Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

210. Telegram 295 from Moscow, July 23¹

July 23, 1963, 9 p.m.

From Harriman. At Gromyko’s suggestion Harriman, Hailsham and Gromyko met privately after regular session.

Gromyko opened by commenting that as far as TB Treaty concerned, progress had certainly been made. Inquired whether Harriman and Hailsham had any views to add to what they had said on NAP yesterday.

Harriman said Washington felt language for inclusion in communiqué as proposed by Hailsham was about right. View in Washington was that more general that language the better chance for agreement. Gromyko had been right in mentioning certain countries we might have trouble with. Gromyko knew that DeGaulle had a personal reaction to this matter. Harriman assured Gromyko we would move as fast as possible after agreement on TB for we would not sign communiqué unless we willing proceed with energy. Stressed President took very seriously Sov concern re France’s adherence to Test Ban Treaty, and hoped get little more details by time of his next meeting with Khrushchev. Pointed out this was indication of President’s attitude that there was now rpt now opportunity of making progress in as many directions as possible. Certainly US wished good will emanating from TB agreement to be spread to as many countries as possible, including NATO and Warsaw Treaty members. However, we hoped Sovs would help US in that endeavor by accepting language on lines Hailsham’s suggestion, which had been approved by Washington.

Hailsham stated there were definite limitations in his instructions, and they had been confirmed by Prime Minister publicly. However, having spent this time in Moscow he deeply convinced about sincerity Sov proposal and importance Sov Govt attached to it. PM would also be impressed favorably but he certainly would not wish him, Hailsham, say anything on this publicly or in communiqué. Hailsham did not know what PM would say in public after he reported to him. In any event, would report to PM fully and conscientiously and PM would take counsel with Cabinet. Reiterated PM would not wish him say anything publicly unless there was definite agreement between other two parties present here, which was doubtful.

Gromyko said that as he himself had stated repeatedly, and as Khrushchev had also said, Sovs attached great importance to that. Sovs understood situation as follows: US/UK not prepared at this time finalize solution this problem and referred to need for consultations with allies. In this connection, he wondered whether he understood correctly that US and UK Govts were prepared review this question and expressed readiness continue discussion this question and seek understanding.

Harriman and Hailsham replied in affirmative.

Gromyko asked whether idea of NAP was thus acceptable.

Hailsham said it was understanding that, as Khrushchev had said, it would not involve recognition and that we could not be committed publicly before consulting allies. Remarked, however, he had read NAP draft and believed it would be a positive step. He could not commit PM but latter would consider matter with allies and colleagues.

Harriman said Hailsham’s remarks, if he understood them correctly, stated what he understood was view his govt. US would consider matter promptly, consult with allies, and then see how to proceed. Assured Gromyko President wanted goodwill prevailing in these talks to spread over Europe. In addition to what he had said re nonaggression, he wished state US wanted do everything possible to obtain adherence by France to TB Treaty. As to nonaggression, there had been recent statements by FRG personalities reflecting more flexible attitudes. Harriman said he was personally encouraged but would not want predict DeGaulle’s attitude. Said would report to President and felt certain President would attempt reach understanding to carry through what Sov Govt had in mind, which he understood to be reduction of tensions and development of good feeling among all European countries.

Gromyko confirmed this was Sov goal. NAP would assist in reducing tensions. Moreover, it would facilitate taking a number of further steps, including steps in disarmament field and above all with respect to German problem, to relieve tensions and increase confidence between our states. Wished stress again Sov belief absence of NAP would considerably weaken TB treaty. US/UK could not deny TB was not disarmament; it was not even beginning of disarmament and could not therefore be regarded as disarmament step. TB would only assist to certain extent in creating favorable atmosphere from standpoint of broader disarmament problem.

Gromyko continued he understood from Hailsham’s and Harriman’s remarks that US/UK Govts were ready make progress re NAP and intended consult their allies. Taking this into account, Sov Govt prepared not link directly signing of NAP with signing of TB. Sov Govt prepared not to make one contingent upon other. Sovs hoped this would be duly appreciated by US and UK. Sovs trusted statements by US/UK responsible representatives that their govts would make every effort to consider positive solution of NAP. Gromyko then referred to language suggested by Hailsham for inclusion in communique and said Sovs not fully satisfied with that text. Therefore, they proposed somewhat modified text which they believed should be acceptable to US/UK. Handed text, and expressed hope agreement could be reached on that portion of communiqué.

Harriman appreciated position expressed by Gromyko. He understood importance Sov Govt attached to this problem. Sovs took our word in good faith and we gave it in good faith. As to TB, while technically it may not be very important it would be hailed by everyone as it would relieve apprehensions of world about contamination of atmosphere and be indication of even more important understandings to come.

Hailsham thanked for Gromyko’s statement, commenting it was helpful. Observed that in addition to reporting to PM he would also have to make speech in Parliament in which he would express in reasonable way this gratitude; this, without formal statement by govt, would assist in achieving objective Gromyko had in mind.

Gromyko explained last paragraph suggested text could be expanded by including mention of some questions raised by participants in these talks, but Sovs could accept para both in its present form and in expanded form. Believed para would be useful to all. Did not wish suggest proposed text be discussed now as US/UK might want study it and perhaps consult capitals. Text could be discussed tomorrow.

Hailsham said text would have to be sent to London and Washington and we would see what we could say about it.

Gromyko recalled Harriman had referred yesterday to procedure for signing of TB treaty and wondered whether he still wished discuss it.

Harriman said if Sovs agreed TB treaty could be initialed by participants in these talks and then SecState would come here to sign. SecState would be accompanied by Senators, perhaps one from each party. This would lend more dignity to signing ceremony and would give Senate sense of participation, which very important for well known reasons. While not instructed do so, he wished say personally that there were certain influences in Senate which were not very helpful and therefore it was important that President handle Senate with care and dignity. This was important not only from international standpoint but also from US internal standpoint. Khrushchev had remarked President’s June 10 speech had required great deal of courage, and there were some developments within US which even raised tensions.

Harriman continued he would go to report to President and Senate and a few days or a week later SecState would come if Sovs had no objection. President believed such procedure would greatly help in getting approval of treaty in Senate. Harriman said President wanted him stress he did not wish delay signing for one day, but suggested procedure would help him in giving recognition to role Senate is supposed play in international commitments under US Constitution. Added President anxious get not only two-thirds in Senate but maximum possible because of great effect of treaty on world public opinion.

Gromyko thanked and said would inform his govt. This question involved level and timing of signing; it would be considered and he would inform US/UK of Sov Govt views. Believed initialing acceptable and inquired when this could be done.

Harriman thought it could be done tomorrow.

Harriman and Hailsham believed treaty should be released together with communiqué, simultaneously in all capitals.

Gromyko thought perhaps better publish treaty with delay of say one day after initialing treaty and publication of communiqué. Such procedure would build up public interest in treaty. Noted that if initialing to take place tomorrow he had in mind text of communiqué would be agreed by then.

Harriman pointed out danger of leaks and expressed strong preference for simultaneous release communiqué and text. Believed would get Washington reaction to Sov proposed text for communiqué tomorrow, but noted did not know whether agreement could be reached at that time.

Gromyko suggested tentative agreement be made that initialing should take place either tomorrow or day after.

Harriman expressed preference for initialing treaty and releasing both communiqué and treaty text tomorrow, if agreement reached.

Hailsham agreed, pointing out it becoming increasing difficult resist press inquiries re status of talks.

Kohler

1. Further private discussions with Gromyko on non-aggression pact considerations, acceptance of test ban treaty, and possibilities for reducing future tensions. Secret. 5 pp. Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman.