Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

181. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, May 10, 1962.

Dear Mr. President: I believe the moment is approaching for us to make a new proposal for a test ban treaty which will stand a better chance of acceptance than anything we have yet put forward.

Such a proposal may offer the only method of preventing a non-stop series of competitive nuclear tests in the atmosphere. I have little doubt that if, as we expect, the Russian test in the near future, there will be strong pressure for a “follow on” series of American tests in 1963, to which the Russians will again respond. I do not believe we stand to benefit in the long run, either technically or politically, from unrestricted atmospheric testing. It is bound to result in a rising tide of protest all over the world.

I therefore recommend, along lines I proposed before we resumed atmospheric testing, that at the first useful opportunity we offer the Russians a test ban treaty providing for detection and location of nuclear explosions through existing systems, with a right to a limited number of on-site inspections for suspicious underground events. If accepted, such a treaty would stop atmospheric testing and provide some deterrent even to clandestine underground testing. Since underground tests now seem to be of only minor importance for security purposes, we should today be able to accept less stringent controls for underground shots than we have previously demanded.

I believe we should make this proposal at the first useful opportunity, certainly well before the beginning of the September 1962 General Assembly session. If the Russians refuse to agree to any on-site inspection by outside authorities—as they do today—we should then be prepared to offer a simple atmospheric test ban treaty without international controls.

An initiative of this kind is required not only to stop atmospheric tests, but also because we have not persuaded third parties that we really need the volume of international control on which we have been insisting for a test ban covering the most significant tests—namely, atmospheric and large underground explosions. It would be a pity if we were forced by outside pressures grudgingly to accept a stripped-down treaty after long resistance. Instead, we have an opportunity here to exercise real leadership, if we move in the right direction in time. And if our efforts should fail, there would be no question where the responsibility for continuing nuclear competition rested.

Turning to disarmament, I observe that after the opening flurry and the debate on testing, the Geneva Conference has tended to bog down. To maintain hopes for progress, and to demonstrate our continued interest in helpful initial steps, I suggest that:

a. We continue to press for Soviet agreement to take up the question of measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. It seems to me that this is the most timely possible initial step, and we ought to push the Russians unmercifully on it.

b. We should accept the Russian proposal to start talking about measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Of course we may have to tangle with them on the precise terms of an agreement on this subject. We favor the “Irish resolution” formula, which would prohibit transfer to states but permit us to carry on with NATO-type arrangements for multilateral control of nuclear weapons;¹ the Soviets may press for “Swedish resolution” arrangements precluding this type of transfer as well.² But I think we can be perfectly straightforward in justifying our position, and that we can gain considerable support for it. I believe it is in both the Russian interest and our own to prevent China and Germany from acquiring an independent nuclear capability. I am not aware that we have carefully explored the possibilities of using this factor to reach agreement with the Russians on the no-transfer problem.

c. I suggest a further look at the idea of agreeing to the establishment of denuclearized zones. I believe we should be able to distinguish between areas where nuclear defense is critically important to us and areas where it is not. We suffered badly in the General Assembly last Fall through our inability to agree to a resolution proposing a denuclearized zone in Africa. If the African states want one—and this is not entirely clear as regards all of them—I do not see why we should not support their wishes. The same is true of Latin America. We could logically demand inspection provisions to ensure compliance.

d. I believe we should make a specific proposal, apart from a full disarmament treaty, for an inspected agreement to bar weapons of mass destruction from orbit. This would involve inspection to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction were included in vehicles launched into orbit. There may be some risk in permitting international inspection of our launchings, but I should think, first, that inspection limited to this single purpose would not have to compromise most other classified information on vehicles, equipment, propellents, etc., and second, that we would gain at least as much from participating in inspection of the Russians as they would from inspection of our launchings. In any event, given the present Soviet phobia on inspection, I think we could get the advantage of a “no bombs in orbit” proposal without much probability that the Russians would ever agree—though if they did I think we would still be the gainers.

Finally, as regards the peaceful uses of outer space, I am happy to note that my earlier concern about our failure to report to the U.N. on short-term orbiting vehicles has now been largely dissipated. Beginning with our next report to the U.N. I understand we shall list in our reports vehicles which were launched and have decayed between successive reporting dates. This will include all of our reconnaissance satellites to date. We may be criticized because we shall not report the orbital characteristics of such vehicles. I believe we could do so in general terms without sacrificing any vital security interest. But at least our current position is a great advance over the situation which has hitherto existed.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5-1062. Secret. Attached to the source text is a May 11 note from Stevenson to Secretary Rusk, indicating that the enclosed is “a copy of a letter I delivered to the President today.”
1. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI), unanimously approved by the General Assembly on December 4, 1961; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
2. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI), passed by the General Assembly on December 4, 1961; for text, see ibid., p. 693. See also Document 97.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.