Office of the Historian

333. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0

Moscow, July 19, 1963, 8 p.m.

222. From Harriman.

1.
Today’s meeting (July 19) lasting little over two hours centered on discussion of the withdrawal clause. Harriman proposed new language in accordance with instructions Deptel 237,1 as follows: [Page 814]

“This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decided that any nuclear explosion has occurred in the prohibited environments which has jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty three months in advance, such notice to be given within nine months of the date of the explosion referred to.”

2.
Gromyko rejected the article rather brusquely. His arguments pointed to elements unacceptable to Sovs: objected to mention of violation of treaty and to limitation on inherent right of sovereign to withdraw treaty in its own supreme interests. Latter, of course, principle of Sov draft withdrawal clause.
3.

Harriman reacted sharply, reiterated importance of elements our draft to US. Said Gromyko’s immediate rejection failed to show serious consideration of important US position and intimated that issue was a breaking point. By end of meeting, temperature had dropped but issue remained as sharp as ever. It was agreed to discuss matter further at eleven a.m. tomorrow.

Flavor of proceedings given by Gromyko’s response to Hailsham’s question at end of meeting, summing up his position. It is undesirable to have direct reference to violation or to nuclear explosions. It is better to use broader language, which would cover explosions. Of course, all of us would understand that this is what is referred to, although it goes without saying any state could exercise sovereign right to withdraw. We have no intention of carrying out nuclear explosion and we believe you have no such intention. (While this language not direct quotation, approximately repeats Gromyko’s words.)

4.
It is not clear to us why Sovs are so firm on this point. Character of discussion showed this not simply the means of tying further progress on test ban treaty to discussion non-aggression pact. Although some have suggested that derogation of Sov theory on state sovereignty in relation to treaty limitations on right to withdraw is explanation, Harriman and others believe it is related to China which is today Soviet overriding preoccupation. Acceptance of our draft would constitute open admission US pressure on Sovs to do something about Chinese nuclear threat. Sovs unwilling make such admission.
5.
At close of meeting, Gromyko repeated Sov desire to have simultaneous signing of non-aggression pact and called it main difficulty in these negotiations. This was his second mention of this subject; the other was in the course of his first remarks.
6.
Hailsham supported us in meeting although his instructions allowed him to accept Sov draft. We were not surprised that he argued strongly to accept, pointing out how unhappy PM and British public would be if negotiations broke down.
7.
Unless otherwise instructed, plan to sit tight. Welcome advice soonest. If we can think of any redraft that seems to offer hope, will send it for instructions.
8.
Full report of meeting including some discussion preamble follows soonest.2
Kohler
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Flash; Ban. Received at 4 p.m.↩
  2. Document 332.↩
  3. A full report of the plenary session is in telegram 223 from Moscow, July 19. It does not include discussion of the preamble. Telegram 224 from Moscow, also July 19, contains a U.S. draft of the preamble, submitted at the drafting committee meeting that morning, and U.S. language submitted at the plenary session to meet the instructions in telegram 237 to Moscow regarding Article I. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Both are in the Supplement.↩