Office of the Historian

25. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, May 19, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Comments on McNamara Briefing Paper on Nuclear Test Resumption1

Neither this paper nor the Fisk Report2 alters my conviction that there is no great military gain to us from resumption of nuclear tests if the Soviets also resume. While nuclear technology is one area where we are probably well ahead, and we have many interesting new weapons possibilities, these presumably would also become available to the Soviets in time. Indeed, much of the DOD case is that if we don’t resume the Soviets may pull ahead.

[Page 71]

Thus to me the guts of the military case is not that we gain so much from testing, but that if we do not do so we run a growing risk of Soviet clandestine testing, which could result in a growing security disadvantage. While intelligence cannot demonstrate that the Soviets are or are not testing, the important thing is that their technical motivations for doing so are growing over time (just like ours). Presumably their ability to test clandestinely also increases with the time available for study and preparation. Thus our worries will grow with time.

DOD’s strong argument that advanced versions of present weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will permit us to produce cheaply thousands of nuclear weapons is highly inconsistent with our new strategic thinking. Even though the new models were smaller, cheaper, more economical, and less dangerous in fallout terms, they just wouldn’t give us a whole new capability beyond what we already have. The same argument seems to apply to smaller ICBMs. Sure they would be swell, but is there an imperative need for them?

The AICBM argument has more to it, but this is an unknown area where we have no assurance that testing will produce anything new.

In sum, I still feel that political arguments, rather than military, make the real case for test resumption. Given the history of US/USSR competition in military technology, we are kidding ourselves if we think that we can gain a real jump on the other guy (or he on us) if both test. However, I grant the military argument that if we continue to observe a voluntary, unpoliced moratorium at a time when clandestine testing by the enemy (if not already underway) becomes increasingly likely, we may find ourselves in a real box.

Bob K
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Test Ban Negotiations 4-6/61. Secret.↩
  2. Document 22.↩
  3. See Document 4.↩