53. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0

2365. Eyes only Secretary. Difficult convey in telegram exact tone of conversation such as that today with Khrushchev.1 In order conserve time interpreter frequently not used and too great emphasis should not be placed on exact words. He was friendly throughout discussion and seemed quite pleased and hopeful at Presidentʼs initiative. Re Bowles speech I believe they are genuinely concerned that we may be saying that accommodation with us means they must renounce any support of govts which come into being by revolution and refrain from adopting attitude which would encourage such revolutions. This they not prepared do. Realistic question is whether they prepared refrain from initiating active subversion. With possible exception Laos they feel they have clear conscience since in Cuba and Iraq they did not take initiative. Khrushchev said he had never heard of Castro until it was announced he had taken Havana. Even in Laos they consider they were responding to our initiative. I am not supporting these contentions but believe they should be taken into consideration in judging Sov intentions. Khrushchev pointed out there is no industrial proletariat in country like Congo and he mentioned they had excellent relations with Ghana and Guinea which were [Page 120] not Communist countries. Sovs of course wish to expand their influence and his citing latter two countries not particularly reassuring. My judgment is Sovs will continue give political and propaganda support to movements against what they consider reactionary govts throughout world and that they will extend their influence wherever possible but that they can be brought to refrain from militant subversion by direct action such as heavy infiltration of agents, etc. I believe Khrushchev recognizes that newly developing countries particularly in Africa will not be ripe for communism for long time to come. I consider most discouraging aspect Khrushchevʼs current policy is his attitude toward UN Secretariat which will have wide repercussions on other problems including disarmament.3

Thompson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.00/4-161. Secret.
  2. See Document 51.
  3. On April 4 Thompson transmitted airgram G-736, which added eight minor vignettes on the conversation with Khrushchev. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/4-461)