54. Editorial Note
The Presidentʼs Special Assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, expressed his opposition to the planned paramilitary action against Cuba in a memorandum to President Kennedy, April 5, 1961. He argued that the operation was likely to turn into a protracted civil conflict which would “give the Soviet Union a magnificent opportunity to wage political warfare. Cuba will become our Hungary; and, since our pretensions to international good behavior have been greater than those of the Russians, we would be more damaged by Hungary than they were (and they were considerably damaged).” Schlesinger questioned, however, the view that “this operation would have serious substantive effect on Soviet policy, in Laos or elsewhere. My guess is that the Soviet Union regards Cuba as in our domain and is rather surprised that we have not taken action before this to rid ourselves of Castro.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, pages 186–189.