Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

209. Telegram 274 from Moscow, July 23¹

Moscow, July 23, 1963, noon

From Harriman. Subsequent to regular meeting this afternoon (July 22), Harriman and Hailsham met with Gromyko privately.

Harriman referred to Gromyko’s remarks re France in larger meeting commenting he had wanted to raise subject himself. Said President anxious get France to join in agreement, but this delicate situation. Believed he would get word from President re this and other matters before meeting with Khrushchev. Said he aware of importance Sovs attach to French problem and wondered whether Gromyko believed useful add to withdrawal article language in same sense as contained first sentence US draft withdrawal clause submitted earlier. Quote and it is expected (or hoped) that treaty will be adhered to by all (or other) countries unquote. Suggested Gromyko give consideration to this, as such language would indicate all three would work together in getting other countries to adhere. Said we hoped as many countries as possible would join. We believed language would be helpful as indication belief of the three that all states should adhere. Gromyko said would study but remarked his first impression was that usefulness such addition doubtful.

Harriman inquired whether Sovs believed the three should work on other countries together.

Gromyko replied in affirmative but noted France was special case, as it was nuclear power although perhaps not very important one.

Harriman reiterated he would probably get something from President before seeing Khrushchev. Said other question he wished raise was signing. If Sovs ready sign TB and then go to work in sincere manner on nonaggression problem, he prepared discuss with Gromyko how US proposed signature of test ban. Since TB treaty required ratification by Senate, US would bring a few Senators along.

Gromyko said prepared hear Harriman’s views any time. As to nonaggression pact, when TB treaty text completed—he hoped tomorrow—he would report situation to his govt in following manner: TB treaty had been agreed at this level but US/UK reps were not ready now to agree finally on NAP and had suggested language for inclusion in communiqué. Sov Govt would then consider situation in this light, but he did not know what decision would be reached. However, he wished stress importance Sovs attached to NAP. Rightly or wrongly, Sovs were certain that everyone represented here would benefit from nonaggression pact. As to TB, it would also have certain importance though not very great, if it were not accompanied by NAP.

Harriman observed no use discussing procedure for signing until Sovs ready sign TB. Position of US Govt was clear there was no connection between TB, which affected all nations of world, and nonagression arrangements affecting Europe. TB would create atmosphere which he believed, although he could not make any commitment, would make easier get agreement on other matter. Could not see how NAP could be negotiated here, as agreement on that subject would, at best, require long negotiations which would put it on ice and be embarrassing to all. If the two matters had any connection, that would be another matter but they were different, except perhaps in sense of reduction of tensions. Harriman assumed Sov Govt ready sign test ban ASAP, and, if so, he would be prepared discuss procedure for signing. Expressed hope Sovs would not object to our bringing Senators, noting Gromyko was accustomed to having them around. We were thinking of bringing one Senator from each party to attend but not to participate in signing. Reiterated no use discuss this until Sov Govt made up its mind.

Gromyko said had nothing to add except that he wished stress Sovs sincere in stressing importance of NAP.

Harriman said Gromyko should not think we minimize this matter; we would take it in sincere spirit.

Hailsham said PM felt present political conjuncture should be used to promote rapprochement. TB could usher in further tension reducing arrangements but he did not believe NAP would be easy to sell to allies. At same time, if TB were signed public opinion in Western Europe would be very favorably impressed for that would be first time agreement of such importance reached. That true particularly of public opinion in UK, but also in France, Germany, Italy. Indeed signing of TB document would have public opinion effect out of proportion with intrinsic value of test ban, which admittedly not very great step towards disarmament. But psychological impact would be very great.

Harriman observed impact might be even stronger than in case of Austrian treaty.

Hailsham referred to suspicions existing among allies re Harriman mission and stressed US/UK must show to allies that they keeping their word. He was sure it would be easier convince allies re non-aggression arrangements if US/UK proved their good faith. Strongly urged Gromyko not be disappointed if both TB and NAP were not signed at same time, but to consider this as step towards objective Sovs regarded so important. Reiterated great importance of TB with respect public opinion. Expressed confidence there would be chance getting agreement on that and other matters. Pointed out if this opportunity were missed for reaching agreement, there may be no other chance. UK believed this agreement would lead to other one and further agreements.

Gromyko referred to FRG pronouncements it would not use force to change borders and De Gaulle’s position on German borders. US and UK of course know each other’s position on this matter but they also appeared be against use of force. Thus on principal point of NAP, i.e., non-use of force for solving outstanding problems, there should be no doubts among anyone as to point frequently raised by some people and groups in FRG, as well as France, that problem of GDR recognition would arise as a result of NAP, he wished point out recognition was separate problem, relating to form of NAP. As Sovs understood situation, it should not be very difficult resolve problem of form.

II

Hailsham expressed view question of fora was possible to resolve.

Harriman commented Khrushchev had given US very important ammunition in discussing this question when he said form could be referred to lawyers. Pointed out Germans were emotional about this matter as it related to reunification. As to De Gaulle, he did not know exactly what his problems were but noted De Gaulle had gone farther than anybody with respect to Oder-Niesse. In any event, De Gaulle would be very difficult if something were done behind his back. Gromyko had talked to Spaak who was on record as being in favor of nonaggression arrangement.

Gromyko commented proposed language for communiqué placed conditions even on discussion of NAP.

Harriman observed the more fluid we remain the better chances would be of getting allies along.

Hailsham said his position very positive but would not wish put it in communiqué. Suggested communiqué include reaffirmation by the three that they would not use force in settling outstanding issues. Anything more than that would create great problems. Referred to French apprehensions re US/UK working very closely together, which at least in part due to fact that British and Americans spoke same language.

Gromyko wished Harriman and Hailsham understand Sov position. Sovs believed reference in communiqué not enough, they believed agreement should be reached here. However, proposed language for communiqué did not even reflect positive attitude towards NAP.

Hailsham wanted assure Gromyko UK positive. Perhaps language could be strengthened, but should not create impression of agreement.

Gromyko wondered whether Harriman and Hailsham would state their own positions in this informal conversation.

Hailsham said UK would favor arrangement, provided they were relieved of certain things. PM wanted bring about situation where such arrangement could be signed, but that could not be done here and now.

Harriman commented this had not been area his primary concern for quite a while as he had been dealing in Far Eastern Affairs. However, he knew people in Washington were concerned about attitude of France, to whom we were committed. Did not wish to be negative but we would support concern expressed with respect effect on unification. Thus language would have to be found which would be satisfactory not only to those present here but to others as well. However, US had consistently sought relaxation of tensions. Referring to his remarks re Berlin in earlier meeting, Harriman said there was concern as to what would happen if suddenly the East Germans stopped access to Berlin. For this reason, we would probably raise this question. At same time pointed out Washington very keen use favorable atmosphere to have it permeate into all European countries, both those belonging to NATO and Warsaw. Thus, only thing he could say was that we would take our work constructively to bring about and expand constructive results.

Gromyko said since Harriman brought up West Berlin and Germany, he wished say that to link access to NAP would mean burying NAP. Harriman and Hailsham were familiar with progress in US/USSR, as well as occasional US/UK talks on general question of German peace treaty. Idea of pact was involved there and was one of questions US/USSR believed should be resolved in connection with German peace treaty and settlement West Berlin problem. However, since now there were practically no negotiations on that subject, Sovs were attempting convince US/UK that it would be useful resolve NAP in connection with TB. There was no point discussing logical connection between test ban and NAP, but Sovs believed NAP would be useful from standpoint improvement international relations. One step, i.e., TB would also be useful from that standpoint because otherwise Sovs would not have suggested it in Khrushchev Berlin speech. However, two steps would be better.

Hailsham said TB could be signed quickly, whereas he was certain NAP would take long time. TB would help get others with respect NAP. He understood Sovs did not want access to West Berlin to be included in NAP. However, if Sovs could do or say something outside which would give real assurances to people, re access, that would be of great help.

Harriman hoped Gromyko would study our suggestion re communiqué, while we would proceed as energetically as possible with allies. Stressed chances would be better if TB were signed than if it were held back. Pointed out everybody regarded TB as standing on own feet; if TB were connected with something else it would get involved in lengthy negotiations, even though such negotiations might be successful.

Hailsham said wished ask before breaking up when Sovs intended make statement re France Gromyko had referred to in larger meeting.

Gromyko replied that had not yet been decided but would be done at appropriate time.

Harriman said we interested in what Sovs had in mind.

Hailsham recalled Khrushchev had said Sovs would examine situation in case France should set off nuclear explosion, but Gromyko had said something different today.

Gromyko said Sovs would state at some point before treaty entered into force that if France engaged in certain actions Sovs would have to examine situation. However, he did not have text of such statement.

Kohler

1. Readout of Harriman/Hailsham private session with Gromyko on French issue and signing considerations. Secret. 6 pp. Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman.