Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

350. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 26, 1963, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Possibility of further agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• The President
• Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State

The Soviet Ambassador handed the President a letter from Khrushchev.¹ After reading it, the President said he agreed that the test ban was a useful first step.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that the debate over the Treaty in the Senate sounded as though it were more a step toward war than toward peace.

The President explained that there were, of course, some attacks on the Treaty and that it was necessary to show that it was not disadvantageous to us.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he had spent considerable time in the United States and understood the situation. He said that the Chairman hoped that we could proceed to find other areas of agreement, both with respect to bilateral questions as well as in the field of international affairs involving other countries. The Chairman thought it would be useful to continue the exchange of opinions on these questions.

The President expressed his agreement, although he pointed out it was probably better not to attempt to do anything until the Test Ban Treaty had been ratified, which he thought would be the middle of September. He pointed out that we understood Mr. Gromyko was coming to the United States and we would be glad to discuss matters with him. He mentioned problems in the field of surprise attack as one possible area of agreement. Another was the ban on weapons of mass destruction in outer space. There was also the Civil Aviation Agreement, and we were looking to see what could be done in the field of trade. He asked what other questions the Soviets might have in mind.

Dobrynin said there was, of course, the German question. He understood that talks on this problem might be continued during the General Assembly.

The President remarked that the Germans were not particularly happy with us just now and said he supposed we had more trouble with our allies than the Soviets did with theirs. He referred to the fact that Chancellor Adenauer would be leaving soon and that there would be a new German Government to deal with. Dobrynin said there was probably not much point in arguing about whose allies gave the most trouble, but he asked if we thought Adenauer was really going to leave.

The President said he probably would, but it appeared that he would continue to be active, and this might make matters difficult for Erhard. Then there were Strauss² and Brentano, who appeared to be anxious to get back into the picture. Altogether, it was a mixed situation which made the problem more complicated. He asked Dobryninʼs view as to what could be done about Germany now.

Dobrynin said everyone seemed to agree that borders could not be changed by war, but the problem was how to fix this situation legally. The Soviets had thought that a peace treaty was the best way. No one knew what would happen in the next five or ten years. The Soviets had hoped that their proposal for a nonaggression pact would be accepted, and were surprised that some of the Western Powers appeared to be reluctant. He said no one would gain from such an agreement, but it would improve the atmosphere. He understood the point respecting implied recognition of the GDR, but said that the Soviets were prepared to take any form that was mutually acceptable to avoid the recognition problem. He inquired whether the President thought an agreement could be reached on this question.

The President pointed out that the French had declared themselves as opposed, and that the Germans did not appear too happy about it. He thought that any good will which his visit to Germany³ had built up had been expended by the problems that arose in connection with the Test Ban Treaty. He said, however, we had agreed to explore this question and would do so. He said we would be prepared to discuss it after the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. He pointed out that in addition to France and Germany, Italy seemed somewhat concerned because they seemed to feel that a greater danger than the German question was the support the Soviet Union gave the Communist Party in Italy.

Dobrynin asked if it were really thought that such support had been increased recently.

The President did not reply directly, but said he was merely pointing out what some of our problems were. He thought it was to everyoneʼs interest that West Germany and the United States maintain their present ties. There were, of course, charges that Germany had a veto on United States policy, but this was not really true. When Gromyko came to the United States, we would be prepared to give an evaluation of where we stood on the nonaggression arrangement.

Dobrynin then said there was a question of observation posts, and the President mentioned weapons in outer space.

Dobrynin asked what about reduction of troops? He replied in the affirmative to the Presidentʼs question whether he had in mind a reduction by a certain percentage.

The President replied that we actually have a de facto situation in which the number of troops are at least stable. We werenʼt adding any, and he thought the British and Belgians might withdraw some. The troop numbers were at least as high as they were going to be. He pointed out that the pressures from such things as our balance-of-payments were in the direction of reduction and he assumed the same was true of the Soviets. We would have to consider whether or not this de facto freeze was not better than attempting to formalize it, which would bring in a number of complications, including inspection.

Dobrynin said he understood this point, but had hoped that the question of observation posts and perhaps military missions might have been combined with troop reduction. The military missions could do something to verify withdrawals.

The President said we would like to reduce the numbers of our troops and would look into it, but said we have to work with the Europeans, and he indicated that formalizing an agreement on this subject might bring more complexities than progress. With reference to our Allies, the President pointed out that the Soviets were not Anglo-Saxons.

Dobrynin said that when Harriman was in Moscow, he had mentioned an exchange of letters between the President and General De Gaulle. He asked whether the President thought the French would continue tests.

The President replied that he thought that for the next year or so the French would only test underground. He said he had written to General De Gaulle to see if there was some way he could assist him in being able to subscribe to the Test Ban. The General had replied that he thought any assistance we could give would only be under limitations that were unacceptable to him. The President expressed the opinion he did not think General De Gaulle wanted assistance. He then asked Dobrynin what China would do about testing.

Dobrynin said he did not know, but that the Soviets were not worried. He said how many bombs could the Chinese acquire?

The President pointed out that they would not need many, and thought their position would be somewhat like that of the French.

Dobrynin admitted that the Chinese felt entitled to have some bombs of their own, but that this would not affect the balance of power. He thought that when they had acquired some bombs and saw the effects of them, they would be more cautious.

The President observed that the Soviets appeared to be worried about the Germans five or ten years from now and said that we had to think about the Chinese over a similar period of time.

Dobrynin said the Soviets were not worried about the Germans as such, but the possibilities they had of involving the United States and the USSR in conflict.

The President said we were not prepared to let the Germans carry us into an adventure which we would have to finish, but he again made the comparison with the situation with respect to China.

Dobrynin said the Soviets did not think the Chinese wanted war, and hoped that they understood what modern war was. When the President asked why the Soviets were more worried about Germany than China, Dobrynin inquired where the Chinese might cause trouble. When the President mentioned Laos, Dobrynin observed that he had been speaking of war, and said that Laos was in a different category.

When the President said that suppose things got worse in Laos and that SEATO felt compelled to secure the Mekong River and then the Chinese felt that Western troops were too close to their boundary and took some action and in reply the SEATO powers moved against the infrastructure, this could build up into something quite serious. With respect to Germany, he thought the most likely danger would be some internal uprising in East Germany.

Dobrynin pointed out that we already have small incidents which could develop into more serious ones. He pointed out how the confrontation between Soviet and American tanks in Berlin had built up. He said that he was at a meeting of the leadership in Moscow when the dangers in this situation were brought to Khrushchevʼs attention. Khrushchev had ordered the Soviet tanks to withdraw for some distance, and said he was sure that the Americans would follow suit. This is what, in fact, did happen. He said that Bonn thought that they could reunite Germany, but that this was now impossible because of the different social systems that had been established in the two parts of Germany.

The President said that the situation does not seem too bad. Of course, Erhard would probably have to try to prove that he was as strong as Adenauer.

Dobrynin thought that it would be useful for the borders to be recognized.

The President observed that West Germany had declared it would not use force to change existing borders, and thought that this was about as good as we could do right now. Dobrynin expressed the opinion that we should take some further step.

The President then returned to the subject of Laos. He sometimes wished that none of us had gotten in there. We wanted to keep Souvanna Phouma in power rather than have either Phoumi or the Pathet Lao take over. He inquired whether the Soviets could not do something about this.

Dobrynin said the Soviet position was well known. The Geneva Agreement had set up Souvanna Phouma and a coalition government had been established. The Soviets did not want to interfere, and they had no troops there and did not intend to send any. In these circumstances, what could they do?

The President pointed out that they had influence in various places. He pointed out that the Polish member of the ICC had not been very helpful in getting the ICC to function usefully.

Dobrynin said that we seem to misunderstand their relationship with their allies, and that they did not advise the Pole what to do. The President said that doubtless the Pole was doing what he thought the Soviets wanted him to do.

Dobrynin then pointed out that apparently we had a somewhat different appraisal of what was actually happening on the spot in Laos. The President said he was supporting Souvanna Phouma and he was somewhat concerned that Souvanna might give up and go to Paris. This seemed to be where most of the political figures from this part of the world ended up. In this event, we would then have no central buffer between the two extremes.

The President then referred to Cuba, and said that apparently the Soviets had withdrawn many of their troops, but we did not know how many were there now.

Dobrynin said that Khrushchev had recently stated that all combat units had been withdrawn from Cuba. The President asked what would happen over the next six months with the Soviets. Would the Soviets withdraw more or would the number remain the same?

Dobrynin said that he had no instructions to say anything on this point, but his strong impression was that when the Soviet instructors there had finished their jobs, they would leave.

The President said we had had reports that Mr. Khrushchev might go to Cuba, and asked if Dobrynin had any information on this.

Dobrynin said it was Khrushchevʼs intention to go to Cuba toward the end of the year, but that no exact date had been set. He inquired whether the President intended to go to the United Nations General Assembly and make a speech there.

The President said that he was considering the matter, but his inclination was not to go. If he went, it would be only for a day. The President said if there were any change in his plan, he would let the Ambassador know.

Dobrynin said that Khrushchev definitely did not plan to go to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, although there had been some thought that he might appear in connection with his trip to Cuba.

The President said he was sure Mr. Khrushchev was aware of the sensitivities involved in his visiting Cuba. This was Mr. Khrushchevʼs affair, but he wanted him to know of these sensitivities.

Dobrynin said he thought the Chairman was aware of the situation but he would inform him of the Presidentʼs remarks. The President said that if Mr. Gromyko came to Washington in connection with his visit to the General Assembly, he would be glad to see him.

Dobrynin then raised the subject of trade, which the President had mentioned, and said that while he had not been instructed to take it up with the President, he could mention one recent development. The Soviets had sold about two million dollars worth of textiles to United States firms, but this sale was now blocked, he assumed by the Treasury, on the grounds that the United States was not sure whether these textiles were Chinese or not. He thought this was a strange situation.

The President said that perhaps Ambassador Thompson could look into this matter.

Dobrynin then reverted to the question of the Civil Air Agreement.

The President said this was a question of finding the right time.

Dobrynin said that perhaps it could be signed to take effect at a later date. When the President mentioned that the Soviets had a considerable amount of gold and that perhaps they could send us some, Dobrynin said that the Soviet proposals on troops reduction and freezing military budgets could help us in this respect.

The President then raised the question of activities in outer space, pointing out that these are very expensive. If outer space was not to be used for military purposes, then it became largely a question of scientific prestige, and even this was not very important, as accomplishments in this field were usually only three-day wonders. If each of us continued on a crash program as the United States was doing now, it would cost a great deal of money. He wondered whether there could be any understanding about what our schedules in this field were.

Dobrynin said he thought this was something that might be worked out. When the President referred to possible cooperative projects, including going to the moon, Dobrynin said that this was an interesting thought, and he would inform the Chairman. He knew from some remarks that Khrushchev had recently made that he felt that we should have more cooperation in outer space.

The President said that if each knew the otherʼs ambitions and plans, it might be easier to avoid all-out competition. If Mr. Khrushchev thought that a cooperative effort was possible, he would be interested.

The interview ended with an agreement on what would be said to the press about the meeting.⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series,USSR, Dobrynin Talks. Secret. Drafted by Thompson. According to another copy the memorandum was approved in the White House on August 27 and inS/AL on August 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR) The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Appointment Book. ( Kennedy Library)
1. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 304–305.
2. Franz Josef Strauss, former West German Minister of Defense.
3. For documentation on the Presidentʼs visit to Germany and Berlin, June 24-26, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, pp. 525 ff.
4. On August 23 Dobrynin had asked Thompson to lunch and developed these same points. A 5-page memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR.