Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

150. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, January 30, 1962, 1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Mr. Pierre Salinger
• Mr. A. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR
• Mr. Alexei Adzhubei, Editor-in-Chief, Izvestiya
• Mr. Georgi Bolshakov, Editor-in-Chief, USSR Magazine

The President had a conversation with Mr. Adzhubei both before and after the luncheon he and Mrs. Kennedy hosted for Mr. and Mrs. Adzhubei. The reporting officer was not present at the conversation after lunch. That conversation is reported on the basis of the information given by the President to the drafter. The following subjects were discussed before lunch:

1. Cuba

Mr. Adzhubei stated that he had had two conversations with Castro, each lasting about three hours. Castro had been rather reasonable in his remarks about the United States, but in view of the strain in US-Cuban relations, had not asked Mr. Adzhubei to convey any message to the President. Mr. Adzhubei wondered whether the United States realized that by its unfriendly attitude toward Castro it was pushing Cuba farther and farther away.

The President emphasized that the strong reaction in the United States toward events in Cuba was due to the fact that over the past hundred and some odd years, the United States had had no hostile power close to its borders. Therefore, when a group which preached hostility toward the United States seized power in Cuba, the reaction in the United States was bound to be very strong. The US was psychologically unprepared for such a change. The President pointed out that the USSR would have the same reaction if a hostile group arose in the vicinity of its borders. In this connection, the President referred to the Soviet reaction to the Hungarian uprising.

2. Laos

The President emphasized that the United States intends to use every means to influence the Boun Oum Government to accept the formation of a Government under Souvanna. He said that he realized that on both sides in Laos there were groups who desired renewal of military action. On the one side, there are people who believe that they would win in that event; while on the other side, on the right, there are people who think that resumption of hostilities would involve the United States.

Mr. Adzhubei wondered whether the United States, proceeding from the premise of false contradictions between the USSR and China, was seeking to delay the solution of the Laotian question and to exploit the Laotian situation for the purpose of aggravating Sino-Soviet relations.

The President categorically denied that the United States was seeking to exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations over the Laotian question. He said that such policy would be unwise. However, he said it was his belief that theUSSR, just as the US, was more interested in a peaceful solution of the Laotian situation than China. He said he thought that both the US and the USSR were interested in a peaceful solution in Laos because Laos was far from either of the two countries and was not an area of vital interest to them. The President reiterated that the US was going to make every effort to get the Boun Oum Government to accept a reasonable solution under Souvanna. He expressed the hope that both sides would exert their influence during the next few days in order to prevent renewal of hostilities, which would be fraught with disastrous consequences.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he was gratified to hear the Presidentʼs views and that he would report them immediately to Moscow. However, he said he was sorry that the US and theUSSR seemed to be having less difficulty in finding a mutual accommodation on matters that are not vitally important to them, rather than on those in which they have vital interests.

3. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The President observed that one of the basic tenets of US foreign policy is that the US is opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He recalled, in this connection, his statement during the interview he gave Mr. Adzhubei last fall.¹ The President reiterated that the US is opposed to Germanyʼs acquiring nuclear weapons, just as it is opposed to any other Statesʼ acquiring such weapons. He referred to the fact that the US has not given France any information necessary for the development of a nuclear capability. In response to Mr. Adzhubeiʼs question as to whether the US was opposed to giving nuclear weapons to NATO as a group of States, the President said that such an arrangement might be one way of discouraging individual States from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. He said that the United States was concerned that at some point France would realize how expensive development of nuclear weapons and of means of delivery was, and that at that point, West Germany and France might join forces in their effort to develop a nuclear capability of their own. A multilateral arrangement with regard to control of nuclear weapons might be a solution to this problem. However, the President expressed doubt that a satisfactory formula for such an arrangement could be found.

Mr. Adzhubei reacted rather impulsively to this statement by the President, saying that if nuclear weapons were given to NATO, they would also be given to the Warsaw Pact. He said that the Warsaw Pact would have less difficulty in developing a formula. He then said that the President should stop reading diplomatic despatches and should send someone who could give him a first-hand account of what is really going on in the Soviet Union. He said that the Soviet people are peace-loving and friendly, but also tough and full of resolve and can resort to extreme measures. This led to a discussion on Berlin.

4. Berlin

The President pointed out that Berlin was a very involved situation and that it would be rather difficult to find a perfect solution for it. However, he did not see why at least a temporary arrangement satisfactory to both sides could not be found. After all, he said, no one knew what situation would prevail five or ten years from now. He observed that there was no need in telling him that the Soviet people were tough and full of resolve because he knew that very well and was quite familiar with the history of the past war. In any event, this was not the point. The American people were also tough, and could also resort to extreme measures. The question is how to avoid resort to extreme measures—and this is the task of leadership. In spite of French wishes to the contrary, the US had engaged in conversation with theUSSR in Moscow, hoping that later negotiations could be transferred to a higher level. However, the Soviet memorandum² given Ambassador Thompson at his second meeting with Mr. Gromyko seemed to be a step back to where we had been before; and, in fact, created the impression that the Soviet Union slammed the door in front of Ambassador Thompson.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he was not familiar with the details of the talks between Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Gromyko.

The following topics were discussed during the conversation after luncheon:

1. Cuba

Mr. Adzhubei wondered whether the US would prefer Cuba to develop into a State like Yugoslavia or have it drift in the direction of China. He noted that there were quite a few Chinese in Cuba. He emphasized that, primarily because of Cuban fears of US invasion, the USSR was seeking to help Cuban economy and was buying more sugar from Cuba than it really needed and was pumping more money into that country than it really wanted to. He also raised the question of Cuban volunteers and inquired whether the US intended to invade Cuba.

The President replied in the negative.

2. Germany and Berlin

The President went over the text of the Soviet memorandum given Ambassador Thompson, and there was some conversation which was rather inconclusive.

3. Sino-Soviet Relations

Mr. Adzhubei admitted some differences between China and the USSR, but emphasized that China and the USSR would be together if there was any aggression.

4. The Molotov Situation

At one point, Mr. Adzhubei said that Mr. Khrushchev was of the opinion that if a plebiscite had been taken in 1957, Molotov would have obtained 95% of the votes and he only 5%. On the other hand, if a poll were taken today, it would be Mr. Khrushchev who would obtain 95% of the votes and Mr. Molotov would get only 5%.

Throughout the conversation, both before and after lunch, Mr. Adzhubei seemed to emphasize that he is regarded in the Soviet Union as Mr. Khrushchevʼs “American boy.” He also expressed his concern about what he seemed to regard as humiliations. In this connection, he referred to some press story which said that he had actually imposed himself on Mr. Salinger, as well as to the way the matter of the Attorney Generalʼs possible visit to the USSR and the Salinger-Kharlamov meeting in Paris had been handled with the press. At one point, he remarked that he had certain ambitions and that he did not wish to die politically.³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series,USSR, Adzhubei Interview. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky on January 31. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is a double-spaced draft.
1. See Document 134.
2. Regarding this memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, pp. 751–755.
3. Kennedy and Adzhubei resumed their conversation at 6:30 p.m. January 31. For a memorandum of this part of the conversation, devoted almost entirely to Berlin, see ibid., pp. 780–784.