26. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Meeting of Committee of Principals on Nuclear Test Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
- (See Tab A)1
Meeting of Committee of Principals, May 23, 11 A.M.
Secretary Rusk put four questions to the Committee of Principals for a discussion of the nuclear weapons test negotiations. The four questions were:
- 1.
- Is there any real prospect that a treaty to ban tests will result from the present negotiations in Geneva?
- 2.
- Is there a real and serious national defense interest in testing nuclear weapons?
- 3.
- On political grounds, can we accept the notion of an uncontrolled ban on tests?
- 4.
- If we must resume nuclear weapons tests, what are the political considerations involved in doing so?
For an answer to the first question, Secretary Rusk turned to Ambassador Dean, who said that in his view the prospects for agreement were pretty dim at the present time. Ambassador Dean did not, however, wish to exclude entirely the possibility of agreement. He went on to say that the Soviet Union had been dissatisfied with the organization of the United Nations and that the Soviet Union clearly did not intend to let any organization have the independent power to influence matters in which the Soviet Union had a strong interest. For this reason, Ambassador Dean was inclined to think that the Soviet’s proposal for a tripartite Administrative Council was rather fundamental as a part of the Soviet over-all position. There nevertheless was a possibility—and this had been mentioned to Ambassador Dean by Mr. Krishna Menon—that the Soviet Union might be impressed by the lack of support for the tripartite proposal in the United Nations. But to sum up, Ambassador Dean could only report that the prospects for agreement in Geneva appeared “pretty dim”.
Secretary Rusk remarked that he could confirm the fundamental nature of the tripartite or “troika” proposal in Soviet thinking. Gromyko had told him that the security interests of the Soviet State must not be affected by decisions made by other people. The Secretary continued that the desire for general disarmament might also be fundamental in Soviet thinking. If the Soviet Union discovered that the “troika” was a bar to reaching agreements on disarmament, it was possible that the Soviets might conclude that it was more important to achieve disarmament than to retain the “troika” concept. At present, however, it was clear that the Soviets were promoting both disarmament and the “troika” idea with equal vigor.
Secretary Rusk then asked Ambassador Dean whether there was any doubt that the “troika” would paralyze the inspection machinery for the test ban treaty. Ambassador Dean replied that there was no doubt about it and he pointed as an example to the procedures for getting inspection teams quickly to the sites of suspicious events. If a single [Page 73] administrator were to be replaced by a debating society, the procedures for rapid implementation of the treaty would break down. Ambassador Dean thought some face-saving gesture to the Soviet Union might be made, such as offering to set up a three-man seismological advisory group to advise the Administrator on the eligibility of seismic events for inspection; the U.S., however, should not give in on the substance of this question.
Summing up discussion on the first question he had posed, the Secretary stated that all seemed in agreement that there was little present prospect for achieving a treaty in the test ban negotiations. There was no dissent from this.
The Secretary then turned to his second question, i.e., what was the national defense interest in testing?
Secretary McNamara said that he felt the gross advantage to the U.S. from a resumption of testing was substantial. In the first place, there would be a reduction in the costs of warheads which would be reflected even more importantly in the reduction of costs of delivery vehicles. This saving might amount to tens of billions of dollars over a period of years. Dr. Wiesner said he thought the savings would not begin to be realized until four or five years from now. To this, Secretary McNamara replied that in obligational terms this was not so far ahead.
In the second place, Secretary McNamara continued, there was a potential for the development of pure fusion weapons. [12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The end result would be that within a well defined circle it would be possible to knock out enemy troops while just outside this area, friendly troops would not be harmed. He noted that with ordinary nuclear weapons it was difficult to know just what the total effects would be, because of variations in meteorological conditions at the time of their use. [7 lines of source text not declassified]
Secretary McNamara concluded that it was possible, although it could not be guaranteed, that an effective anti-ICBM weapon could be developed if testing were resumed. He felt there was much to learn and much to gain in this field.
In response to a question by Secretary Rusk, Dr. Brown said that testing in the atmosphere probably would not be necessary to determine the kill radius of anti-ICBM weapons.
As to the net results to be expected from testing by the U.S., plus testing by the Soviet Union, Secretary McNamara stated that he could not give a very satisfactory answer. It was his personal opinion that the differential in weapons capability between ourselves and the Soviet Union would be at least as great in the future as it was today if both sides resumed testing. He concluded by stating that he strongly urged the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.
[Page 74]A discussion ensued as to the Soviet interest in nuclear weapons in relation to its objectives in the nuclear test ban conference. Secretary McNamara remarked that it was possible, of course, that the Soviet Union did not want a test ban. Dr. Wiesner said that the Soviet Union might have a different assessment from ours of whether nuclear weapons would be used in the future. Dr. Scoville noted that there was evidence that the Soviet Union had tested tactical weapons and Secretary McNamara said there was strong evidence that the Soviets were working vigorously on anti-ICBM weapons.
Dr. Wiesner noted that an asymmetry between the Soviet Union and the United States had developed in the ICBM field because the U.S. had developed small warheads which were more vulnerable to anti-ICBM efforts than were the larger warheads used by the Soviet Union. On the ground, the U.S.’s ICBMs were less vulnerable than the Soviets’, but on re-entry, they were more vulnerable. Secretary McNamara said that the Polaris and Minuteman missiles could be improved by further testing and that decoys could then be used more extensively. Dr. Wiesner said he believed the anti-ICBM problem was one of our most difficult technical questions and one which was least likely of being successfully solved. Dr. Brown agreed that it was extremely difficult to meet a strong, sophisticated and decoyed attack.
General LeMay added that one of the things wrong with missiles was their unreliability. If we could make warheads, and hence, missiles smaller we could afford to test more of them and thus increase their reliability. Secretary McNamara agreed that again a question of cost was involved.
Mr. McCloy asked Dr. Brown for his view of the results of resumed testing by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Dr. Brown replied that in the long run, since both sides have approximately the same capability, testing by both sides would result in the Soviet Union and the United States achieving approximate parity. However, which side needed nuclear weapons most was another question. For example, if both the Soviet Union and the United States were to develop smaller missiles, this would help the United States more than it would help the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union to begin with had an easier job of hiding its missiles. Dr. Scoville added that the Soviet Union might be behind the United States in the area of nuclear testing related to defense against ballistic missiles.
Returning to the question of the economic impact, Dr. Wiesner said he wished to make clear his belief that the savings which had been referred to would be realized several years ahead and not in the 1964-65 period. He finally wished to note that if the Soviet Union tested clandestinely, which it probably could, and the United States did not test, it [Page 75] would be bad for the United States both in terms of economics and in terms of the military situation.
Secretary Rusk asked whether the Department of Defense was worried about the Nth country problem. Secretary McNamara replied that he was concerned about the Nth country problem, but he could not see a clear relation between the test ban and this problem. What did concern Secretary McNamara was the possibility that some other country could develop [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
Ambassador Dean inquired whether testing limited to underground was acceptable or whether it might not be necessary to test in outer space. Dr. Brown said he felt that tests generally could be limited to underground although some of the more esoteric types of experiments might best be conducted in space. Dr. Wiesner said he felt the important consideration was that any United States’ testing should not produce fallout. Mr. McCloy asked whether underground tests involved the possibility of venting and whether the radioactivity had to be washed out from the site of the underground explosion. Dr. Brown said the possibility of venting was negligible if the site was properly chosen and the test occurred sufficiently far underground. As regards washing out the radioactivity, it was not necessary to do that. He noted that over the years since the Rainier tests, the radioactivity from that test had migrated distances measured only in tens of feet.
Turning to the third question which he had posed, namely the political acceptability of the notion of an uncontrolled ban on tests, Secretary Rusk said he felt there was a disadvantage in continuing a moratorium without control. Our position on the need for controls would be eroded if an uncontrolled moratorium were permitted to continue and we would be under increasing pressure to accept agreements without control. Mr. McCloy agreed with this assessment. With respect to the world reaction from a resumption of testing, Secretary Rusk said he felt there was an important difference between testing which would produce fallout and testing which would not produce fallout. The latter, Secretary Rusk stated, was a manageable political problem.
The Secretary then inquired how much could be done underground in the way of weapons development. Secretary McNamara said he thought a great deal could be done underground. Ambassador Dean asked about outer space tests, and Chairman Seaborg said we would not be ready for such tests within two years.
Dr. Wiesner said it was his opinion that the military considerations involved were so long range in nature that the political considerations should be the determining factors in timing the resumption of testing. Secretary McNamara said he would agree only if it were understood that a delay in resumption of testing would not mean an indefinite and perhaps permanent postponement of testing.
[Page 76]Secretary Rusk thought that tests should not be conducted for purely political reasons. If a test were conducted, it should be because of its military significance. Furthermore, he did not see much difference in the public reaction that could be expected as between seismic research detonations and a weapons test. He did not see much sense in “easing” into the testing of weapons. Secretary Rusk then inquired what the time lag was between instructions to prepare for testing and the actual test.
Chairman Seaborg replied that there was a continuous gradation in importance of individual weapons tests; there was no discontinuity between the more and the less important. Proof testing could begin ten weeks from the time the laboratories were asked to start preparations.
Ambassador Dean said he felt the United States should decide on which were the most fruitful tests and that these should be conducted first. It should be recognized that political repercussions could be expected from testing and if it were decided that the military importance of resuming tests was overriding, then the United States should resume tests in the most meaningful way possible. Chairman Seaborg noted that there was a weapons test [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which could be conducted in about ten weeks. He felt that perhaps all the possible tests might not be carried out at the end of the ten-week period because, to a certain extent, they interfered with each other. The test holes would be used up if all three shots were fired at about the same time.
Secretary Rusk then referred to his fourth question for discussion; the problem of working out the political considerations involved in resumption of tests. Mr. Murrow stated that nothing which had been said in the meeting would be very persuasive in convincing public opinion around the world of the need for U.S. resumption of tests. The public would not find convincing the argument that testing should be resumed because it will cut costs or because the kill radius could be increased or because there were some possible, but perhaps unlikely, improvements which might be made in anti-ICBM defenses. The only possibility of convincing the public in other countries of our need for testing would be if the President could say that the national security and indeed the national survival of the United States was at stake. Furthermore, the Soviet Union might even say that it would not test nuclear weapons and then proceed to test clandestinely. Mr. Murrow said he felt Ambassador Dean and Mr. McCloy had made great progress in selling the world on our proposals and on our appetite for the treaty. Secretary Rusk said our position should be built on the idea that the United States would stop testing if the Soviet Union modified its impossible positions in the test negotiations. Secretary McNamara agreed to the importance of this point.
(At this point Secretary Rusk left the meeting.)
Mr. McCloy said that we could not blink the fact that the reaction of the public around the world would be bad. There would be a worsening [Page 77] of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This might make the world more unstable and result in less security for the United States. There was a dilemma in this because while there were many political reasons for not testing, it was also true that an uncontrolled moratorium on testing might pull the whole rug out from under us on other disarmament matters. One thing was clear and that was that we could not let the conference drift.
Mr. McCloy said he had thought we might tell the Soviets that we would not discuss disarmament with them on July 31 nor would we table any disarmament plan until the question of the troika was settled. If the Soviet Union wished to take the question to the UN, this would be fine with the United States. We could say that the Soviet general and complete disarmament proposal is phony because what the Soviets are proposing is this tripartite Administrative Council which makes control futile.
Ambassador Dean remarked that the United Kingdom has been trying to persuade the United States to announce tests as a bluff. Ambassador Dean felt it was important, however, that the United States not announce tests until it is actually ready to conduct a nuclear test. Otherwise he felt UK support would vanish during the interim between announcement and actual test due to internal pressures in Britain.
Mr. McCloy asked how long a time would be required to prepare for weapons tests to improve the weight yield ratio or for tests like [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Chairman Seaborg said it would take longer than ten weeks to prepare for such tests. Ambassador Dean wondered whether tests in November or December might be an appropriate target date. This would be after the General Assembly discussions. Secretary McNamara said if a delay in tests meant that no test would occur for a long time and possibly not at all, he would have to oppose such a delay.
Dr. Wiesner stated that in his opinion the United States had begun to enjoy a good position in the nuclear test talks only recently and that we should capitalize on this. Before the present administration took over, few people were convinced that the U.S. really wanted a treaty. He saw no reason why the United States should not wait until November or December to conduct weapons tests if a public affairs buildup over that time were desirable. Secretary McNamara said that if it were decided to resume tests and if this were a definite intention, then whether the tests were held in July or December would make no difference. Mr. McCloy said he thought the Soviets needed a stimulus to show them they could not have the best of all worlds with things as they are. For this reason he would not mind having it known that the United States is preparing to resume tests even though we did not announce it. Mr. Kohler asked what would happen if a decision to test were made and then the Soviet Union [Page 78] said they would sign the Western treaty. Mr. McCloy and Ambassador Dean replied that the United States would be prepared to sign the treaty under those circumstances and to stop testing.
Secretary McNamara asked what would happen if a UN debate on nuclear testing took place and world opinion were mobilized against a resumption of tests. The United States might then decide to postpone resumption. It was this kind of possibility which worried him about delaying the resumption of tests. Dr. Wiesner said he assumed the United States would be able to use time to swing opinion to our side. Mr. Nitze said he felt we would not gain ground from the public opinion standpoint on resuming tests, but that we might gain ground on the troika question. Mr. Bundy said that a resumption of tests would probably mean the troika issue would be lost, also.
Mr. McCloy said he did not suppose a decision could be made today. The forthcoming meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev would, of course, be important in this connection.
Mr. McCloy then asked for opinions on his idea of not resuming disarmament negotiations until the Soviets dropped the troika proposal. Dr. Wiesner replied that we must distinguish between general and complete disarmament and reciprocal arms control measures. In some arms control measures only bilateral observation would be involved. In the general disarmament area, however, the troika proposal would become very important.
Ambassador Dean then referred to his original instructions of March 1961 and said that he had then been authorized to submit the “escalator” proposal on numbers of on-site inspections. He had not submitted the “escalator” proposal but recently the Soviets had been saying more seismic events occurred annually in the United States than in the Soviet Union, yet the United States asked for the same number of inspections for both the Soviet Union and the United States. Ambassador Dean said he felt it would be good negotiating tactics to emphasize to the Soviets at this point that we are willing to relate the number of on-site inspections to the number of events which actually occur, so that if twice as many events occur in the United States as in the Soviet Union, twice as many inspections would take place in the United States. We would then introduce our escalator proposal which would combine the fixed figure for inspections with the feature of adjusting the number of inspections to the number of events which actually occurred. It was generally agreed that this would be a helpful move.
The meeting adjourned at 1:00 p.m.