150. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State0
Disto 11. Dean met March 11th with UK (Godber and Wright) re test ban. Dean indicated US intends make following proposals: (1) US desires some inspection for preparations—declarations of activities re test preparations and preco inspection certain test sites. (2) US hopes shorten time between treaty signature and beginning inspection. (3) US agrees to drop treaty threshold to zero. (4) US would hope propose reallocation on-site inspections by zones within USSR. In large portion of USSR which is aseismic, i.e., no earthquakes for last ten years, we would propose minimal number annual on-site inspections.
Remainder of annual inspection quota could be utilized in seismic areas. Re point 3, Dean indicated he presently uncertain whether his instructions call for increase in number control posts and on-site inspections as part of process elimination threshold. Noted we attempting clarify this point urgently with Dept and would report results UK soonest.
Godber’s general reaction, not unexpectedly, was “disappointment”. UK had hoped we would be more forthcoming. True, forward movement on threshold is most appreciated by UK. Nevertheless we were backtracking on two major issues—inspection for preparation and [Page 375] time at which control system and inspection process would begin to operate. These would make things terribly difficult publicly, would not be welcomed in London and could not be called bold initiatives. Wright backed up Godber’s disappointment. Godber explained he felt proposal to inspect for preparations was retrograde because it was going back on treaty of April 18, 1961.
Dean pointed out during test ban conference we had received solemn Sov assurances they were not testing while all the time Sov secret preparations were underway. Noted also removal of threshold and limitations of inspection in aseismic areas both forward moving proposals.
Godber said UK scientists believe real progress has been made in detection and therefore bolder proposals in order. If this not the case then US and UK scientists had better quickly get together.
Dean pointed out re inspection for preparations that declaration plus inspection of certain test sites relatively modest proposal. True we couldn’t inspect labs but we had to have assurances against secret preparations for weapon field tests. Godber replied if that case, in presenting proposal we were assuming large political liability for very little in return on inspection side.
Godber asked if we ruled out all use of national systems—even in case of detection atmospheric tests. Dean replied Sept. 3 atmospheric ban offer1 made only to prevent extensive Sov atmospheric series and that series is now over. Wright asked if we could agree to propose only changes in April 18 draft, i.e., threshold, limited inspection aseismic areas, and last year’s treaty modification, while at same time make clear that we would be prepared at appropriate time to negotiate on questions inspection preparation, keeping specifics submerged for moment.
Del comment: As reported Disto 4,2 del not clear about circumstances under which treaty threshold would be dropped as explained first para this tel. Therefore del made no suggestion US would be prepared sign April 18 draft with three amendments noted last sentence last para above.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1262. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London.↩
- Reference is to the joint statement on nuclear testing by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan on September 3, 1961; see Document 63.↩
- In Disto 4, March 11, the Delegation asked the Department for clarification on the relationship between abandonment of the threshold and any increase in controls, and on U.S. willingness “to sign treaty as it now stands even without supplementary inspection for preparations and speed-up provisions.” (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/3-1162)↩