58. Editorial Note
The landings of the Cuban Expeditionary Force at the Bay of Pigs on the southern coast of Cuba began on April 17, 1961. On April 18, the Department of State received telegram 2550 from Moscow conveying a letter to President Kennedy from Chairman Khrushchev. The letter, which the Soviet Government made public, expressed “indignation” at the invasion of Cuba by armed bands “trained, equipped and armed in the United States” and called on Kennedy to “put an end to aggression.” The letter also declared that the Soviet Union would “render the Cuban people and their government all necessary help to repel armed attack” and implied that the Soviet Union might retaliate by menacing U.S. interests elsewhere. President Kennedy responded the same day in a letter handed to Ambassador Menshikov and released to the press. Kennedy stated that the “United States intends no military intervention in Cuba” but could not conceal its “admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba.” Kennedy also warned the Soviets not to use the situation in Cuba as a pretext to inflame other areas of the world. For text of the two letters, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VI, pages 7–10.
Khrushchev replied to Kennedyʼs letter of April 18 in a long letter of April 22 in which he reiterated and expanded upon his charge of aggression against Cuba and again pledged Soviet support for Fidel Castroʼs government. For text, see ibid., pages 10–16. The Department of State responded the same day with a statement in effect dismissing Khrushchevʼs letter as unworthy of reply. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1961, page 663.
In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs crisis, U.S. policy makers reassessed Soviet involvement in Cuba and the threat posed to the United States and its interests in Latin America. In a memorandum to President Kennedy, April 21, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Rostow raised the issue of “a potential Soviet offensive base in Cuba.” The United States must decide whether to permit Castro to acquire defensive arms, asserted Rostow, and “what the touchstones are between defensive arms and the creation of a Communist military base [Page 124] threatening the U.S. itself. I assume that evidence of the latter we would take virtually as a cause of war.” For text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, pages 310–312.
In an April 26 paper prepared for the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed Soviet bloc military aid to Cuba, noting that since September 1960 its value was estimated at between $50 million and $100 million. A May 2 report prepared jointly by the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency stated that “with continuing material and technical assistance from the Bloc and with further military training and political indoctrination, under Bloc tutelage, the combat effectiveness of the Cuban armed forces will substantially increase. The Bloc will probably provide some MIG-17ʼs when Cuban pilots training in Czechoslovakia return home. However, the buildup of a sizable jet air force in Cuba will probably be a slow process as compared with the improvement of the army. Nonnuclear air defense missiles may be supplied to Cuba, but the Bloc will not supply offensive type missiles nor nuclear weapons.” A May 4 paper prepared for the National Security Council by an Interagency Task Force on Cuba stated that there was “no danger of effective direct attack against the U.S.” and only a “remote possibility of an attempt to convert Cuba into a Russian base for strategic attack on the United States.” However, Cuba clearly served “as an exporter of physical aids to revolution” and “as an example and stimulus to communist revolution.” For text of the two papers and the report, see ibid., pages 389–390, 417–422, and 459–475.