Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union⁰

Washington, July 18, 1963, 9:29 p.m.

237. Following is President’s guidance as of 8:00 pm, July 18:

1. Test Ban Agreement

(a) Withdrawal Provisions. We cannot accept withdrawal clause unrelated to occurrence of nuclear tests and therefore find Soviet version contained Embtel 208¹ unacceptable. Language of Soviet version would allow any party to withdraw at any time by merely declaring that, in its unilateral judgment, extraordinary circumstances have jeopardized its supreme interests. This is dangerously similar to what happened when Soviets resumed testing in 1961. Alleged extraordinary circumstances could be a mere pretext. The Senate and the American public would almost certainly reject treaty on ground commitments illusory.²

Believe you should hold firmly to withdrawal clause along lines of that set forth in Embtel 183,³ adopting as a fall-back language in Deptel 218.⁴ The defect in Deptel 218 is that it does not provide either notification period or statute of limitation for renunciation. Therefore, if you have to fall back on Deptel 218 language you should insert those two additional conditions.

(b) Article I. We agree to Article I as set forth in Embtel 183⁵ eliminating phrase in brackets. However, text as drafted contains possible ambiguity since repetition of phrase “the carrying out” might indicate that limitation of qualifying clause listing environments applies only to “other nuclear explosion.” To remove ambiguity we suggest that article be reworded to read either: “To prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear explosion including weapons tests” or “the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.”

(c) Peaceful Uses. We agree to drop Article 2 on peaceful uses as requested Embtel 208.

(d) Formalizing Agreement. If three-environment test ban discussions go well, you will be required at some point to indicate view as to how agreement should be formalized. As President made clear in his press conference Wednesday, such agreement must be submitted for Senate ratification. If Soviets raise point you are authorized to state that President’s June 10 statement that U.S. would not be first to test again in atmosphere will continue to apply pending ratification, and assume that Soviets would adopt same policy. If satisfactory draft agreed, our current thought is that you and Hailsham should return to capitals to report, without signing. Within a week of your return to Washington you would go back to Moscow with high-ranking U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State and including Senators of both parties for official signing. All our soundings indicate great importance of maximum Senate consultation and involvement. Moreover, President does not wish to come to Moscow at this time, and we believe that Moscow as locus for signing is important to Soviets and is a concession against which this next to summit level can be bargained. However, if Khrushchev and Hailsham both press hard President might be prepared to meet Khrushchev and Macmillan at some neutral point outside of Soviet Union for signature, but you should not agree to any summit meeting without further instructions.

(e) Depository Arrangements. We would prefer to have UN as depository but recognize this raises question of Communist China and others. We would therefore be agreeable to a neutral depository, preferably Switzerland or Austria. Alternatively we would be prepared to have each of three original signatories act as a depository notifying the other two of the receipt of new signatures.

(f) Approaching Additional Signatories. You should explore how Soviets contemplate approaches to other potential signatory parties. Our preference is that this be covered by language in final communiqué urging adherence by all other states, to be followed up through diplomatic channels by original signatories.

(g) Adherence of East Germany, North Korea, etc. To permit adherence of entities that we do not recognize as states would suggest treaty language be modified to permit adherence by “all states or governmental authorities recognized by any of the original signatories.” Thus in accepting adherence we would not raise question of recognition.⁶

2. Static Observation Posts. While we understand your tactic of pushing for inclusion of this subject in NAP, we think that long-range objective should be to deal with static observation posts proposal independently. Whether or not NAP fails, we see value in achieving satisfactory static observation post agreement. Suggest you draw out Soviets on nature of zones they have in mind. FYI and for use in your discretion, we would favor inclusion of all of Soviet Union and United States. End FYI.

Would be desirable to end up with agreement that each side consult their Allies, leaving open how matter would be further pursued. We would be prepared, however, to transfer further discussions to Geneva.

3. Nonaggression Arrangement.

(a) Avoiding Tie to NAP. President remains deeply concerned that any tie to NAP be avoided both to prevent trouble with French and Germans and to avoid criticism from influential supporters of test-ban at home.

(b) Need for Broad Agreement. You should, of course, maintain position that we could not contemplate nonaggression arrangement unless it were broadened to include provisions relating to the security and stability of Berlin.

(c) Communiqué. Believe language reference communiqué your 191⁷ would unduly alarm Germans and French. We could, however, agree to following text: “The Three principals discussed the Soviet proposals for nonaggression arrangements under which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact would confirm their intention to comply strictly with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in their relations with one another. It was agreed that the three Governments would inform their respective Allies in the two organizations fully about these talks and consult them with a view to further consideration of this subject.”

4. Freezing Present Level of Forces in GDR and West Germany. Obviously this is unsatisfactory if limited merely to the two Germanies. Soviets could build up forces in other satellites and USSR, while US would have difficulty building up additional US forces outside of Germany. Even if Soviets prepared to broaden this proposal to include stabilization of force levels in all satellites, we do not feel this is a profitable subject to pursue at this time.

5. Proposal for Freezing Budgets. Experience shows that our ability to increase our defense budget in the face of threatened Soviet aggression is one of the most effective sanctions we command. Moreover, we do not believe it feasible to develop effective system of restraint through a budget-freezing in view of the special character of the Soviet economic system and the ability of the Soviet State to control costing and conceal expenditures. You should, therefore, make it clear, if Soviets seriously advance a proposal along this line, that we do not believe this is fruitful course to pursue. As a means of heading off serious consideration this question you might emphasize that any arms control through budgets would necessarily entail highly elaborate inspection arrangements.

6. With respect to both budgets and levels of forces, however, you should say—but not in communiqué—that US does not seek any increase in arms race—but rather the reverse—and if there can be growing confidence and genuine relaxation of tensions we would hope that force levels and budgets on both sides would begin to come down both by agreed measures of disarmament and by other actions which each side could take by its own decision. Unless international tensions increase, it is our current expectation that our 1964 military budget will be in the same general range as that submitted for 1963.

7. Nondissemination. Agree your recommendation in Embtel 195⁸ that you play down further discussions and request Hailsham to do the same.

8. Trade. If Soviets again inject issue of increased trade, you might reply that the US also is sympathetic to the idea of improving commercial relations and developing trade between our two countries. As the Soviets know, this involves complex technical questions on US side but we are making a fresh review of the possibilities in this field and it may be possible to work out some solutions of these technical problems. One of the difficulties is that the Soviets seem primarily interested in the purchase of prototypes of our sophisticated machinery and thus in obtaining our technology at low expense to themselves. We could take much more forthcoming attitude toward expansion of trade between our countries if we could work out ground rules between us that would include provision for the protection of industrial property (patents, copyrights, etc.) and protection against dumping. This seems necessary in order to facilitate trade between capitalists and state trading systems. We would be interested in their reaction to the possibility of working out such ground rules.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only—Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared in draft and substance with the President, Thompson, Ball, Bundy, and Read; and approved by Rusk. All those officials participated in a meeting on the test ban negotiations held at the White House from 6:30 to 7 p.m. that day. At the outset, “the comment was made that the Moscow delegation had ‘pact fever’ and needed to be slowed down.” In the course of the meeting, agreement was reached on several of the instructions contained in telegram 237. (Memorandum by Bromley Smith; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Negotiations, Harriman Trip) See the Supplement.
1. In telegram 208, July 18 (received at 3:20 p.m.), Harriman reported that at the plenary meeting that day, Gromyko “made a strong pitch” on the importance of the NAP and also tabled a version of the withdrawal article to be adopted if the others dropped the peaceful uses article. The Soviet text reads: “This treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the treaty three months in advance.” Harriman recommended acceptance of this text and removal of the peaceful uses article. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) A longer account of this meeting is in telegram 211 from Moscow, July 18. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
2. This point was made by Ball at the 6:30 p.m. meeting at the White House. “He added that when the Soviets resumed testing in 1961, their justification for their action was approximately the same as proposed in the withdrawal clause.”
3. See footnote 2, Document 329. This U.S.-U.K. proposal reads: “It is the anticipation of the parties that this treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely and shall be adhered to by all states, particularly those states that could be in a position to carry out an explosion prohibited by this treaty. If a party determines either that another party has failed to observe the terms of this treaty or that any other state has taken action which the parties have bound themselves herein not to take, the party will be free to reconsider its position. It is hereby understood and agreed, however, that the party may not withdraw from the treaty without first both consulting the other parties to the treaty and giving notice of at least 60 days. Such notice is effective only if given no sooner than 60 days and no later than 120 days after the determined date of the failure or action upon which the withdrawal is based.”
4. In telegram 218 to Moscow, July 17 (drafted by Rusk and cleared with McGeorge Bundy and Foster), Rusk emphasized Senate insistence on a withdrawal provision and suggested this text: “This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of a party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the treaty (and its Annexes) are not being fulfilled and observed or if any party to this treaty determines that nuclear explosions in prohibited environments or with prohibited effects have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party’s national security.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
5. Paragraph 1 of the text of Article I in telegram 183 reads: “Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes (except as provided in Article II) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion and the carrying out of any other nuclear explosion at any other place under its jurisdiction or control: A. in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, in outer space, or in the territorial high seas; or B. in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.” Article II was the withdrawal article.
6. This instruction was superseded by telegram 263 to Moscow, July 21 (drafted by Foster, cleared by the President and Bundy, and approved by Read). The language “states or governmental authorities” was not necessary because of “legal advice that this [existing language] does not constitute recognition of any unrecognized country signing subsequently because of multiple depositories.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
7. Dated July 18. (Ibid., DEF 4 Warsaw Pact)
8. Document 331.