communiqué³ which he acknowledged was not ideal from our point of view.

The President then raised the question of sending a letter to de Gaulle.⁴ He thought we should send this letter now and let the British Prime Minister know of our decision because the time for his press conference was getting near. He said at the time we announced the initialling in Moscow we should release a statement from the White House saying that we welcomed the successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Shortly thereafter he should make a formal speech which would include all our arguments in favor of the test ban treaty.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that several Senators had a let-down feeling because they had been fighting a comprehensive test ban treaty and now are confronted with a three-environment test ban which permitted the continuance of underground testing. Many of the arguments against a comprehensive treaty fall to the ground under the limited test ban treaty because the problem of inspecting underground tests does not arise.

Mr. Murrow felt that public opinion was somewhat confused and urged that the President’s speech be made as early as possible.

The President said if the test ban treaty was initialled tomorrow, he could make his speech on Friday or hold over until Monday. No press conference is scheduled before Wednesday. Mr. Bundy suggested that there be a brief statement at the time of initialling to be followed by a longer speech.

Mr. Murrow urged that the Administration set the tone for the public at once by emphasizing that the limited test ban treaty was the result of our initiative.

Secretary Rusk said he felt the bipartisan leaders should be brought in for a briefing promptly. He also suggested that policy guidance on the test ban treaty be sent to the field.

At this point Mr. Bundy reported on a telephone call he had from Mr. Kaysen from Moscow.⁵ With respect to the phrase discussed earlier, the delegation felt the cure was worse than the disease. The delegation had been over this point with the British delegation and together they had decided not to raise it with the Russians. The negotiators were in session but the U.S. delegation had asked for a delay in order to obtain additional instructions.

The President said he felt that the language to be included in the communiqué is regarded more seriously here than in Moscow. If Mr. Harriman still doesn’t want the language which we have suggested to him, then we will face the problem of what Mr. Harriman should do. Secretary Rusk said that the President, in his speech and again before signing the treaty, could explain the entire problem.

Mr. Bundy said that Mr. Harriman would be returning to Washington on Saturday or Sunday. Mr. Murrow urged the President not to await Harriman’s return before making a speech. The President agreed that he would speak on Friday and would want a draft by tomorrow. Mr. Harriman is to be asked for suggestions to be included in the speech.

Secretary Rusk cautioned that Mr. Harriman, in his talk with Khrushchev on Saturday, might encounter very rough going.⁶ Mr. Harriman might be in the position of returning to Washington with a limited test ban treaty in one pocket and a Soviet ultimatum in the other. Ambassador Thompson said that the Russians have pushed Mr. Harriman hard on their proposal for a non-aggression pact.

The President wanted to be sure that the French, Italians and Germans were informed of the negotiations. He thought Secretary Rusk should send a personal message to German Foreign Minister Schroeder.⁷

Mr. Bundy read to the group the most recent Harriman cable on the draft communiqué.⁸

The President responded by suggesting that Mr. Harriman discuss the point in his conversation with Khrushchev. He felt it would be hard to deal with it in the wording of the communiqué. He said we might be asked in the Senate about this point and we should be in a position so that Secretary Rusk could say we have dealt with the point. The record of the Moscow meetings should be such as to prove that the point had been discussed with the Russians.

Secretary Rusk agreed that we must discuss this with the Russians. If they respond and reveal that they had in mind an effort to limit our use of nuclear weapons in war by means of the limited test ban treaty, then we will indeed have a major problem on our hands.

The President said that if we are ever asked about the point, we will answer by saying we have discussed it with the Russians. It is important to tell Mr. Harriman so that he will understand why it is necessary to have raised this question during his meeting in Moscow.⁹

Bromley Smith¹⁰

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, Harriman Mission, 7/63. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The ending time of the meeting is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
1. Telegram 303 from Moscow, July 24, not printed. It reported that during a reception at the Polish Embassy 2 days previously, Mrs. Gromyko had said to Kohler: “You tell Mr. Harriman that he has to do everything that is necessary to get this (test ban) treaty. We have to have this so that when those Chinese have their first nuclear explosion, we will have a basis on which to call them to account.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
2. According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation at 5 p.m. that day between Rusk and Chayes, the latter stated that his problem with the language was not its international consequences, but that it would give the opposition talking points and would almost certainly cause the Senate to attach a reservation to the treaty. Rusk said that in going over the treaty with three different Senate committees the question had not come up. Chayes said that he himself had been slow to recognize the problem. “He would hate to feel that we had not tried them [the Soviets] out on it.” (Drafted by Bernau; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
3. It is not clear which draft is referred to here; see footnote 9 below.
4. For text as delivered on July 25, see Document 352.
5. No memorandum of this telephone conversation has been found.
6. July 27. Harriman actually met with Khrushchev on July 26; see Document 354.
7. In telegram 232 to Bonn, July 24, Rusk instructed McGhee to tell Schroeder that while the United States considered it “of highest importance” that China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and East Germany all adhere to the test ban treaty, it was “well-established in the post-war period that adherence to multilateral agreements does not imply recognition among signatories who do not otherwise recognize each other.” After citing examples, Rusk concluded that he hoped that Schroeder would find his comments a “basis for removing any anxieties about GDR adherence.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
8. Apparent reference to telegram 311 or 313; see Document 347 and footnote 4 thereto.
9. See Document 350.
10. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.