57. Editorial Note
In telegram 1722 to Moscow, April 12, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk expressed concern at the effect in Laos of the Soviet delay in responding definitively to the British proposal of April 5, particularly the call for a cessation of hostilities. Rusk instructed Ambassador Thompson to remind Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko of President Kennedyʼs statement during their meeting on March 27 that “while we seriously and wholeheartedly supported the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, free from any foreign alignment or domination, the United States as a great power could not stand by if forces hostile to the United States sought to take over the country by military means.” For text of telegram 1722 and information on the British proposal of April 5, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XXIV, pages 124–125. President Kennedyʼs report of his meeting with Gromyko on March 27 is ibid., pages 105–107.
Gromyko responded to the British proposal on April 16; British analysts cited two major shortcomings in the response: it did not explicitly accept a cease-fire as a precondition for an international conference, and it did not provide for an immediate International Control Commission presence in Laos to verify the cease-fire. (Ibid., page 135) However, following a meeting on April 19 between Gromyko and the British Ambassador to Moscow, the United Kingdom recommended to the United States that it accept the Soviet response as “explained” by Gromyko with the understanding that it would not be binding on the United States and [Page 123] that the West would not attend the conference unless there were a cease-fire by May 5. The U.K. recommendation was discussed at a meeting of the Laos Task Force on April 19. For text of the memorandum of the meeting, see ibid., pages 137–138.