Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, May 27, 1961, 2 p.m.

2941. Believe Khrushchev will wish meeting with President to be pleasant one and that he will desire if possible to make some proposal or take position on some problem which would have effect of improving atmosphere and relations. I find it extremely difficult however to imagine what this could be. Some change in attitude on Laos problem is possibility since quite possible Soviets consider neutral Laos at this time desirable from their point of view. Slight possibilityK might intimate to President his concern over Red Chinese policies but think this unlikely in any direct way. Believe K will place main emphasis on general and complete disarmament. Revival of Central European regional security arrangements possibility as well as renewal proposal Warsaw-NATO non-aggression agreement.¹

President should be prepared for K exploitation two weaknesses in our position. In any discussion self-determination he will probably bring up our failure carry out elections Viet Nam. In any discussion our concern over expansion Soviet influence Latin America via Cuba he will bring up question our bases and activities on Soviet periphery.

With respect Laos best agreement we can hope to get will apparently rest on shaky foundations. At appropriate time and possibly during Presidentʼs talk would be advisable my opinion attempt put on Khrushchev responsibility for seeing that Laos in fact remains neutral and that this will be gauge of over-all Soviet intentions. Unless and until there is radical deterioration of our relations believe this could have real value as domination Laos itself not major Soviet interest particularly in view Chinese angle.

Believe Soviets will be concerned about moves of administration in arms field and K may well raise this subject contrasting this with his action to demobilize substantial number Soviet troops.

As gesture of goodwill K may respond favorably on subject joint projects in outer space. K likely express appreciation of Presidentʼs action in controlling provocative statements particularly on part military officials.

K may probe our intentions in Congo and on this question believe good case can be made for fact that Soviets have been misinformed and have misjudged our actions. In course conversation K likely rake up U-2 case and may well make gesture release of Powers. Believe caution advisable on former as K might later quote President in order stir up controversy in US. President might take line that flight was major error particularly timing thereof, but that Khrushchev apparently does not realize extent to which Soviet secrecy caused concern over Soviet intentions to those responsible for US security.

Assume President will also have been briefed on subjects of trade, CIA activities, Vershinin visit,² Korea, and possible eventual Presidential visit to Soviet Union.

Thompson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-2761. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
1. In a conversation on May 23, primarily devoted to Germany and Berlin, Khrushchev had mentioned the idea of a non-aggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Thompson noted that the proposal had little meaning for the West, but might make it easier for the Soviet Union to concede points on Berlin or atomic testing. Thompson concluded by saying the President should be prepared to knock it down completely or consider such a proposal. (Telegram 2908 from Moscow, May 25; ibid., 611.61/4-2661)
2. The question of a visit to the United States by Soviet Air Marshal Constantin A. Vershinin had been under discussion during the spring of 1961 without resolution. While the Department of State favored it, the Department of Defense in a letter of April 5 stressed the negative aspects of such a visit. (Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, July 3; ibid., 033.6111/7-361) On July 9 Secretary of Defense McNamara wrote to Rusk saying that the climate for the visit was not right and on the following day Ambassador Thompson was informed that the issue was dead. (Davis letter to Thompson, July 10; ibid., 033.6111-VE/7-1061)