Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

182. Memorandum of Meeting⁰

Washington, May 14, 1962.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador Dean and Mr. Foster called on the President to report on the progress of the disarmament negotiations at 10:00 A.M., Monday, May 14, 1962. Ambassador Dean gave his judgment that we are making good progress in Geneva. The eight neutrals are generally well disposed toward us, and we have convinced them that we have a serious commitment to disarmament. Our draft treaty has generally been very well received. The Indians are an exception: Lall¹ has been undercutting us in every way possible. In response to the President’s question as to whether Lall was a fellow traveler, Mr. Foster expressed the view that he was a Communist. Ambassador Dean indicated that he and Zorin had managed to hold their meetings as co-chairmen in a quiet, business-like and non-polemical key. On the time schedule, he indicated that we now plan to work on in Geneva until the 15th of Aug. and adjourn until the end of September, having overcome Soviet opposition to continuing the session.

Ambassador Dean answered the President’s question as to whether the delegates viewed disarmament as a real possibility, in the affirmative. He indicated his own reasons for thinking that the U.S. had to consider this as a real possibility in terms of the mounting costs of armaments. Zorin, on the other hand, clearly viewed the Geneva conference as merely an occasion for propaganda. It was Zorin’s basic view that the West could not accept disarmament, because the Communists would succeed in their “wars of liberation” once we were disarmed. However, Ambassador Dean stated that in his judgment, the problems of cost and fear of falling behind the United States in the arms race would have an effect on Soviet thinking.

Ambassador Dean raised several problems he now has with our draft treaty outline in terms of certain repeated criticism from the neutrals:

1. Reductions by type and production by category in the first stage leaves open the possibility of a large change in the composition of weapons in favor of newer types.

2. Lack of a definite time limit in the third stage and thus lack of a time period for the achievement of General and Complete Disarmament. Mr. Foster commented on Senatorial opposition to a definite time limit.

3. Provision for a veto on transitions between stages by permanent members of the Security Council. Ambassador Dean suggested that a specification of conditions which must be met before transition could take place would be a desirable substitute for a veto.

4. The inability to discuss non-transfer of nuclear weapons. The Soviets were pressing hard on this issue, and the neutrals were much interested in it. The President indicated that he thought our present position on this matter was correct, and that we must save the issue for discussions in the Berlin context. Ambassador Dean indicated that he did not think the support for a denuclearized zone in Africa was strong. The Nigerians believed the South Africans would not accept it, and they certainly could not accept it if the South Africans did not.

The President commented that we could not discuss a denuclearized zone in Europe. Ambassador Dean indicated that he had received a personal letter from Segni,² requesting that this matter not be brought up because if it were the Italian delegation would have to support it in order to maintain the support of the Socialists for the government.

Ambassador Stevenson’s letter to the President of May 10³ was discussed. Ambassador Dean and Mr. Foster explained that we were already pressing points a. through d. of that letter. The question of a new test ban treaty was raised. It was agreed that now is not the time for a new offer. We should be prepared, however, to make a new offer after the Soviets tested. Mr. Foster indicated that he was examining with the interested agencies the possibilities of an atmospheric test ban treaty. The question of whether an atmospheric treaty was better than one which extended to other environments but with a less rigorous control system was raised, but left open. Mr. Foster undertook to prepare a response to Stevenson’s letter.

Mr. Foster indicated that the Business Council had received him cordially and supported the Administration’s effort with respect to disarmament.

CK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current, 5/62-8/62. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. In a May 14 note to Bundy, attached to another copy of the memorandum, Kaysen wrote: “As you can see from the attached, Dean did nearly all the talking. I don’t know whether the record makes clear the only impression I got from the thing: Dean’s confidence that he is doing a great job is unlimited. The President was not very much interested and had relatively little to say. He expressed no opinion on any of the specific questions that Dean raised. (p. 2) Foster’s purpose, I think, was to get Presidential support to deny all these requests. At the moment none of them is pressing although I think we will require some give in our position on the first three in order to continue the discussions.” (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 5-6/62)
1. Arthur S. Lall, Indian Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.
2. Antonio Segni, President of Italy.
3. Document 181.