Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

166. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan⁰

Washington, April 3, 1962.

Dear Friend:¹ Your letter of March 30² raises again the question of a last appeal to Khrushchev on the test ban treaty. I agree with you that if we are ever to make a last statement on nuclear testing, the time is coming soon. I should think some time next week would be good.

What needs to be said is familiar. The discussions in Geneva have done much to clarify in the minds of others what we have understood for some time, that detection and identification are two separate problems, and identification is the hard one. No matter how we arrange to detect seismic events that might or might not be nuclear explosions, the only way we can always verify the proposition that a given event is not a nuclear explosion is by on-the-spot inspection. Thus, some provision for on-the-spot inspection by international teams is a necessary part of a satisfactory treaty. If the Soviets continue to rule out any inspection as an element in any test ban treaty, further discussion of the subject at this time is useless. If Khrushchev should reverse the previous Soviet position on this point, it might just be possible to resolve whatever outstanding issues there are about the nature and location of detection systems in such a way as to get an effective treaty before our tests are scheduled to begin, and it would be worthwhile to try.

However, I must confess that I am not optimistic about the prospects of securing such a reversal of the Soviet position. It seems clear to me that the Soviets have decided both that they wish to test again and that they are not now prepared to accept any system of international inspection on their territory.

Nonetheless, I agree with you that it is useful to make a last statement, for whatever chance it may have of succeeding, and to keep our position clear to the end. I think it important that any statement should define the issue sharply enough in terms of inspection and verification that it offer Khrushchev no occasion to start a fruitless discussion on the subsidiary issues of location and ownership of detection stations.

Your proposed draft of March 24 appears to me to be a good basic document,³ although we have some suggestions which we will be discussing within the next 24 hours with David Ormsby Gore.

I have written in terms of a statement and not of a joint appeal because I do not think that I myself can join in a renewed direct communication to Khrushchev on this matter. I do not quite share the view that the statements made by Soviet representatives cannot be taken as authoritative, and opinion in this country would not hold that a further appeal from me to Khrushchev was appropriate or constructive. On the other hand, I also do not share your feeling that an appeal from you alone will lack its own effectiveness, and I can even see some advantage in your taking this course, from the general Western point of view. I refer to a joint statement only because you have indicated that you would prefer not to act independently.

Sincerely

John F. Kennedy⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4–362. Top Secret. The source text bears a typed notation: “Send thru Department, night action, Eyes Only for Bruce for earliest delivery Wednesday a.m. (April 4) to the Prime Minister—from the President.” The text was transmitted in telegram 5292 to London, April 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4–362)
1. The salutation is written in an unidentified hand.
2. Not printed. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961–1962) See the Supplement. Secretary Rusk frankly expressed, “in a preliminary way,” U.S. reservations to the proposals in Macmillan’s letter at a meeting with Ambassador Ormsby Gore on March 30. (Memorandum of conversation, March 30; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-3062) See the Supplement.
3. Attached to a March 24 letter from Ormsby Gore to McGeorge Bundy is an undated draft text of a joint statement the two nations might issue on the nuclear testing issue. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K, 1961-1962) See the Supplement.
4. The closing and President Kennedy’s signature are written in an unidentified hand.