Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

265. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 28, 1963, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy
• Mr. William E. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, WE

Among the subjects discussed was non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The Secretary observed that the U.S., several weeks ago, had asked for French comments on a draft proposal for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹ We had received no reply and did not know how to interpret French silence. He said that this case typified what he considered a lack of communication. Ambassador Alphand said that Ambassador Bohlen had seen Couve de Murville today on that subject. He read from a telegram and said that the French position was that the French had no objection to our discussing this proposal with the Soviets but that they could not give us a commitment that they approved in principle. It was not “their” negotiation, but “ours”. The French could not give their formal consent in advance to a negotiation in which they are not taking part.²

The Secretary said that there was no plan on our part to keep this a bilateral negotiation. We were not asking to act as France’s agent. Ambassador Alphand suggested that we should undertake discussions with the Soviets on this subject; if the Soviets asked about the French position we should ask about the Soviet position. The Secretary said that we would not act as go-between Moscow and Paris. He pointed out that we would be in an impossible situation if, in discussing this problem with the Soviets, we were completely uncertain about the position of one of our allies. We had received substantive comments on the proposal from the British and from the Germans. We had received no substantive comment from the French.

Ambassador Alphand gave his opinion that the French saw the following difficulties: 1) if Sino-Soviet relations do not improve, the Chinese Communists would not sign the proposal and there would be no agreement; on the other hand if these relations were to improve the agreement risked to be merely a piece of paper without much value. 2) The Soviet interpretation about non-proliferation differed from that of the U.S. The Soviets were opposed to nuclear weapons in the hands of other countries no matter where ultimate control rested. Consequently, the Soviets would insist on not stationing nuclear forces outside the territorial limits of the nuclear powers. For example, the Soviets have already said that they are opposed to the concept of the multilateral force.

The Secretary noted that this was a substantive comment. Ambassador Alphand said that these views had been expressed to the Secretary by Couve when he saw him last December. The Secretary said the Soviets might be prepared to withhold nuclear cooperation from the Chinese if the West withheld nuclear cooperation from the Germans. Ambassador Alphand asked whether the Soviets had said so. The Secretary said that the Soviets had not specifically said so but that there was a strong implication that this would be their position.

Ambassador Alphand asked whether the non-proliferation proposal was linked to the Berlin talks. The Secretary said that it was precisely in order to avoid such a link that we proposed to take up non-proliferation in a wider framework. Obviously, we certainly did not wish to conclude a bilateral agreement with the Soviets on non-dissem-ination of nuclear weapons to Germany.

Ambassador Alphand noted that the subjects that could be discussed with the Soviets were Berlin, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, arrangements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the problem of frontiers. He wondered which of these subjects would be discussed at this stage. The Secretary said perhaps eventually there could be exploration on other subjects than Berlin but only after considerable progress had been made on Berlin and then only after closest consultations with our allies. For example, we could hardly be expected to undertake exploratory talks on arrangements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO without having first obtained the full consent of NATO. Our purpose was to see what the Soviets had to propose with regard to access to Berlin and Western troop presence.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved in S on March 6. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. A memorandum of their discussion on U.S.-French relations is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 760–761.
1. Regarding this U.S. draft declaration, see Document 249.
2. In telegram 3447 from Paris, February 28, Ambassador Bohlen reported on his conversation that day with Couve de Murville. On non-proliferation, Couve took the same position as Ambassador Alphand. Bohlen “pointed out that you [Rusk] had discussed this matter with him last autumn following a conversation with Gromyko at the UN and had given him the document last December since which time we had had no French reaction. Couve merely repeated what he had said earlier but did say that if the Soviets reacted toward this document favorably and the Chinese seem disposed to join, the French Government would then be before a decision whereas now they were before a hypothesis. This was as much of a French position as I could get from Couve and he showed no disposition to take it up with de Gaulle or the French Government, which indicated to me that this had been the established French position.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) Bohlen’s telegram arrived in the Department at 4:25 p.m. on February 28, but the Secretary apparently did not see it before this meeting with Ambassador Alphand.