64. Current Intelligence Weekly Review0
Developments in Soviet Foreign Policy
Moscow last week expanded its attacks on the US over the events in Cuba to include vituperative criticism of the President personally as well as broad denunciations of US policies—especially in the “Observer” articles in Pravda on 28 and 30 April. While the Soviet leaders are determined to exact the maximum propaganda gains from the Cuban developments, their treatment of the May Day activities suggests that they do not plan a long period of bitter hostility toward the US such as followed the U-2 incident. Their statements made no mention of the U-2 affair of last May Day, and the official editorials for this yearʼs celebrations and the address by Marshal Malinovsky were relatively moderate in comparison with the “Observer” articles and not predominantly anti-American in content.
Pravdaʼs editorial on 1 May, however, referred to the “criminal intrigues of American imperialism” in Cuba, and Malinovsky in his order [Page 129] of the day and speech in Red Square repeated this line, stating that “armed intervention” against Cuba was organized by “imperialist circles of the US.” Malinovsky also warned that the “aggressive circles of the imperialist states … are resorting more and more frequently to military action to put down the growing national liberation movement” in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
The military section of the Moscow parade differed little from those in recent years. No new equipment was shown, and the emphasis was on missiles and armor, a common practice for several years. Malinovsky claimed at one point that the USSR now has “perfect weapons which excel anything an army has ever had.” Although this could be taken to refer to weapons as yet unrevealed, it is more likely that he was merely praising the general quality of Soviet military equipment. In Berlin, the East German Army displayed 21 T-54 medium tanks and about 15 armored amphibious tanks, the first seen in its possession.
Malinovskyʼs warning that West Germany is the main point of military peril in Europe reflects the increasing attention given to Germany by the bloc. A communiqué issued on 28 April at the end of Rumanian leader Gheorghiu-Dejʼs visit to Warsaw called for the “fastest possible” conclusion of the German peace treaty and transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city. The communiqué also warned that the bloc would sign a separate peace treaty if the Western powers continue to “endlessly delay the conclusion of a treaty with the two German states.”
Khrushchev also took up the German and Berlin issues in his conversation with West German Ambassador Kroll on 24 April. He used this talk to offset the impression that he was committed to a showdown on these issues before the Soviet party congress in October. He claimed that originally he planned to call for a settlement of the problem during the first quarter of 1961 but that he had decided to give President Kennedy more time.
While strongly emphasizing his determination to settle the issues during 1961, Khrushchev told Kroll that the bloc had set no precise deadlines and would be willing to wait until the West German elections and “possibly” until after the party congress before convening a bloc peace conference to sign a separate treaty with East Germany. Such restraint, however, would depend on no “unexpected” Western moves, such as a Bundestag meeting in Berlin.
As to the consequences of a separate peace treaty, Khrushchev stated that the Western powers would have to make arrangements with East Germany to maintain their communications with Berlin and that he would advise Ulbricht to abolish the air corridors. In response to Krollʼs statement that this could bring about an international crisis, Khrushchev said he was convinced that the West would not risk a general nuclear war over Berlin. He said that he expected the West to resort to economic sanctions [Page 130] and possibly a break in diplomatic relations, but that the USSR could cope with such measures.
Khrushchev assured Kroll that the prospect of a showdown over Berlin “need not affect negotiations already begun with the US,” but added that he was skeptical about the outcome of any such negotiations. Although Khrushchev failed to mention prior East-West negotiations before a bloc peace conference, his willingness to give the President more time suggests that he still expects a further round of negotiations. His readiness to wait until next fall also suggests that he is aware that the process of arranging new talks will take longer than he anticipated last fall and that negotiations could extend beyond the party congress.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; Noforn. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 7-8 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.↩