Office of the Historian

237. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0

Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.

979. Policy. Khrushchev–Kohler—Part IV—U-2; Cuban fishing port; nuclear test-ban; US elections. [Here follows discussion of President Kennedy’s political talents, U-2 incidents, and a Cuban fishing port.]

Khrushchev said there were other basic problems still confronting our two countries. One was nuclear-test-ban. We are now very close on this issue. Only problem is that of underground tests. Soviets didn’t want these to continue since they were source of arms race. USSR is on even basis with us on underground testing. We should agree on proposals of English scientists. But President wants inspection, which Soviets will never accept. This is invention of American imperialists and monopolists. Soviets had arranged underground tests which US had detected and announced next day. So national means are clearly enough to detect underground tests.

I said I was familiar with recent exchanges on this subject, but wished to read to Chairman what I had written down after talking to President. (I then read applicable section instructions.)1 I said I might just add that we on our side, President, Secretary, Foster, and all concerned, had done our best to recognize their sensibilities and to reduce possibility they might view inspection as espionage. While unmanned seismic stations had greatly improved chances of detecting explosions or what [Page 588] seemed like explosions, there was nothing of which we knew that would replace a certain measure of inspection to determine whether certain events in particular were tests or natural events.

Khrushchev said statement by American scientists published two days ago admitted there were means to verify this.2

I said I thought this was an inaccurate statement. We had looked at all possibilities and were convinced no means existed to determine nature of event. Fact that event has occurred can be determined, but inspection is needed to establish what kind of event it was. Number of cases in which inspection would be necessary wold probably be infinitesimally small, but in those cases it would be necessary. Such inspection would also be helpful to USSR, since our scientists say there must be inspection to establish nature of event. I personally had no doubt that, if USSR said it would not test, then it would not. But there must be provision for objective observers to determine whether events were natural or not, or doubts would remain in rest of world.

Khrushchev said there were various points of view on that question and that is why there is no agreement. But Soviets had found out that there are means to determine nature of event without inspection. It was situation in Congress which prevented President from moving on this subject; he can’t convince Congress to agree and consequently holds on to argument about inspection.

I said Congress represents public opinion. Difference between us is now so small, President hopes we can come to agreement. But agreement must be ratified by Congress and Congressional opinion represents US public opinion. We had made every effort to reduce this so it would not be a problem for Soviets and President really hopes for agreement.

[Here follows discussion of the upcoming Congressional elections.]

Kohler
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. The telegram is one of seven that Kohler transmitted to the Department of State that reported on his 3-hour conversation with Chairman Khrushchev on the morning of October 16. This was Kohler’s first formal meeting as Ambassador. Their lengthy conversation was a tour d’horizon of U.S.-Soviet relations. Telegrams 970, 973, 974, and 982, as well as the full text of telegram 979 are printed in vol. V, Documents 146–150. Telegram 978 on Cuba is printed in volume XI; telegram 981 on Berlin is printed in vol. XV, pp. 359–362.↩

  2. The fourth point of Kohler’s instructions, dated September 6, read as follows:

    “(4) The President continues to regard an effective nuclear test ban as a matter of the greatest importance, and would like Ambassador Kohler to emphasize these two basic points: first, there is simply no way in which the President can bring the United States Senate to agreement on a comprehensive treaty without inspection; second, as the President sees it, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have three great common interests in a workable agreement:

    • “(a) the fallout problem
    • “(b) the hazard of high energy electrons contaminating outer space
    • “(c) and, perhaps most important of all, the common interest in discouraging other powers from acquiring nuclear weapons.” (Department of State, Central Files, 123-Kohler, Foy) Attached to these instructions is a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Kohler, September 6, that reads: “The President has approved these instructions as rewritten after his discussion with you.”

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  3. Not further identified.↩