221. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State0
Disto 799. For Secretary and Foster from Dean. In various conversations with Kouznetsov (Sov), other than at formal meetings, he does not hesitate to speak in English, speaks warmly of his post-graduate work and stay in the United States, emphasizes great admiration Soviet people have for US technical achievements and absolute necessity of our solving both nuclear test ban and disarmament problems. Speaks warmly of his friendship for Foster and of their excellent cooperation at surprise attack conference in 1958, and recalls gifts of Life of Lincoln and Lee.
Yesterday he expressed great admiration for my practical approach to problems and cordially invited me but in rather casual than formal terms to come to Soviet Union to see Khrushchev, preferably before UNGA, but at any time.
Nevertheless, despite the fact he is seemingly more gracious and more cordial and outgiving than Zorin, believe it is largely a surface cordiality [Page 555] and he is actually somewhat harder and tougher than Zorin, who is always polite but more of a skilled technician. Kouznetsov never fails in a charming way to extol the virtues of the Soviet Union, the Russian people, and Communism, and to ridicule in a polite way failings of American system.
Constantly talks about necessity breaking down economic barriers in trade between US and USSR and firm necessity of our standing shoulder to shoulder together in solution world’s problems and tends by subtle form of flattery to indicate that if we two were left together, we could easily solve problems.
Cannot detect any evidence of any softening in Soviet position and in fact detect slight hardening in general tone, although it would be difficult to fasten on any particular words or expressions to prove this with evidence.
Believe they fully intend to carry out their present series of atmospheric tests and they look upon Padilla Nervo’s suggestion as another uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on underground testing;1 though when I point out we would be against this, Kouznetsov’s answer is “Let’s not use the word ‘moratorium’.” Or “Let’s not speak of inspection or control.” “Let us just say that neither of us will conduct underground tests, as inspections are no more necessary in connection with underground tests than they are with respect to atmospheric.”
Advises definitely he will not go to UNGA and in respect to question as to whether Khrushchev would, stated he was uninformed.
Believe that theories which I have heard often expressed that Kouznetsov was sent here to expound easier policy on test ban and disarmament is so far not warranted by actual facts, and that their principal aim is to get us to stop testing underground.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-2362. Secret.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 193.↩