Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

358. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, September 27, 1963.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Moscow and Peiping are relentlessly pursuing their political warfare aimed at discrediting each other and winning the allegiance of foreign parties. The Chinese and Soviet parties are each apparently operating on the assumption that the conflict will be protracted and inconclusive. Neither side seems to believe that the other will allow itself to be provoked into some irreparable action that would precipitate a complete break in party relations and possibly even diplomatic ties. At the same time, each party is making strenuous efforts to place itself in the strongest possible position in the event they are forced into open rupture.

The Soviet leaders clearly are confident that Peipingʼs refusal to sign the nuclear test ban treaty has provided them with a potent weapon in their drive to discredit and isolate the Chinese Communists. The long Soviet Government statement published on 21 and 22 September¹ claimed that the Chinese have suffered a “serious moral and political defeat” and that their rejection of the treaty “amounts to complete apostasy” from the world Communist line. The whole thrust of the statement was to portray the Chinese leaders as bloodthirsty warmongers who are ready to embark on irresponsible adventures. It warned that Peipingʼs desire to acquire nuclear weapons causes “serious doubts concerning the foreign policy aims of Chinaʼs leaders,” and charged that they are committed to a “military solution of the contradictions between socialism and capitalism.”

The Soviet statement replied to recent Chinese charges of Soviet subversive activities in Sinkiang Province by claiming that Chinese “servicemen and civilians” have “systematically violated” the Soviet frontier since 1960. Moscow for the first time took notice of Peipingʼs declared intention to revise or abrogate “unjust” territorial settlements imposed on China by the “imperialists.” The statement warned that “artificial creation” of territorial disputes would mean “embarking on a very dangerous path” and strongly implied that Moscow will refuse to recognize Peipingʼs claims.

In the latest polemical exchanges both parties have gone so far as to call into question each otherʼs readiness to fulfill commitments under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. Peiping repeatedly has cast doubt on Soviet commitments and has accused the USSR of “flagrant violations” of the treaty. The Soviet statement charged Peiping with seeking to justify its desire to acquire nuclear weapons by denouncing Moscow as an “undependable ally.” It warned the Chinese against assuming that they could enjoy Soviet nuclear protection and at the same time continue to attack the USSR. To underscore this warning, Moscow quoted the Russian proverb: “Do not foul the well; you may need its waters.”

The Soviet statement concluded with a pro forma appeal for a cessation of polemics, but also with a thinly veiled threat of unspecified retaliatory actions if Peiping persists in attacking the USSR. It warned that the Chinese “must clearly realize that the most resolute rebuff from the Soviet party and people awaits them on this road.” Moscowʼs handling of two recent frontier train incidents suggests that any future Soviet reprisals may include a drastic curtailment or complete termination of the Chinese training program in the USSR. It is possible that the Russians are even contemplating a complete break in economic relations along the lines of Soviet action against Albania in 1961. There are also rumors in Moscow of a Soviet decision to break state relations with Peiping.

A Pravda article on 19 September, which blamed the Chinese for the failure to settle the Sino-Indian border dispute, constitutes Moscowʼs strongest and most extensive criticism to date of Peipingʼs policy on this issue. In an obvious attempt to discredit China in Afro-Asian eyes, Pravda deplored Peipingʼs refusal to “listen to the voice of reason” as embodied in the Colombo proposals of December 1962 and accused the Chinese of playing into the hands of the imperialists.

Peiping has shown its extreme sensitivity to Moscowʼs damaging charges that the Chinese leaders are “war maniacs”—inadvertently confirmed by a fumbling Chinese attempt on 1 September to “explain” Maoʼs remarks in 1957 concerning the probable outcome of a nuclear conflict²—by attempting to return the polemical warfare to the area in which they have the better weapons. In the second major Chinese article in the projected series replying to the Soviet party pronouncement of 14 July, Peopleʼs Daily on 13 September adopted a disdainful, patronizing tone toward Khrushchev and assumed the role of faithful defender of Communist orthodoxy against the heretical Soviet premier.

The article, which was designed to exploit the disarray and demoralization in foreign parties created by Khrushchevʼs attacks on Stalin, was addressed primarily to hard-line factions in these parties to whom Peiping looks for support. It tried to show that Khrushchev is unworthy to head the world Communist movement and defined the ideal “head-quarters of the proletariat” in terms which fit only the Chinese Communist Party.

The article struck directly at Khrushchevʼs most vulnerable point by emphasizing that he had been “particularly active” in carrying out Stalinʼs suppression of Soviet “counterrevolutionaries” in the 1930s. With surpassing insolence, Peiping claimed that even a majority of people in the USSR itself disapproved of Khrushchevʼs attacks and “cherish” Stalinʼs memory.

While the Chinese strain to gain adherents outside China, there are indications that the Sino-Soviet rift, added to domestic economic difficulties, is creating morale problems in China. According to a report of an official inquiry into popular attitudes in a county of Kwangtung Province, many people are alarmed by the loss of Soviet support for industrialization and are pessimistic about the future. The US consul general in Hong Kong comments that this and another recent report show that Peipingʼs challenge to Moscow—while appealing to Chinese xenophobia—has also generated apprehension over the regimeʼs motives and possibly deepened doubts about its present course. (Confidential)

Soviet Foreign Policy Outlook

The dominant factor shaping Moscowʼs present foreign policy outlook appears to be its desire to avoid new crisis situations with the West while dealing with the increasingly bitter and damaging struggle with the Chinese Communists for leadership of the Communist movement. The serious economic problems facing the Soviet leaders, highlighted by the recent large-scale grain purchases in the West, probably have also strengthened their interest in a general improvement in Soviet-Western relations.

The moderate and “statesmanlike” tone of Foreign Minister Gromykoʼs speech to the UN General Assembly on 19 September³ was the most recent example of Soviet efforts to encourage a détente atmosphere. He urged all governments to use the favorable situation created by the test ban treaty to agree on further measures to ease tension and he carefully refrained from direct criticisms of US policy in such sensitive areas as Cuba and Southeast Asia. He gave only perfunctory attention to the German and Berlin problems and repeated Khrushchevʼs theme that, from the bloc viewpoint, the Berlin Wall has reduced the urgency of a German peace treaty.

In keeping with longstanding Soviet “détente tactics,” Gromykoʼs speech focused primarily on disarmament. His proposals for a heads-of-government meeting of the 18-nation disarmament committee during the first half of 1964 and for a US-Soviet treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space were intended to demonstrate the USSRʼs constructive attitude. He also sought to underline Soviet flexibility by offering a further “concession” in Moscowʼs general disarmament plan which would permit the US and the USSR to retain a limited number of missiles and nuclear weapons until the end of the last stage of the disarmament process.

The Soviet leaders appear to see little early prospect for further agreements comparable to the test ban in importance. They are under no pressure, and they remain unwilling to make concessions as the price for agreement on major issues such as Berlin and Germany. They probably believe, moreover, that West German and French opposition will preclude agreement on such measures as a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty, a reduction of foreign forces in the two Germanys, and a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. Khrushchev, however, probably hopes to draw the US and its allies into a protracted period of negotiation on partial disarmament and European security matters. He would calculate that such talks would intensify differences among the Western allies and increase the reluctance of some NATO members to proceed further with a multilateral NATO nuclear force.

While the Russians see no present opportunities for advancing their aims on major European questions, they apparently attach considerable importance to further bilateral agreements with the US as a means of keeping alive the momentum and atmosphere created by the test ban treaty. In addition to Soviet interest in agreements banning nuclear weapons in outer space and establishing legal principles for the peaceful uses of space, Moscow has indicated a desire to conclude a consular convention and a civil air transport agreement.

Although the USSR has termed President Kennedyʼs UN address⁴ an “encouraging” and “sober” approach to world problems, it has not yet reacted publicly to his proposal for a joint manned lunar landing project. Gromyko, however, told Ambassador Kohler on 10 September that the USSR agrees in principle to the US concept of joint cooperation in outer space programs. (Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only)

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. The first article is Confidential; the second is Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 3-6 of the issue.
1. For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XV, No. 38, October 16, 1963, pp. 3-15.
2. A reference to Maoʼs speech in Moscow, November 1957, quoted in a “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government,” September 1, 1963, which is printed in People of the World, Unite for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons! (Peking, 1963), p. 42.
3. For excerpts from the text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 509-524.
4. For excerpts from the text, see ibid., pp. 525-531. For full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 693-698.