Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

355. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 17, 1963, 11:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Soviet-American Relations and Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Foy D. Kohler, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union

I met with the President for a bit over one-half hour.

After the initial greetings and picture-taking he referred to a letter he had received from Adenauer asking that reference to German reunification be included in his speech to the UNGA.¹ He asked whether I thought this would create any problem. I replied that I had read a draft of the speech and found it very good. I thought that if a reference could be included in somewhat general terms related to self-determination, there would be no problem.

The President then asked for my views on the idea on cooperation in outer space he had put forward to Dobrynin during their recent conversation.² I told him that I had discussed this with Gromyko who had considered the suggestion an “interesting” idea.³ However, I had the impression the Soviets were both intrigued and puzzled about just what the President might have had in mind. Consequently, while giving a cautious welcome to the idea, Gromyko had asked that we come up with some concrete suggestions as to what might be done in this field. The President said that, although this had not been an idea that he had considered in detail, he continued to be interested in developing it and thought it would in fact be useful, for example, and save a great deal of expense if we could come to some kind of agreement with theUSSR on the problem of sending a man to the moon. I reaffirmed that I thought there might be some real interest in developing cooperation in this field since Khrushchev had a problem of allocation of extremely limited resources which made the Presidentʼs problem relatively simple.

The President then asked my views as to what the Russians had in mind discussing during Gromykoʼs visit. I said that of course the Russian prime projects which Khrushchev [Gromyko?] would put forward were a non-aggression pact proposal and some version of the fixed control post idea. However, I thought they understood that we were entangled with our allies in both of these problems and would be unable to go very far during the upcoming talks. There were some measures in the disarmament/security field which might be discussed some with Gromyko. However, I did not see how we could get very far in substance with these partial measures here, though some agreement in principle might be reached to guide further discussions in Geneva. Consequently, the only field left in which I could see possibilities of something concrete emerging was that of bilateral interests. I personally hoped very much that we could go ahead now with the civil air agreement which was initialed a couple of years ago and in return get from the Russians a leased line to Western Europe for the improvement of the Embassyʼs communications. I mentioned that some people seemed to be thinking we could get much more, such as a Berlin settlement, in return for the civil air agreement but I did not think we could sell this horse a second time at such a price. I thought we would do well and that our interests would be served if we could get the civil air agreement, which I considered to be in our interest anyway, together with improvement in Embassy communications. The President appeared to me to indicate general agreement with these observations. I said that in addition to this I would hope that we could discuss two other questions of bilateral interest: a Consular Convention with the promise it held of opening up consular offices in the two countries, a process which would be to our advantage; and trade, a subject which was of great interest to the Soviets and which would presumably be of mutual benefit. There ensued considerable discussion, particularly of the trade aspect, during which I responded to the Presidentʼs question about the status of the Johnson Act;⁴ the possibility that this could be interpreted to permit three to five year credits for Soviet purchases of large-scale installations; the limited possibilities of a large development of trade in any event; and related matters. The President expressed his interest in moving as much as we could in the trade field. In this connection he referred to the Canadian and Australian sales of wheat to theUSSR, indicating some regret that we had not been able to do this ourselves, but agreeing that the disposition of Canadian and Australian surpluses would presumably open up some outlets for our own. The President also said he thought the handling of the subject of trade was too dispersed in the government and that he had dictated a memo suggesting that the question be put into the hands of a responsible official who could pull it together and ensure a more effective exploration of the possibilities in this field.⁵

In response to his inquiry about the handling of these further questions I told him that work was going forward in the Department preparing position papers and that the Secretary would presumably be discussing these matters with him before leaving for New York.

The President asked about the UK role in talks with the Soviets. This led to some discussion of the previous quadripartite meetings with the Soviets; of the difficulties occasioned by French non-participation; and of the field of mutual interest on a tripartite basis illustrated by the test ban treaty negotiations. I said, however, that while at least one tripartite meeting would be necessary, the Russians were clearly interested principally in talking on a bilateral basis with us. I said that if we could come out with a civil air agreement and improved Embassy communications together with some agreement in principle on consular and trade relations to be the subject of continuing negotiations, I thought this would serve the purpose of maintaining a forward movement. The President nodded agreement.

The President also inquired about relations between Moscow and Peiping. He asked whether in the event of the death of either Khrushchev or Mao or both the present conflict might be terminated and a close relationship restored. After saying that I was sure there could be no reconciliation during the existence of the present leadership, I said it was possible that there could be an ostensible reconciliation between the Russian and Chinese Communists. However, even in this case I thought it would be a temporary relationship. Fundamentally, I thought the cleavage rested on national factors. Specifically, from the Russian point of view, the Russians were simply not going to share the wealth with the Chinese as would be required on a basis of pure Communist theory; and the Russians were not going to permit the Chinese actions to involve them in a nuclear conflict with the U.S.

The President asked about Russian views of the multilateral force and non-dissemination. I told him that while the Russians were aware of the difficulties we were having with the MLF and thus not at present in a state of acute concern, they would never agree to any non-dissemination formula which would allow for and seem to give their blessing to MLF. Consequently, I could see no prospect of any agreement on this subject. The President expressed his agreement saying that he saw no reason why Moscow should agree from their point of view.

The President asked whether he would see me again. I told him that I hoped so and assumed that I might accompany the Secretary in discussions he might have with the President about the talks with Gromyko. He asked when he would see Gromyko and I told him nothing was fixed but that I assumed it would be somewhat later on. He also asked when I would be back in Moscow and I told him that my present plans were to return the first week in October.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler, who was in Washington for consultations.
1. A copy of Adenauerʼs September 16 letter is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. For text of the Presidentʼs address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 20, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 693-698.
2. See Document 350.
3. See Document 354.
4. Reference is to the Johnson Debt Default Act, signed April 13, 1934, which prohibited financial transactions with any foreign government in default of its obligations to the United States. (48 Stat. 574) It was amended on July 31, 1945, to exempt foreign governments that were members of both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development from some of its provisions. (59 Stat. 516)
5. Not further identified.