222. Memorandum of Conversation0
Washington, August 23, 1962, 3
p.m.
SUBJECT
- Non-diffusion of Nuclear Weapons
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Anatoliy F.
Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy
- Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
- The Secretary
- William R. Tyler, Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs
- William O. Anderson, EUR/SOV
The Ambassador called by appointment at his own request. He opened the
conversation by stating that he had received, and was instructed to convey
to the Secretary, a message from Foreign Minister Gromyko responding to the Secretary’s
message of August 8.1 (Note: Subsequent to the conversation
Mr. Anderson informally obtained from
Counselor Kornienko a Russian text of the Gromyko message;2 a translation is attached.) In brief,
the message from the Foreign Minister noted that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. positions now appear to be quite
close as regards the non-transfer problem. It is proposed that an
international undertaking be sought involving three points: (1) an
obligation on the part of the nuclear powers not to hand over to non-nuclear
states nuclear weapons or the technical information necessary for their
production; (2) an obligation on the part of non-nuclear states not to
produce and not to acquire from other states nuclear weapons, and also not
to receive technical information necessary for their production; (3) there
should also be excluded the transfer of nuclear weapons through military
alliances to those states which do not possess them, i.e., the transfer of
such weapons in an indirect manner, irrespective of whether or not the
national armed forces of these states are component parts of the armed
forces of any military alliance.
A question now arises concerning the steps which should be taken next. It
would seem that the four nuclear powers, the U.S., U.K., France and the U.S.S.R.,
should take the initiative in attempting to formulate an international
agreement to which other powers would be invited to adhere.
[Page 557]
The Secretary commented that, as he understood the presentation, the position
outlined by Foreign Minister Gromyko
would appear to be a constructive and positive step forward. He then
stressed that it is very important that there be no misunderstanding as
regards the third point mentioned in the Gromyko message. The Secretary stated carefully that we are
ready to agree not to transfer weapons directly to a non-nuclear nation and
we are likewise willing to agree not to pass nuclear weapons indirectly
through a military alliance to a non-nuclear power. However, it must be
clear that alliance arrangements as regards the possible use of nuclear
weapons constitute a subject which, as the Ambassador well knows, has been
under discussion on our side for some time. We cannot now define the
hypothetical formula upon which the alliance on our side may agree; however,
it should be clear that we would not use an alliance arrangement for the
purpose of passing nuclear weapons indirectly to a non-nuclear power. The
Secretary reminded the Ambassador that we had discussed this matter in some
detail on several occasions with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva and it is highly
desirable that the Foreign Minister not misunderstand the U.S. position on
this point. The Ambassador stated that he understood the Secretary’s concern
and would report this point fully to the Soviet Government.
Attachment3
MESSAGE FROM SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO SECRETARY
RUSK, DELIVERED ORALLY BY
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO THE SECRETARY AUGUST 23, 1962
Your message regarding the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, sent to me
through Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin,
concerns a question to which the Soviet Government attaches great
significance. During our conversations in Geneva I told you that the
Soviet Government is in favor of preventing the further diffusion of
nuclear weapons in the world. The Soviet Government has already put
forward proposals on this matter in the General Assembly of the UN as well as in the Committee of Eighteen
in Geneva. It is apparent from your message that the position of the
United States Government at the present time is close to the position of
the Soviet Government on this question. It is clear that between us
there are no differences
[Page 558]
concerning the fact that an agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear
weapons should contain provisions under which the nuclear powers would
take upon themselves the obligation not to make nuclear weapons
available to other states and the latter [would assume]4 the obligation
not to receive or produce such weapons.
As you will recall, during the course of our discussion of this question
in Geneva, I pointed to the importance of avoiding the possibility of
transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers through military
alliances. You then declared the readiness of the United States to find
a formula which would exclude the transfer of nuclear weapons to
national possession through the agency of military alliances and blocs.
It is in this light that the Soviet Government is also examining the
words contained in your message to the effect that the U.S. and the
USSR could reach an agreement
regarding the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to national armed forces
of other countries, not only directly but also indirectly, i.e., through
blocs such as NATO. In other words, the
agreement should guarantee the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to the
national forces of non-nuclear states also in those cases where such
forces are component parts of the armed forces of one military bloc or
another.
Thus, inasmuch as there is between us in essence agreement relative to
the contents of the agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons,
the next step could be the working out of the concrete provisions of
such an agreement.
From the exchange of opinions between us it follows that the basic points
of an agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons should clearly
be the following:
- 1.
- An obligation on the part of the nuclear powers not to hand
over to non-nuclear states nuclear weapons or the technical
information necessary for their production;
- 2.
- An obligation on the part of non-nuclear states not to produce
and not to acquire from other states nuclear weapons, and also
not to receive technical information necessary for their
production;
- 3.
- There should also be excluded the transfer of nuclear weapons
through military alliances to those states which do not possess
them, i.e., the transfer of such weapons in an indirect manner,
irrespective of whether or not the national armed forces of
these states are component parts of the armed forces of any
military alliance.
What course of action would it be advisable to take in order to achieve
practical results more quickly with respect to preventing the diffusion
of nuclear weapons? I think that the nuclear powers could already agree
on the necessity of working out an appropriate agreement. It is quite
obvious that all powers which possess nuclear weapons, i.e., the USSR, the U.S., England and France, could
undertake an initiative for the
[Page 559]
preparation of an appropriate international agreement which would be
proposed for the signature of all governments.
We are prepared to continue maintaining contact with you concerning this
question through our Ambassador in Washington.
