BRIEFING OF SENATORS FOLLOWING PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S
BREAKFAST ON MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 1962
There were no questions except a few directed to the President himself.
The DCI was not involved in the
answering of any questions, however, statements in his briefing were
repeatedly referred to by both the Senators in their questions and the
President in his replies.
In connection with nuclear testing, the President explained his plans for
preparing to proceed with atmospheric testing and emphasized decision
had not been made, and would not be made until mid-March because
preparations for testing would not be completed until 1 April. He did
state, however, that he felt no persuasive argument had been presented
for further atmospheric testing except for the purpose of testing
weapons systems and ballistic missile systems, and environmental and
effects testing. The President seemed to draw a sharp line between tests
of this type and those conducted for further improvement in the
efficiency, yield, weight, etc., of weapons. He specifically stated that
he was not impressed with the need for an improvement in the weight
yield ratio or an increase in the yield and constant weight, etc.
LIST OF PERSONS ATTENDING CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON MONDAY, JANUARY
8, 1962.
The President
The Vice President
Senator Carl Hayden
Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Everett Dirksen
Senator John W. Fulbright
Senator Hubert Humphrey
Senator Leverett
Saltonstall
[Typeset Page 919]
Senator George Smathers
Representative John W.
McCormack
Representative Carl Albert
Representative Leslie Arends
Representative John W. Byrnes
Representative Charles Halleck
Dr. Thomas E. Morgan (Representative)
Representative Francis E. Walter
Mr. O’Brien of the White House Staff
Secretary McNamara
Mr. John A. McCone
Mr. Howard C. Peterson of the White House Staff
General Lemnitzer
Secretary Rusk
[Facsimile Page 4]
SOVIET LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES
I. New information in the past year, providing a much firmer base for
estimates on Soviet long-range ballistic missiles, has caused a
sharp downward revision in our estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength but strongly supports
our estimate of medium range missile strength.
II. We now estimate that the present Soviet ICBM strength is in the range of some 25 operational
ICBM’s on launchers from which
missiles can now be fired against the US, and the increase will be
controlled by site construction and will not be significant, during
the months immediately ahead. (US Air Force Intelligence, however,
estimates the present number of Soviet ICBM launchers at about 75.)
III. The present ICBM force level
probably results chiefly from a Soviet decision to deploy only a
small force of the cumbersome, first generation ICBMs, and to press
the development of a second generation system.
A. ICBM’s missiles intensively
test-fired during 1961 the 51–1961 vs 11 to 20 per year and 58, 59,
60 (including several firings to about 6,500 n.m.). The second
generation ICBM (about 20 firings)
is believed to be smaller than the first and could have a launch
weight of about 300,000 pounds. Based on the launch pads at the test
range, it appears that the new missile is launched from a relatively
simple flat pad, with missile assembly and checkout facilities
nearby.
[Facsimile Page 5]
IV. However, a little later, after the second generation ICBM becomes operational we
anticipate that the number of operational ICBM launchers will begin to increase
significantly.
V. We also estimate that the USSR
now has about 250 to 300 operational launchers equipped with 700 and
1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles.
[Typeset Page 920]
A. Most of these are in western USSR, within range of NATO targets in Europe; others are in southern USSR and in the Soviet Far East.
B. In addition, the USSR will
probably have a 2,500 n.m. system ready for operational use by early
1962.
C. The USSR’s combined strength in
these medium range missile categories will probably reach 350 to 450
operational launchers in the 1962–1963 period, and then level
off.
VI. Soviet ICBM and MRBM launchers probably have
sufficient missiles to provide a reload capability and to fire
additional missiles after a period of some hours, assuming that the
launching facilities are not damaged by accident or attack.
[Facsimile Page 6]
SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING
I. The 1961 Soviet nuclear test series during which (45 tests were
detected) prooftested complete weapons systems, advanced Soviet
understanding of thermonuclear weapons technology, and contributed
vital weapons effects knowledge. Soviet thermonuclear weapon
technology, in particular, appears sophisticated, advanced, and
different from that of the West. The 1961 series will permit the
Soviets to fabricate and stockpile, during the next year or so, new
weapons of higher yields in the weight classes presently
available.
II. The weapons systems tests probably
included short- or medium-range ground-launched and short-range
submarine-launched ballistic missiles with yields up to 3 MT.
III. Weapons effects tests were apparently
conducted under ground, under water, and at altitudes up to 160 n.m.
Those at high altitudes will contribute valuable effects information
for the Soviet anti-ballistic missile program.
A. In two tests on Oct 21 and 27, the nuclear devices were carried
aloft by surface-to-surface missiles launched from Kapustin Yar and
detonated at altitudes of 80 and 160 n.m. In both cases, at a time
appropriate for interception
[Facsimile Page 7]
an anti-missile missile was
probably fired from Sary Shagan, the Soviet anti-ballistic missile
test center.
B. The purposes of these two tests appears to have been the
determination of the ability of radars in the anti-missile system to
function in the environment resulting from the nuclear bursts.
However it is believed that these tests were not complete
anti-ballistic missile system tests.
IV. The developmental tests show a
concentration on weapons with yields of about 1.5 to 5 MT and suitable for delivery by all
Soviet bombers and offensive missiles. Preliminary analysis
indicates that in several cases, through a combination of high
thermonuclear efficiency, low weapon weight, and economy in
fissionable materials, significant progress in thermonuclear weapons
design was achieved.
[Typeset Page 921]
V. The two very large yield tests in the series are particularly
significant in that they indicate a high degree of sophistication in
weapon design.
A. The 25–MT device which the Soviets
detonated had an extremely high thermonuclear efficiency.
B. The 58–MT device probably was
actually a 100–MT weapon tested at
reduced yield. As tested the device obtained only a few percent of
its yield from fission. Weapons of this size and weight could be
delivered by the Soviet large bomber, or could be emplaced offshore,
but probably could not be delivered against most US targets by any
currently operational Soviet ICBM.