348. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
316. From Harriman. Harriman and Hailsham private meeting with Gromyko 3 PM today.
[Here follows an extended account of the portion of the meeting summarized in telegram 311, Document 347.]
Harriman then said he had been requested1 raise another point. Recalled Gromyko’s remark that Sov Government would make statement re France and said that while we did not know what Sovs would say we hoped nothing would be said which would make our mutual problems more difficult. Gromyko had not indicated what and when Sovs would say, but this had raised concern in Washington. Observed Hailsham was authorized say something on this matter.
Hailsham said only thing he could say was that UK possessed information French would not have their Pacific test site ready for another year and that Sahara could be excluded as French testing site for political reasons. Taking this into account Sovs may feel it not necessary make statement at the present time.
Gromyko said could not add anything substantive re France to what Khrushchev and himself had said in course these talks. Sovs had not yet decided when official statement would be made, but evidently it would not be made during stay of US and UK reps here. Rather statement would be made at some future date, and Sovs would expound position they had reserved re France. Stressed great importance Sovs attach to problem of France as latter was nuclear power.
Harriman said obviously Sovs had right make statement, but we believed they might wish postpone it. Noted de Gaulle had announced he would have TV interview on July 29 and if Sov statement were made just before that interview, he might say something hastily just as he had done in January with respect UK. Therefore we asked that Sov statement be postponed, and give us chance to talk to him. If Sovs spoke about France, we would have to speak about China as Chinese problem was very important in our public’s mind. Although China in different position than France, it known China attempting develop nuclear device. There was public information that China might achieve that end this year or next year. China was only country that was known to be developing nuclear device and seeking eventually to become nuclear power.
[Page 843]Gromyko said statement would not be made before July 29 but could not say when since no decision had been made yet.
Harriman hoped Sovs would consult with us so that we could give them friendly advice re situation and effect of their possible statement. We were now in doubt as to what Sovs intended say.
Gromyko said would be glad receive information we might have re French attitude and mood and quite possibly would take it into account. Stressed however Sovs reserved right make statement.
Harriman noted we did not wish make statement re China but would have to if Sovs made statement re France.
IV
Gromyko commented US free to do so but wished note France was nuclear power whereas China was not. Reiterated would be useful receive infor re French mood.
Harriman believed he could be affirmative on this latter point.
Hailsham expressed similar view.
Harriman pointed out we and Sovs had common objective of getting French adherence. Did not see why we should not consult to achieve this end.
Gromyko reverted to text of communiqué and said would study other parts thereof. Inquired whether question of place of signing TB treaty was settled.
Harriman replied in affirmative.
Gromyko said that as to reference to date, he prepared accept “in near future” but Sovs preferred no statement be made, either informally or publicly, spelling out this reference in terms of days or weeks. Schedules of participants would have to be checked and date could be specified later.
Gromyko then referred to problem of interpretation para two Article Three, dealing with deposit of instruments of ratification. Did not believe agreed interpretation could be arrived at. Noted US had one approach to Chiang Kai-shek and Sovs another. To Sovs, Chiang was not a government; he was empty space to them and was illegally in UN. Therefore Sovs could not accept or recognize any document or instrument of ratification from him, whatever the form. Signature of Chiang Kai-shek’s representative would not appear on Sov copy of treaty. Gromyko said he trusted we did not expect any different answer from Sovs on this point. Therefore we should have no illusion that agreed interpretation para two Article Three could be arrived at; suggested we should live with our differences and noted this would not damage treaty.
Harriman said while we did not use same language we had similar attitude towards East Germany. Wondered whether Gromyko’s statement [Page 844] meant we should not accept Chiang Kai-shek’s or East Germany’s adherence. Inquired whether Sovs would want them adhere. Asked what situation would be in practice: should ratification be accepted only by one depositary govt, or should it be sent back?
Gromyko said US would be reasonable if it rejected Chiang’s ratification and accepted GDR’s. Said no analogy between Chiang and GDR, but there was analogy between GDR and FRG.
Harriman suggested that if we were to live with our differences, we should not argue, and inquired again how Gromyko envisaged arrangement in practice.
Gromyko replied he sure we did not expect any other view from Sovs re Chiang. We knew Sov position re Taiwan.
Harriman asked whether this would lead to a situation where none of nonrecognized countries could adhere.
Gromyko replied in negative, noting Sovs attitude toward Franco was well known, and Sov Govt did not recognize him. Said he was speaking only of Chiang.
Harriman said it appeared each case would have to be treated individually.
Gromyko recalled Indochina and Laos conferences, and pointed out USSR had sat there next to South Vietnam and South Korea, Sov attitude toward which was well known. Reiterated he was speaking of Chiang.
Harriman said it thus appeared Sovs did not want Chiang to accede. Observed we in different position; although we did not recognize CPR, we wished see it adhere, and hoped Sovs would use their good offices. Asked whether Sovs would object to CPR’s adherence.
Gromyko wondered why they should, pointing out Sovs regarded CPR as lawful govt.
Harriman asked whether Sovs would encourage CPR to adhere.
Gromyko said the broader the participation the better.
Harriman then asked whether Sovs object to Senators participation in signing.
Gromyko said absolutely not. Said had seen Khrushchev today and reported to him. Sovs accepted this and would greet such powerful group as would be composed of SecState, Harriman and Senators. This also went for UK group, although its composition was not known.
After some further discussion it was agreed there would be a meeting at 3:00 PM tomorrow (July 25) to discuss and hopefully agree on communiqué and then initial TB treaty. Pictures would not be allowed during initialing but only after. Communiqué and text would be given to press simultaneously but embargoed for release until 10:00 PM Moscow time.
[Page 845]No business was transacted in subsequent larger meeting except to confirm agreement re place of signing and to hear report from drafting committee that all texts had been compared and were ready for initialing.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 9 p.m.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 344.↩