Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

357. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence McCone⁰

Washington, September 25, 1963.

SUBJECT

• CIA Characterization of the Soviet Space Program

1. This memorandum is in answer to your request for information.¹

2. The Central Intelligence Agency has consistently characterized the Soviet space effort as a simple but aggressive one utilizing the launch vehicles and facilities which in essence constituted the early Soviet ICBM program. From this base the program developed along simple lines using existing military hardware with as few new developments as possible and, until recently, with no variety. Since 1960 no significant change has occurred in Soviet launch capability.

3. From its commencement in 1957 until the present, the Soviet program has reflected the belief that achievements in space will persuade the world that in the realms of science, technology, and military strength, the USSR surpasses all other nations in the world.

4. From the very early launchings the program has gradually broadened until it consists of five fairly discrete elements with well-defined purposes. These elements are the Kapustin Yar Cosmos series, the Tyuratam Cosmos series, a manned spaceflight program, an interplanetary program, and a lunar program. The total scope of this effort is not nearly so broad as that of the U.S. effort and reflects a selective choice of missions in the face of some limitations.

5. The Kapustin Yar Cosmos series is an astrogeophysical research project involving small payloads and begun in 1962, probably in response to demands by Soviet scientists for an opportunity to conduct the types of experiments in space that were being carried out in large numbers by U.S. scientists. This series appears to be limited to this purpose and is not suited for a reconnaissance mission despite suggestions that this might be the case by other members of the intelligence community.

6. A major purpose of the Tyuratam Cosmos series is almost certainly the development of a meteorological satellite. We believe that it is this satellite which the Soviets will use to fulfill its commitments in the cooperative agreement between the Academy of Sciences and NASA. The characteristics of the system [1 line of source text not declassified] appear to be adequate to do this and provide much higher resolution than planned U.S. systems. Because the vehicles used in this series are all recovered and some differences between vehicles have been noted, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that they might be engaged in reconnaissance or geodetic missions. Technical analysis has as yet revealed no firm positive indications of such missions, however.

7. In general, we have found no good evidence of the existence of Soviet plans or programs for the military use of space. While military support missions such as reconnaissance or geodetic fixing may possibly be undertaken, we consider it generally unlikely that the Soviets will deploy orbital bombardment systems in this decade. This position has been well defined in NIE 11-9-63.²

8. The Soviet manned space flight program is a conservative, well planned effort based upon the use of systems proven to be safe and reliable. Its long-term goals unquestionably include manned lunar landings and interplanetary flights but there is no evidence that their program is progressing on a crash basis. Current emphasis in Soviet bioastronautics work appears to center about the study of problems and the development of systems related to prolonged space flights and appears more responsive to the needs of a space station than to landing a man on the moon.

9. The interplanetary program is one characterized by failure but nevertheless vigorously pursued. It is expected that it will continue and that launchings will occur as suitable opportunities arise.

10. Lunar launchings were resumed in January of this year after a long hiatus, with the purpose of getting detailed data on the nature of the surface of the moon. We believe these probes were intended to soft-land on the moon but they may have been lunar orbiters with a mapping and reconnaissance mission. These probes were all failures, although Lunik 4 was successfully ejected from parking orbit but failed to fulfill its mission. The above points have been covered in briefings and in numerous OSI Scientific Intelligence Digests. It is estimated, on the basis of apparent constraints of celestial mechanics, that attempts to gather lunar surface data will begin again late in November of this year.

11. In our briefings and papers, OSI has stated its belief that the Soviets intend to compete vigorously in the early exploration of the moon and that this effort will include manned flights, although not manned lunar landings. A circumlunar manned flight is not an unreasonable mission in terms of currently existing Soviet launch vehicles once the rendezvous and docking techniques have been developed. A manned lunar orbiting mission might be accomplished, but to be practicable it would require a booster about twice as large as the SS-6. A clear purpose of such missions would be to enhance the prestige of the USSR and to offset the impact of an early manned lunar landing by the U.S.

12. We have also taken the position that it is not yet possible to settle with assurance the question as to whether or not the Soviets are engaged in a manned lunar landing program competitive with the United States. The analytical problem has essentially been one of not being able to find definitive indications of their being in such a race while having to admit that such indicators might exist without our being able to discover and identify them. Time is rapidly running out on this situation, however. In December 1962 in NIE 11-1-62,³ it was estimated that there was a better than even chance that the Soviets had a competitive manned lunar landing program though no firm conclusion could be reached. A later review of pertinent material produced essentially the same judgment. We still can find no firm evidence of the existence of such a program, but have, because of the passage of time, estimated that the chances of its existence are now something less than even. Though we have predicted the flight testing of a new larger booster and a new manned capsule, we still have no firm evidence of their early introduction. In addition, the Soviets have in the interim accomplished none of the technical prerequisites for a manned lunar landing outlined in NIE 11-1-62. This suggests, as well, that the Soviets might not have progressed to the point where they can make any substantial contribution to a cooperative program. Lovellʼs conversations are perhaps indicative in this regard but cannot be considered as conclusive evidence of a Soviet decision not to conduct a manned lunar landing.

13. In our view, if the Soviets are not engaged in an all-out manned landing program, we expect them to substitute major goals or somehow reduce the effects of the U.S. accomplishment of this mission. A cooperative venture with the U.S. for a manned lunar landing would reduce the Soviet problems in this regard tremendously. Where the question of cooperation has arisen, we have been most skeptical of both the technical feasibility of such a venture and of its long-term advantages. Goals likely to be substituted by the Soviets include the early lunar missions mentioned above and the establishment of a space station. Current Soviet capabilities would allow them to establish several different types of orbiting stations.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Chrono: Job 80-B01285A. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. No record has been found of McConeʼs request for information. Five days earlier in a speech before the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations, President Kennedy had stated: “Finally, in a field where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity—in the field of space—there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the regulation and exploration of space. I include among these possibilities a joint expedition to the moon.” For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 693-698. For documentation on U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XXV.
2. “Soviet Capabilities and Intentions to Orbit Nuclear Weapons,” July 15, 1963. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates)
3. “Soviet Space Programs,” December 5, 1962. (Ibid.)