Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

162. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy⁰

New York, March 20, 1962.

Dear Mr. President: I told you the other night that I had some further ideas about nuclear testing.¹ I am sending them along now and would be happy to discuss them if you cared to.

1. Now, before the tests, is the most reasonable time there has ever been for the US and the USSR to make a test ban treaty, because any arms control is most practicable between near equals in the categories controlled.

2. The argument is both familiar and persuasive that by testing in April we will be doing the Soviets a big favor, because their fallout can be expected with the spring rains and we will have to take at least a share of the blame, since it would be impossible to convince the skeptical that it is not our fallout. The arrogance with which they conducted their tests and broke off negotiations may, indeed, have been intended to induce us to do our atmospheric testing soon, so as to mitigate the effects of their abuse of world opinion.

3. The Soviets probably see some military disadvantage in our resumption of atmospheric tests. The prospect of our testing thus does act as a lever to pry an agreement out of them. However, if we test at the height of the spring fallout, it will probably nullify this effect and the prospect of the April tests will apply no leverage at all. Thus, unless we postpone the resumption by about two months, we fail to take advantage of the opportunity mentioned as point 1.

4. I have had an uneasy feeling that the tests scheduled in April may not yield as indispensable technical information as they would if there were a little more time for preparation. If that is so, the inconvenience of maintaining the task force longer would be compensated by an increase in the scientific results.

If there was adequate reason for postponement, I doubt if we would “lose face,” even though the announcement has already been made for April. Colonel Glenn’s superb flight has recently reminded the public that delays are not abnormal or unwise.² Also I suspect we are only now beginning to feel at Geneva the impact of the basic anti-testing feeling of the neutrals, and further evidence of our anxiety to make a treaty before resuming would be helpful.

Such a delay would bring the period of testing uncomfortably close to the General Assembly. And I have, you may recall, felt that if we were going to test we should do so, after a suitable interval for the Russians to reach an agreement, as far in advance of the General Assembly as possible. However, on further thought, I have concluded that any embarrassment at the General Assembly would be outweighed by the advantage of not taking the blame for the Soviet fallout.

I submit the foregoing with little thought that it presents anything original.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 2/17-4/4. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a March 20 cover note from Stevenson to McGeorge Bundy, in which Stevenson wrote: “I hesitate to prolong this discussion, but I wonder if you would be good enough to consider the enclosed letter and pass it along to the President.”
1. This conversation has not been further identified.
2. Colonel John Glenn’s successful orbital flight in a Project Mercury space capsule on February 20 had been delayed mainly because of bad weather.