Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

198. Telegram 183 from Moscow, July 18¹

Moscow, July 18, 1963, 2 a.m.

From Harriman and Fisher. Following detailed report on status of test ban negotiations covers both plenary and drafting committee sessions:

Present state of test ban negotiations with reference to preamble and six articles of August 27 draft is that drafting committee meeting on preamble tomorrow. Drafting committee reached agreement on the following language for Article I which principals found satisfactory. Begin verbatim text with bracketed language indicating areas where no agreement:

Article I

1. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes (except as provided in Article II) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion and the carrying out of any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

A. In the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, in outer space, or in territorial or high seas; or

B. In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

2. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore (except as provided in Article II) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect proscribed, in paragraph 1 of this article. End verbatim text.

Soviet rep objecting strongly to Article II. We will trade off Article II for agreement on Article III along lines of following text. Begin verbatim text: It is the anticipation of the parties that this treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely and shall be adhered to by all states, particularly those states that could be in a position to carry out an explosion prohibited by this treaty. If a party determines either that another party has failed to observe the terms of this treaty or that any other state has taken action which the parties have bound themselves herein not to take, the party will be free to reconsider its position. It is hereby understood and agreed, however, that the party may not withdraw from the treaty without first both consulting the other parties to the treaty and giving notice of at least 60 days. Such notice is effective only if given no sooner than 60 days and no later than 120 days after the determined date of the failure or action upon which the withdrawal is based. End verbatim text. This article just handed to Soviet rep today and due to situation mentioned in contemporaneous reporting telegram may be subject to some further negotiation.

Soviets have indicated acceptance of principle of old Article IV but have expressed a desire to reverse the order of the reference to original parties and vote of all of the parties in paragraph 2. We propose however to negotiate for simple majority of all parties including all original parties in order to make amendments easier for future plowshare program if developments make such amendment desirable.

Soviet representatives have indicated acceptance to Article V but have offered to have agreement signed in Moscow and Soviet Union as depository. They did not insist on depository issue when we indicated we would be prepared to accept either UN, a neutral, or US, UK and USSR as joint depository, the latter being more probable of acceptance. Have left open when and where signed.

Sovs have as yet indicated no objection to Article VI dealing with authentic texts, but due to future French problem who may be offended if we leave French language out and equally offended if we put French language in without their being party, we are contemplating attempt finesse problem by having duplicate original texts in Russian and English in fact but having no treaty article on the subject.

Although Gromyko may hold up agreement on details pending disposition of NAP issue, appears we can reach agreement on test ban after withdrawal matter finally settled.

Kohler

1. Status of test ban negotiations following plenary and drafting committee sessions. Unclassified. 3 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 USSR (MO).