78. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to President Kennedy, May 26, 1961, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Rostow stated that it was his view that “the Viet-Nam situation is extremely dangerous to the peace and that we must push on all fronts to force a deflation of that crisis before it builds to a situation like that in Laos. If it comes to an open battle, the inhibitions on our going in will be less than in Laos; but the challenge to Russia and China will be even greater.” Rostow noted that the United States was working on two fronts: “to build Diemʼs strength” and “to heighten the awareness of the international community about the border issue and to make the ICC the focus of the Laos conference.” But, Rostow continued, “a third front on which we must work is Mr. Khrushchev himself. Thus my efforts to get the town to focus on the role of Viet-Nam in Vienna.” For text of Rostowʼs memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume I, pages 157–158. As it turned out, Kennedy and Khrushchev scarcely mentioned Viet-Nam during their meetings in Vienna on June 3-4. For records of their conversations, see Documents 83–85 and 87–89.