A briefing paper and an advance copy of Mr. McCloy’s memorandum are attached for your use at the
proposed meeting.
Enclosure
BRIEFING PAPER
FUTURE UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
SOVIETS ON THE TEST BAN
Mr. McCloy has forwarded a
memorandum on this subject (copy at Tab A) for discussion at an early
meeting of the Committee of Principals, which he has proposed for
Monday, 22 May. This memorandum, with more emphasis on the political
aspects, covers the same ground as Dr. Harold
Brown’s memorandum to you of 13 May 1961, Subject:
Department of Defense Policy on Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests.
Mr. McCloy’s memorandum sets
forth accurately the current situation at Geneva, and states it is clear
that the intent of the Soviet negotiators
[Page 68]
is to avoid a prompt conclusion of a test ban
agreement. He poses two questions to be decided:
- A.
- Should the U.S. sometime in June or July of 1961 indicate that
it is preparing to resume nuclear tests?
- B.
- Should the U.S. actually detonate a nuclear device prior to
July 31, 1961, and, if so, what sort of a nuclear device should
be detonated?
The memorandum then covers objectively the arguments for and against the
resumption of nuclear testing. Mr. McCloy concludes that if, after a final approach to Mr.
Khrushchev by the President
and Mr. Macmillan, there is no
significant change in the Soviet approach, the United States, acting in
concert with the United Kingdom, should indicate that it is preparing to
resume nuclear weapons tests, at the same time indicating the U.S. does
not propose to test on the surface of the earth, in the ocean or in the
sensible atmosphere. (This answers Question A.)
The memorandum then explores arguments for and against the detonation of
a nuclear weapon or other device before July 31, 1961, and implies that
a test of a nuclear weapon before that date would
not be in our best interests. A nuclear detonation in the seismic
research program (Vela Uniform) is indicated to be preferable. (This
states an implied answer to Question B.)
Mr. McCloy then makes seven
detailed recommendations (Section V, pages 22-24). These appear
generally consistent with the recommended Defense position on resumption
of nuclear weapon testing which was submitted by DDR&E on 13 May
1961 for the Secretary’s approval, and can be supported by Defense
subject to the following comments:
- a.
- Recommendations 1 and 2 state in substance that if, after a
high level approach to Mr. Khrushchev, no significant change ensues in the
Soviet attitude, the U.S. should decide to resume nuclear
weapons testing. Although not stated in the recommendations, the
text of the memorandum (top of Page 11) states that “the U.S.,
acting in concert with the U.K.,
should indicate that it is preparing to resume nuclear weapons
tests.” In view of the past reluctance of the U.K. in this matter, the U.S. should
be prepared to proceed unilaterally if necessary.
- b.
- Recommendation 4 states that the announcement would indicate
that the U.S. “considers itself free to resume weapons testing
and that it plans to do so as soon as this will afford it an
advance in weapons development of major military significance.”
Perhaps the U.S. in a public announcement should not be this
specific, but should state the testing is essential to U.S.
national security.
- c.
- The last sentence of Recommendation 4 states that it should be
indicated the U.S. has no plans to test on the surface of the
earth or in the sensible atmosphere, while the text of the
memorandum (second paragraph, Page 11) also includes “in the
ocean.” Defense would prefer the less restrictive language in
the recommendation, and preferably some more general language
regarding “tests which will produce relatively insignificant
radiation effects.”
