Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

167. Teletype Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy⁰

London, April 5, 1962.

T 183/62. Message is in two parts. Part 1 begins.

Dear friend

Thank you very much for your message of April 3 about nuclear tests.¹ I have discussed the problem with my Cabinet colleagues today.

We are all agreed that there should in any event be a joint statement by us both in the next ten days or so. The question as to whether I should in addition send another letter to Khrushchev is in their view nicely balanced.

I am not really so much concerned with the public opinion of Britain at the present time. In my experience that always stabilises itself in the long run behind what is right and sensible. But my colleagues are interested by your thought that there might be advantage in such an approach from the whole Western point of view. There is always the off chance that Khrushchev would accept the principle of on the spot verification. That of course would be an enormous advantage from the point of view of the future of the world even though it might, and I am sure you have thought of this, cause us both some immediate difficulty. If he did accept it would be almost impossible for you not to hold up the tests to see whether an effective treaty could be got. It would also, I think, imply that we might be forced to the position of agreeing that there would be no static stations on Russian soil.

Another possibility is that Khrushchev might ask for a summit for discussion either at Geneva or elsewhere. If he did so without clearly accepting verification by on the spot international inspection then we would stand firm and be in a strong position. But if he accepted verification and asked for a meeting on this basis it would be difficult to refuse.

In other words, if he accepts we are in the short run in some difficulty as to how to proceed but in the long run we will have secured an immense advantage which the whole of humanity will welcome. So, on the whole, I am inclined to send a letter on the lines of the attached draft.²

There is one subsidiary point which I think could easily be overcome. We would be asked why I wrote this letter and why it was not a joint one. My reply will be that since Bermuda we have been in the closest consultation about every step, and that it had been our practice sometimes to operate singly and sometimes jointly in our dealings with the Russians.

I would be grateful if you would think this over and send me your view either by this wonderful new teleprinter system or by telephone call.

With warm regard

Harold Macmillan

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Joint US/UK Statement on Nuclear Testing 4/10/62, 3/62-4/62. Top Secret.
1. Document 166.
2. Not printed.