The attached memorandum is in response to your request for further
information about the Soviet missile program.
Attachment
ESTIMATED SOVIET ICBM
REACTION TIMES
There is no intelligence specifically indicative of Soviet ICBM reaction time. The following
minimum reaction times for ready missiles, therefore, are based (1)
on the assumption that rapid reaction time has been a Soviet
objective, and (2) on what is known about Soviet ICBM performance characteristics and
launching procedures.
First Generation ICBM (NIE
11–5–61 Dated 25 April 1961)
Condition I—Crews on routine standby, electrical equipment
cold, missiles not fueled. Reaction time—1–3 hours
Condition II—Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up,
missiles not fueled. Reaction time—15–30 minutes
Condition III—Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up,
missiles fueled and occasionally topped. This condition probably
could not be maintained for more than an hour or so. Reaction
time—5–10 minutes
Second Generation ICBM (CIA
opinion)
Condition I—Crews on routine standby, electrical equipment
cold, missiles not fueled. Reaction time—1–2 hours
Condition II—Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up,
missiles fueled. This condition could be maintained indefinitely
in temperate climatic environment but would be limited to an
hour or so under the worst conditions. Reaction time—2–5
minutes.
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THE SOVIET SOLID PROPELLANT
PROGRAM
Our evidence indicates that the Soviets made a decision shortly after
World War II to pursue their long-range ballistic missile program on
the basis of liquid propellants rather than on large grain solid
propellants. This decision was probably based upon several
considerations:
1. Their ability to exploit the German World War II ballistic
missile program which was based upon liquid propellants rather
than solids.
2. They probably did not at that time forsee a submarine launched
ballistic missile program.
3. They probably did not forsee a requirement for rapid reaction
times which are obtainable with solid propellants or storable
liquid propellants.
4. They were probably also aware of the initial greater payload
potential for space missions of the liquid rocket
systems.
As the Soviet ballistic missile program progressed, they developed an
extensive experience with liquid propellants. In the
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mid-1950’s when they were considering a second generation ICBM and a ballistic missile from a
submarine, the question of solids vs. liquids probably arose. We
believe they probably decided on storable propellants for these
roles, thus capitalizing on their liquid propellant experience
factor, and perhaps avoiding time delays inherent with developing a
completely independent solid propellant program.