Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

163. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball⁰

Washington, March 22, 1962, 6 p.m.

Ball: I just had a talk with Dean Rusk¹ and I wanted to give you the burden of it. He said that at dinner tonight Gromyko had shown a certain amount of interest in the modus vivendi, which he had given him early this afternoon.² He’s holding out and putting off talking about it seriously; instead of coming back Monday evening he might wait and continue it a day or two. He just has to play it by ear.

The President: Right.

Ball: [Here follows discussion of Berlin.] On the nuclear test business, he is going to make his statement tomorrow.³ He is going to highlight the things that you had in mind. We are sending him over a text tonight which has already been telephoned over and which is being cabled over to follow.⁴ It attempts to emphasize that. I might just read you what … It is very short. It’s the verbatim text of the written speech: “The essential element upon which we must insist is that there be an objective international system for assuring that the ban against testing is being complied with. This means that there must be an international system for distinguishing between natural and artificial seismic events. The April 18 treaty provided for such a system. Last week the United States and the United Kingdom made some modifications of that proposed treaty in a way calculated to meet Soviet objections. I have described these modifications. These proposed modifications were rejected almost immediately by the Soviets on the grounds that international verification was not necessary. This refusal to accept any form of international verification strikes at the very heart of our effort to guarantee the world against the resumption of nuclear tests. The key element in the position of the United States is that there must be effective international verification of the obligation undertaken in any such treaty. The United States will consider any proposal which offers such effective international verification, but the United States will never settle for anything less.”

The President: Why don’t we say “cannot” rather than “will never”.

Ball: “Cannot”

The President: Well, “cannot settle for anything less.”

Ball: OK. He is going to cable over tonight a long appreciation of the situation.⁵

[Here follows discussion of Berlin.]

0. Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking.
1. A transcript of Ball’s telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk on March 22 at 5:20 p.m. is ibid.
2. Reference is to a modus vivendi on the problem of Berlin.
3. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 167-176.
4. The proposed final paragraphs of the Secretary’s statement were transmitted in Tosec 114 to Geneva, March 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-2262)
5. The text cited in footnote 5 above includes the phrase “cannot settle for anything less,” as the President suggested.