Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

197. Telegram 154 from Moscow, July 16¹

Moscow, July 16, 1963, 11 a.m.

From Harriman. Harriman and Hailsham met with Khrushchev in latter’s Kremlin office from 3:00 to 6:20 pm July 15. Harriman accompanied by Kohler, Fisher, Kaysen and Akalovsky. Hailsham accompanied by Trevelyan, Wilson, Zukerman and Weeler. In addition Khrushchev, Sov group included Gromyko, Zorin, Tsarapkin and Sukhodrev.

Before actual conversation began, Harriman handed Khrushchev letter from President.

Khrushchev opened saying as host he wished greet visitors and welcome their arrival Moscow. Said believed in their good intentions. People awaiting results of these meetings not only because they burdened by military expenditures but primarily because such expenditures limited their economic resources and thus shortened their lives. In final analysis, accumulation of armaments had throughout history led to war and destruction of human beings, including those accumulating armaments. Thus he believed in this enlightened era of development of science and technology, we must abandon war as means of solving disputes and resolve differences by peaceful means. Modern era not one of colonialism, when countries could be seized by means of war. Today, both robbers and those robbed in equal position, since both would be annihilated in nuclear war. Consequently, he welcomed good intentions displayed by President and Macmillan. (Here Khrushchev made slip of tongue and referred to President as President Eisenhower, for which he apologized profusely.)

Khrushchev continued he understood task of those assembled was prepare such documents as would enable President and Macmillan sign agreements on test ban, NAP, disarmament, and German peace treaty. If US/UK wished additional agreements, Sovs were prepared consider them. Jokingly, he remarked his list of topics was rather short and perhaps all of them could be settled before dinner.

Gromyko interjected since there were four topics and four hours remained until dinner, each topic could be allocated one hour.

Khrushchev said Gromyko had whispered to him translation President’s letter. Thanked for letter and President’s good wishes and asked Harriman convey to President his gratitude and respect. Also thanked for good wishes conveyed by Hailsham on behalf Macmillan. Said Sovs nourished hope test ban agreement would be signed; if no success could be achieved in reaching comprehensive agreement then, to use President’s words, it appeared no particular difficulties existed with respect three-environment ban. Also, Sovs believed AFNAP should be concluded; NAP would be good addition to test ban, addition peoples waiting for.

Khrushchev noted President in his letter recommended Harriman. Said he held Harriman in high esteem and happy to see him again. Observed he and Harriman old acquaintances and recalled his offer make Harriman his assistant; however, Harriman had not yet entered his duties.

Harriman commented if these meetings fully successful, question might be reopened. Khrushchev said Villa he had offered Harriman still waiting.

Harriman observed villa only one of enticements of Khrushchev’s offer.

Khrushchev replied this was basis of deal which had been made.

Khrushchev said in order not waste time, he wished state right away Sovs would not agree to any inspection, even 2 or 3 they had accepted before. Sovs wished comprehensive test ban, but on condition there would be no inspections although they still agreed to black boxes. Question of inspection was outdated, and there was no point arguing about it. Therefore, such questions as modalities, number of inspections, etc., also fell by wayside. Stressed Sovs would not agree even to one single inspection. As to three-environments ban, it involved no inspection. Sovs agreeable discuss it and if US-UK prepared sign such ban Sovs also ready to do so.

Harriman, referring to President’s letter, said we had come here with high hopes and our objective was provide greater assurance of peace. Said could not help recall how 22 years ago he and Lord Beaverbrook had come to Kremlin discuss with Stalin how to win war. Now he and another, but equally esteemed UK colleague were here discuss progress towards peace. He also could not but think of difference between Kremlin of those days, when it had been dark and very carefully guarded place, and Kremlin of today with its gardens full of children at play, which was indicative of great changes.

II.

Recalling Khrushchev’s mentioning Eisenhower’s name, Harriman observed latter had been symbol to Americans and, he believed, also to Sov people of cooperation for victory over enemy. Noted Eisenhower had visited Moscow in 1945.

Khrushchev said Sovs had indeed cooperated very well with Eisenhower and there had been no conflict with him during his tenure as Supreme Commander. On this point, Sovs in agreement with Harriman since they, just as he, held Eisenhower in high esteem. True, later Sovs and Eisenhower diverged, but that was on completely different grounds.

Harriman referred to President’s words that he wished move toward cooperation for peace, and observed if success could be achieved in these talks that would be good augury for future. Referring to prolonged meeting between Khrushchev and Hailsham this morning, Harriman facetiously remarked he assumed all problems had been settled there, and he wished be informed where he should place his signature. Seriously, however, he wished stress President’s desire reach comprehensive test ban covering all four environments. Fact there was misunderstanding between two sides re identification underground disturbances, question over which their respective scientific communities in disagreement. Noted two distinguished scientists had come from US and two from UK, and suggested they meet with Sov scientists to explore further their differences of view. If USSR had some new method of identification, that would be helpful; however, there had been no change in advice President got from US scientists, who saying inspection required for identification. Harriman believed no use discuss this point here as both sides knew they in disagreement. However, he believed useful make progress towards three-environment ban. President agreed to such ban, which would be, as Khrushchev suggested, without inspection, as first step toward comprehensive ban and without prejudice to inclusion underground environment in future.

Harriman continued US believed three environment test ban would be very valuable as it would overcome fears world had of danger to future generations from atmospheric tests if such tests carried out to great extent. Also, such ban would give hope to world that progress toward disarmament being made. Therefore, if Sovs maintain position that no inspection permissible, US prepared discuss three environment ban. However, Harriman wished underline what President said in letter, viz., US had no espionage intentions in connection inspection. At same time, Harriman saw no real value in long argument on this point, and repeated US agreed on three environment ban.

Hailsham said had not much to add to what Harriman had said, but wished say Prime Minister preferred comprehensive ban; however, PM believed three environment ban would be better than none and therefore agreed to such ban. Hailsham said he had only one additional comment, namely, that it would be useful for scientists of both sides to meet and discuss problems at hand with view to developing program of existing national systems, purely national if need be, as there was difference between two sides in this area. It would be useful if scientists of all three parties met and developed appropriate research program and thus contributed to narrowing differences. Scientific discussions could take place without prejudice to talks among those present here or to any agreement they might reach. Stressed UK would be happy to sign three environment ban.

Khrushchev said Sov viewpoint was very well known as test ban negotiations had been going on five or six years. Sovs even earlier proposed agreement on basis national means of control. A draft had already been prepared, but then US/UK raised problem of underground tests and thus whole thing was scuttled. Said he [there] was nothing new in US/UK argumentation on this point and expressed view if discussion this problem were to be resumed, both sides would use same vocabulary in their comments as before. That would be of no use and could only protract these discussions. Therefore, this problem should not be raised at this time; three environment ban should be signed as there were no differences there. Of course, Sovs would like sign comprehensive ban, but US/UK apparently not ready do so yet.

As to Harriman’s assurances re espionage, Khrushchev said it was hard to believe them. This reminded him of cat saying he would only eat mice and not bacon lying in room. He would not trust such cat, as it would undoubtedly snatch bacon when there was no one in room. In any event, this question should not be discussed now; it would be resolved in due course.

Khrushchev saw no need for discussions among scientists, since we now talking only of three environment ban. In these circumstances, scientific discussion would be only polite exchange of views without any concrete basis.

Khrushchev then handed Harriman and Hailsham Sov draft three environment ban, and draft NAP. (Septels). Recalling Harriman’s remark re long Sov-UK meeting this morning, Khrushchev commented he had not yet coordinated texts with UK but was sure UK would support them. Suggested US/UK study documents and comment thereon, so that these negotiations could be concluded successfully. Asked Harriman and Hailsham whether they wanted read documents first or sign them without reading.

III.

When Hailsham commented precise treaty language was something for lawyers to work out, Khrushchev said lawyers spoke same way whether they spoke for prosecution or defense. Harriman had kinder heart as he was not a lawyer; that was why he, Khrushchev, wanted Harriman as adviser. Hailsham remarked perhaps he could serve as adviser for USA, to which Khrushchev said best investment was in USSR stock and Hailsham had better hurry up buying it.

Harriman said did not wish argue whether or not there should be inspection, but wished point out that if Khrushchev kept someone in room, cat would not eat bacon and thus espionage fears would be eliminated.

Khrushchev said cat would eat bacon as soon as man in room turned his head away: He knew what cats were like.

Harriman recalled US/UK had tabled on August 27, 1962 proposal for three environment test ban, and handed copies to Sovs. Said in case Gromyko had forgotten, that document was somewhat longer than Sov paper and covered some points we wished discuss.

At this point, Khrushchev, Gromyko and Zorin exchanged among themselves comments in Russian on US draft. Gromyko pointed out to Khrushchev US draft contained provision for explosions for peaceful purposes, to which Khrushchev said this was different proposition. Zorin pointed out absence reference to France.

Hailsham observed one question to be raised, although there were other points which must be discussed too, was reference in Soviet draft to France, which not represented here. Did not see how French adherence could be secured. As to body of text, said wished reserve his views. Pointed out he authorized negotiate three environment test ban agreement to be signed by governments in more formal way.

Khrushchev believed no discussion should be held in specific terms at this time. Suggested US, UK study drafts and discuss them in foreign ministry, and then return here at later date. Hailsham agreed, but noted he talking only of test ban. Repeated France not represented here, and said he had hoped return home with prepared document to be ratified by governments. Since France absent here, he did not see how that could be done.

Khrushchev reiterated US/UK should study drafts, inform their governments and perhaps ask for instructions, and meet at foreign ministry for discussions in course of which he was sure issues would become clearer.

Hailsham agreed Sov draft should be studied with same care as had been applied in its preparation, but expressed hope Sovs would study US/UK document as well.

Turning to NAP, Hailsham said this raised political problems and suggested Harriman might wish comment on this point.

Khrushchev agreed Sovs would study US/UK document carefully.

Referring to test ban, Harriman hoped question of France could be discussed and perhaps agreed upon now. US was hopeful come to agreement on at least three environment test ban and discuss this matter with France later. Inclusion of France now only raised difficulties. As only three parties represented here, would be very embarrassing for US discuss document without French being present.

Khrushchev said Sovs fully understood this and saw no difficulty of agreement among three nations present. However, we must determine our attitude re France, which was nuclear power and US/UK ally, and must take its position into account. He agreed it would be tactless settle this question in absence French. Said reference to France had been included in Sov draft to indicate France’s position should be taken into account. But Sovs did not make this an immutable condition; i.e., they did not say no agreement was possible without France.

Hailsham expressed gratification at Khrushchev’s remarks.

Harriman asked whether it could be assumed reference to France would be deleted.

Khrushchev replied it evidently would. Recalled his remark Sovs had included reference in order focus attention on this problem, and reiterated this was not precondition for agreement and Sovs did not say they would not sign agreement if France did not sign. However, Sovs reserved their position in event nonadherence by France.

Hailsham said would appreciate it if Khrushchev clarified his remarks re reserving Sov position with respect France. Believed if agreement reached on treaty, it would be binding on three parties present, but hoped and thought France must adhere, and the three must persuade it to do so. However, did not see what guarantees he could give in this respect, and said this exceeded his instructions.

Khrushchev agreed test ban would be binding on three and said he not calling for any guarantees. However, Sovs must take account of France and might return to this question later. Said there would be no reservation re France in text of treaty, but could not give any indication of nature of Sov reservation. This would also depend on what type of tests France would conduct, i.e., whether underground or atmospheric. Even US and UK, who France’s allies, probably did not know what France would do. Reiterated there would be no reservation in treaty text.

IV.

Harriman noted there were other nations in world, not only France. In his statements, Khrushchev had referred to President’s June 10 speech. Harriman wished draw attention to one particular passage in that speech, namely, to President’s statement that test ban would place nuclear powers in position to deal more effectively with further spread of nuclear arms. Quoted relevant sentences, and expressed hope there would be chance of discussing non-diffusion after test ban had been agreed. Pointed out this was not a condition in any sense, and US prepared go ahead with test ban. France—which was a problem—was not only problem; there were other countries to which non-proliferation might apply.

Khrushchev agreed there were many problems in the world. Yet France was nuclear power and was conducting nuclear tests. Other countries, while they very possibly might become nuclear powers, were not such powers at this time.

Harriman agreed France was special case, but inquired whether Khrushchev could perhaps inform him re situation in respect CPR.

Khrushchev looked around table and asked where CPR was. Suggested Harriman go to Peking, provided of course he could get a visa.

Harriman recalled his last conversation with Khrushchev, in which he had said it was Mikoyan’s fault he could not get a visa. Khrushchev said he supported Mikoyan on this score as he did not wish Mikoyan to deal with matters which were none of his business. This was a socialist society, where tight rules of conduct applied; it was not a wishy-washy capitalist society.

Harriman said he wished concentrate on test ban but also explore non-dissemination. If three-environment test ban were agreed, we believed no country could acquire nuclear capability without atmospheric testing. However, if adherence of as many countries as possible could be obtained to a non-dissemination arrangement, that would be a great step beyond three-environment test ban.

Khrushchev said Sovs prepared discuss non-dissemination. Sov position on this question was known, and USSR prepared negotiate and sign agreement on that basis.

Hailsham referred to Khrushchev’s suggestion three-environment test ban be discussed in foreign ministry, and said he would be happy to do so. However, there were two types of problems involved here. Some were those of drafting, to be dealt with by lawyers; others were political, to be discussed between people with authority. He therefore wished ask how latter problems should be dealt with after both sides had studied each other’s documents.

Khrushchev believed US/UK could sit down with Gromyko and start formulating main provisions of agreed document. If any questions should remain unresolved with Foreign Minister, then there could be meeting with him.

Hailsham and Harriman agreed.

Khrushchev then turned to NAP. Said Sovs attached great importance to such pact because if, as appeared likely, agreement on test ban was reached—and such agreement undoubtedly would be of great significance—there still would remain many skeptics. There had already been conducted sufficient number of tests and it was hardly necessary continue them. There was adequate basis for further build-up of forces and for continuing production nuclear weapons. Thus, arms race would not be stopped and war would not be ruled out. Test ban would only satisfy public opinion that no further contamination of atmosphere would take place. This would be big thing indeed, and he did not wish minimize its importance. However, those who wished see complete security for peoples, who were opposed to aggression by one group of states against another, would not be satisfied. This why Sovs proposed NAP. Said he had read in Western press about difficulties re GDR, which not recognized by NATO countries. Believed this problem could be referred to lawyers to develop language which would eliminate such difficulties. In short, Sovs did not wish ship recognition of GDR through NAP. GDR was quite well off whether or not it was recognized by NATO countries. Such recognition would not change a thing. After all, Russian Czar had not recognized US for 26 years, and US had not recognized USSR for 16 years. Czar had been foolish, and US had not shown abundance of wisdom either. But if West wished follow same course, that was all right with him; that would only indicate capitalism had out-lived itself and was unable be realistic. Thus, recognition was not Sov goal; only goal of NAP was create stable world and consolidate peace. True, NAP would yield little in terms of specifics, but would bring great moral satisfaction.

Khrushchev continued that although this was not a new question, as it had been raised by Sovs before, he wished suggest that military budgets be frozen at levels of, say, 1963. He believed this would be reasonable and would give to peoples hope that governments were at last showing common sense and doing something to arrest arms race and not add fuel to fire.

V.

In addition, he wished return to proposals made at one time by US/UK, but which had been rejected by their sponsors as soon as USSR accepted them. Specifically, he meant establishment of control. Sov had suggested establishment control posts to rule out possibility of surprise concentration of forces for surprise attack purposes. Sovs had proposed establishment control posts at railroad junctions, airfields, ports, and major roads within certain agreed zones. Such posts would be for purpose of preventing nations from concentrating forces in given areas for purposes of surprise attack. This was field where Sovs agreed to inspection. Sovs prepared accept Western inspectors in return for establishment Soviet inspection on Western territory.

Harriman wondered whether missile bases would be included.

Khrushchev replied in negative. Said missiles and their launching pads were stationary and therefore could not be concentrated. Missiles were a disarmament problem, whereas he was speaking of control, and these were two different matters.

Khrushchev then suggested that also for the purpose of eliminating danger of surprise attack, agreement should be reached now on establishing control over present levels of forces in GDR and Western Germany, so as to come to agreement on balance, or equilibrium, of forces in those areas, which, in turn, would also prevent surprise attack. Moreover, such measure would generate confidence.

Khrushchev said he was not raising question of German peace treaty, because it affected many countries, including countries outside NATO and Warsaw Pact. It was much broader problem and he did not wish raise it here. However, he believed everyone understood that so long as German problem existed in present form, i.e., so long as there was no peace treaty, this problem would be source of tensions and obstacle for negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Reiterated he not raising this problem here, but merely wished to point out its significance.

As to other questions he had raised, he did not wish stimulate their discussion here and now. Those problems could perhaps be discussed later. However, people who adhered to positions of peaceful coexistence would experience great relief if NAP were signed, control posts were established, and military budgets were frozen. He thought Harriman and Hailsham would agree with him that qualitative change had occurred in interest displayed by two sides in German peace treaty. After GDR had established control over its borders, including its border into Berlin, he believed West became considerably more interested in peace treaty in order to stabilize West Berlin situation. Point was that GDR now completely controlled all of its borders. It was stable, and peace treaty would not change anything from standpoint its security. On other hand, peace treaty would entail change in Berlin; it would bring about stabilization. This matter was of concern to Germans, but such stabilization would be appreciated everywhere. As to German reunification, Khrushchev believed Harriman and Hailsham were experienced people and knew that division of Germany was not on national but rather on socio-political basis. He compared situation to US/British relations during Revolutionary War, when British people had been in both places but one group had felt subjugated and fought for its rights. Point was that GDR was socialist, whereas West Germany was capitalist. Related anecdote current during Russian civil war, according which reds and whites were saying they differed only on one minor point which could be easily resolved, namely, on land problems. Whites were saying they needed land to bury reds and reds were saying they needed land to bury whites. Problem had been resolved by chasing whites out of country and thus in effect burying them. This was how issue between GDR and West Germany could be resolved at some future time. However, two Germanys should not be pushed against each other as that would result in world conflagration.

Harriman referred to Khrushchev’s suggestion for freezing military budgets and said he believed Khrushchev wanted reduce military expenditures. Wondered whether Khrushchev had anything in mind on this point, or whether he thought some agreements could be possible which would bring about such reduction.

Khrushchev said he agreeable to exchanging views on this subject, but had no specific proposals to offer. However, if Harriman interested in this matter, perhaps something could be worked out.

Harriman pointed out he had only suggested this matter be explored, and had not meant specific agreement.

Khrushchev said he understood this and commented he had also raised some questions for exploration purposes.

Harriman observed test ban could lead to other limitations, or at least to thoughts of other limitations.

VI.

Khrushchev said he had another idea. If agreement were reached on reducing military expenditures, Sovs could agree, on certain conditions, to place orders in West for amount of reduction. He could not say what that amount would be, but main point was to channel resources to peaceful purposes. As he had already told Hailsham this morning, Soviet economic situation was excellent, and even in absence of any agreement they were going cut down expenditures for missiles. USSR had quite enough missiles and its general staff was quite satisfied with situation. Of course, military would go on and on with their demands unless one curbed their appetites. In fact, only today had his military suggested that since expenditures for missiles were going to be reduced, expenditures for general armaments should be increased. There were many smart alecs in any country who applied such logic.

In any event, whether or not agreement on this point was reached, Harriman and Hailsham would hear from his report this coming fall that USSR would invest huge sums in agriculture and chemical industry. USSR had accumulated sufficient savings for this purpose. Khrushchev said he was mentioning this so that Harriman and Hailsham should not think he was appealing to them for help because USSR was lacking funds. Time had long since gone when West could expect such a thing. Now USSR had sufficient funds to cover expenditures for all armaments and for development of peaceful economy.

Harriman referred to Freeman’s current visit to USSR and hoped Khrushchev would see him.

Khrushchev replied did not know how long Freeman would stay, but said would be happy to talk to him.

Continued that now situation between USSR and West unequal in one important respect. US was applying 227 kg chemical fertilizers per hectare, whereas Sovs applied only 70. Thus, Americans wiser and Sovs more foolish. However, here wisdom was not measured by amount of brains, but rather by amount of dollars available. USSR was now in position start massive development chemical industry for production chemical fertilizers. 5.8 billion rubles would be allocated for this purpose and whole problem would be resolved in five to six years. USSR would have same amount of chemical fertilizers as U.S. Khrushchev noted UK used even more fertilizer per hectare, namely, 787 kg. For this reason, yield of grain per hectare was also higher in UK than in U.S.; it was 27 to 30 centners in UK versus 16 or 17 centners in U.S. West Germany used even more fertilizer per hectare, 1,137 kg per hectare and its average yield was 35 to 40 centners. For time being, Sovs were setting US level as their goal, because USSR was also a vast country and had a great deal of arable land. If USSR raised its yield by five or six centners per hectare, it would be in position offer grain to U.S.

Harriman commented facetiously that would be a good thing.

Khrushchev agreed, but said that reality of this problem lay in fact that 19 billion rubles would be invested this year in construction and development of industry; 21 billion rubles would be invested next year. Every year, investment would be raised by 1.5, 2, 2.5 billion rubles and the further investments went the greater progression of increase would be. Thus, if additional two billion rubles were added to fertilizer industry every year, level of development of industry in other fields would not drop but rather increase. Point was that one gained two rubles for each ruble invested.

Harriman commented USSR was getting capitalist.

Khrushchev retorted USSR was getting not capitalist, but rich. USSR prospects were very bright, disarmament or no disarmament, but it would take five to six years to complete this program. At end that period, USSR would have problems similar to those US now facing, i.e., it would have agricultural surpluses 996 and might then reduce its crop lands. USSR had invested 5.2 billion rubles in development virgin lands, and return had been eight to nine billion rubles. Thus, all investments had been amortized and, in addition, agricultural machinery for those lands was still there. However, he believed investment in fertilizer industry was more effective than investment in virgin lands. By investing in fertilizer industry problem would be easier to resolve for in order to develop virgin lands nation-wide campaigns and large scale transfer of population were required, whereas in case of fertilizer industry one could build plants just in certain locations. USSR had all resources necessary for construction such plants. Khrushchev said he had been preparing his report and this was why this problem was so vivid in his mind.

However, this would be only first part of program of development chemical industry. Next steps would be development plastics and artificial fiber industries. He believed some ten billion rubles would have to be invested in those fields. Sov objective was produce sufficient quantities of artificial fiber and footwear so as to be able cut prices in half. While food and housing were now cheaper in USSR than in US, and medical care was free, clothing was cheaper in US. But USSR would deprive US of that advantage.

Harriman remarked the more Sovs prosperous the more we applauded.

Khrushchev assured Harriman there was no need fear peaceful competition. Of course capitalists were always on look-out for gain, but days of colonialism had passed.

Hailsham commented US and India, both former UK colonies, were now prosperous and remarked in jest this was all because of UK.

VII.

Khrushchev laughed and said it was UK who had reared them.

Harriman said Khrushchev’s remarks very encouraging and he very happy hear them.

Khrushchev said he also very happy and noted he had completed work on his report just last Saturday.

Harriman thought next order of business was discussion with Gromyko of three environment test ban. Commended US/UK draft treaty, noting it longer and more imposing and thus would have greater impact on public opinion.

Khrushchev said he had already stated Sovs would study US/UK draft. Final text could take best parts from both drafts, particularly as two drafts oriented in same direction.

Harriman said that in all seriousness he wished discuss, before he left for home, what would happen when CPR exploded its bomb. He did not expect settle problem but wished exchange views on it.

Khrushchev said would be glad talk to Harriman, but believed it not useful discuss what might happen somewhere. He would rather suggest that questions of mutual interest be discussed. Correlation of forces would not change for as Harriman knew that to explode bomb was one thing and produce weapons another. France knew it and UK knew it too. Enormous investments were required in this field and so far—he said he wished stress quote so far, unquote only US and USSR had been capable of accumulating nuclear weapons. Fortune being, US and USSR were more or less equal. He did not wish belittle anybody, but this was question of economic might.

Harriman commented he had read Sov newspapers and had noted CPSU was particularly concerned re Chinese views on nuclear war. This raised question of what would happen if and when Chinese got nuclear weapons in their hands. Soviet concern about Chinese attitude was particularly evident in Soviet newspaper article he had seen when he arrived here.

Khrushchev agreed Sovs had differences with Chinese on this question. However, he said life went on and their Chinese friends would surely understand Soviet position more realistic and offering better prospects.

Harriman said that if this matter was of concern to Sovs they could not object to it being of even greater concern to US.

Hailsham hoped Chinese would take Sovs view on this question.

Khrushchev commented Hailsham was capitalist, and capitalists were happy to see these differences.

Harriman recalled that Stalin had had no liking for Mao.

Khrushchev said Harriman should ask Mao about Stalin; Mao did not like Stalin either. Khrushchev said he had worked with Stalin for a long time and knew his weaknesses and strengths. But now USSR had lived ten years without Stalin and things were going all right.

Harriman remarked he did not wish discuss Stalin’s personality and had mentioned his name only because subject of China had come up. In any event, he agreed with Hailsham’s remark re Chinese.

Khrushchev said he had talked to Mao and their views on Stalin were in agreement. He then laughed and said Harriman wanted him expelled from party because people could say Khrushchev was being supported in his views by capitalist Harriman. He quickly said, however, he was only joking: he appreciated this support of Soviet view. He did not know who was richer, Eaton or Harriman, but nevertheless Eaton had received Lenin peace prize. Likewise, while he had nothing in common with Pope John XXIII he respected him as human being and he thought Pope John would enter in history as first Pope who displayed realism. Pope John and himself were antipodes, but in struggle for peace Sovs welcomed all people regardless of their beliefs, race, or political convictions.

Hailsham thanked Khrushchev for opening his thoughts in such generous manner. Said sure his PM would also appreciate this and be impressed. Said would be happy hear Khrushchev’s views on any subject though he not in position discuss those matters which affected third countries. He was impressed with what Khrushchev had said, particularly about his striking plans for economic development. Hoped trade and exchanges in cultural, scientific, and other fields would develop, because he believed that would strengthen peaceful coexistence between peoples of two countries. Said did not believe difference between capitalism and communism was most important thing now, but thought time would show.

VIII.

Khrushchev said of course two sides poles apart in their sociopolitical views. However, one matter affected equally everybody regardless of their class or political views, and that was question of war or peace. Therefore both sides should engage in quest for peace. As to trade, Sovs had for long time been in favor of that. UK should convince US not to impede development of world trade. It was US who had stopped Germans from selling pipe to USSR. He had reliable information that it was US Ambassador to USSR, Kohler, who had recommended this course of action and unfortunately US Govt had accepted that recommendation. This was secret he could now reveal. This was bad advice, but he, Khrushchev, could not object to this since Kohler was in service of US Government. Of course if one asked Kohler about this now he would not say, but Harriman could check later at State Department. However, this act by US had done no harm to USSR. He, Khrushchev, could only express thanks for freeing him of obligation to place orders in Bonn. USSR produced enough pipe by itself.

Harriman commented he would report to President that Khrushchev held Kohler in high regard.

Khrushchev agreed but suggested Harriman look up Kohler’s telegram in State Department and be referee. Said Kohler knew this was true and offered produce Kohler’s telegram if latter denied his responsibility. State Department knew facts of this matter, and President must know them too.

Khrushchev continued Sovs did not need trade, but were against trade being used for cold war purposes. Some people said they wanted reduce tensions but at same time they spoiled air. He could understand if that were done by Congress because there were many madmen there. But when Ambassadors do this, then Sovs became concerned.

Harriman said he hoped Khrushchev’s remarks re Kohler were joke, or else if Khrushchev serious he would have to speak in Kohler’s defense.

Khrushchev replied if Harriman wanted he could take it as joke.

Kohler said since he had been in question he wished point out that Marshal Sokolovski was one Khrushchev should blame for this, because Sokolovski had written book indicating Sov intentions re pipe.

Khrushchev said he had never read Sokolovski’s book. He would have to stop being Chairman if he spent time reading books by generals who, having passed their retirement age, were reminiscing in books. He did want to say, however, that Sokolovski had been very good as staff officer. In any event, if Kohler played on Sokolovski’s pipe he had put himself in a pipe. Here US thought it could put a needle in USSR but it failed. At time this happened, UK and Sweden had suggested increase their quota but planning committee proposed that no pipe be ordered in 1963. He, Khrushchev, had said to committee it would be awkward cancel orders but Kohler helped him out of predicament.

Hailsham expressed hope Sovs would buy UK ships. Khrushchev agreed provided prices were right. Said Sovs had bought tire plant from UK which he had seen in Dnepropetrovsk and which was very good. Thus Sovs bought lot of things from UK.

Hailsham said Khrushchev could be assured UK wished trade of suitable kind and wished Sovs good use of UK products.

Khrushchev said he believed trade was first sign of neighborly relations. He who did not want trade wanted war. Since time immemorial whenever trade stopped that meant war, and whenever war ended that meant trade. Sovs did not want US to sell anything to them; what they wanted was that US abolish its discriminatory law or else there would be no confidence.

Harriman commented if progress on questions mentioned today were made then this certainly would not be beyond realm of possibility or would at least be discussable.

Khrushchev said on basis his info he believed it difficult expect anything progressive from US at this time. So many things were done in US which everybody saw that they should not be done. E.g., Harriman was coming to USSR, but US at same time issued its captive nations resolution. Was there any wisdom here? Of course not. Four years ago, during his visit to USSR, Nixon had been frank on this point. He had said that he, Khrushchev, surely did not think he was so stupid as to sign such law if it depended only on him. Nixon requested that this not be given to press, and he, Khrushchev, had kept his word. However, Khrushchev remarked, he had disgressed from subject matter under discussion.

Harriman said he glad Khrushchev had raised this matter and disposed of it so well.

IX.

Khrushchev said all this needling was no good. Recalled his boat trip with Nixon, during which he had told latter to look at Sov people along river and see what kind of slaves they were. Harriman should also take boat trip and see changes in Sov life.

Hailsham said he was glad see Sov people prosperous and happy; we had been looking very carefully at them. However, Khrushchev should not underestimate generosity of American people. He, Hailsham, was half American himself. He remembered that during war English people used to say that Germans could destroy them but there was US on other side of ocean.

Khrushchev agreed US had rendered assistance during war.

Hailsham hoped there would be similar cooperation again.

Khrushchev complained US had stopped cooperating after war. Said if only measures discussed here could be implemented and if only US abolished its discriminatory law, even without actual trade, that would deprive cold war warriors of things they clinging to.

Harriman referred to hot line agreement as something which had already been achieved; it was not big step but was important.

Khrushchev agreed this was not big step.

Hailsham expressed hope there would be more such agreements.

Khrushchev again accused US/UK of reneging on their past proposals in disarmament field, to which Hailsham replied UK Government sincerely wanted disarmament and believed one step should follow another and thus we could move ahead. This was something President Kennedy had also advocated in his speech.

Khrushchev said this was correct. Sovs held very high opinion of President’s June 10 speech. It was wise statement and it demanded great deal of courage. However, one could see no deeds following words as yet.

Harriman suggested Sovs should produce deeds.

Khrushchev laughed and said this was good division for labor: Sovs should produce deeds, and US should produce words.

Harriman pointed out US here to produce deeds and thought next step was work with Gromyko to develop language reflecting our intentions.

Khrushchev thought language to be developed should be such as would sound well. Thought agreement on substance was already there.

Hailsham agreed.

It was agreed meeting with Gromyko would take place July 16, 3:00 p.m.

There followed some discussion of communiqué, agreed text of which transmitted septel.

Kohler

1. Readout of Harriman/Hailsham discussions with Khrushchev on July 15. Secret. 20 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 USSR (MO).