349. Editorial Note
From 5:50 to 6:25 p.m. on August 15, 1963, Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson met with President Kennedy in the Oval Office for a discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations. Thompson reported on talks with Chairman Khrushchev, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, and other Soviet officials during his visit to Moscow as a member of the U.S. delegation to the signing ceremony for the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The conversation ranged over many topics in addition to the treaty: the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet economy, Laos, Berlin, the Bonn government, Cuba, Brazil, the non-aggression pact, the U.S.-Soviet air agreement, and Khrushchev himself. A tape recording of the conversation is in the Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Tape 106/A41.
“One of the things he [Khrushchev] hit hardest was trade,” Thompson reported, and “he made clear he wanted [commercial] credits.” Asked by Kennedy, “if they have all this legendary store of gold, what advantage are the credits to them?” Thompson replied “we think they have a real balance of payments problem—the whole bloc.” Thompson continued, “we donʼt know what their gold stocks are but we donʼt think they’re all that big and they’ve been drawing down on them undoubtedly. And now you see the earlier credits they’ve had from our European allies are coming due as they begin to pay for this stuff. And they’re trying to stretch out now in their talks with the Japanese and others to get longer credits than they’ve been getting. So I think they are hurting.”
Questioned by Kennedy about the civil air agreement with the Soviets, Thompson reported that Secretary of State Rusk, who headed the U.S. delegation to Moscow, told the Soviets that “one practical problem is that PanAm didnʼt want to start the service in the winter time, theyʼd lose money.” Rusk agreed to “look into” a proposal to “sign it in the fall and have it take effect in the spring.” During a brief discussion of the Sino-Soviet split, Thompson said “thereʼs no chance of their getting together, in my opinion, between the two countries. I think there is a chance that, as they both slip down this road they’re going, they may want to avoid forcing these parties [Communist parties in other countries] to choose up and take sides.”
The President asked Thompson why he thought the Soviets accepted the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Thompson responded at some length, commenting, “I think this was in our mutual interests and they realized it.” However, “they were under the illusion they could get a general ban without inspection, and it took a long time. They were misled by some of [Arthur] Deanʼs talk, and probably didnʼt come to this as early as they would have if they hadnʼt thought they could get the other. And then of course we know about those craters where they apparently had some explosions. [Page 750] And it may be that that convinced their military they could get something useful out of underground without too much cost.” Thompson concluded, “I certainly donʼt think this indicates a great big turning to the West in a big way,” and “if we do go ahead now itʼs going to be small steps.” Later in the conversation, the President asked “what do you think of the chances of this treaty blowing up in our face in the next year or so?” Thompson replied “very slim.”
Asked whether he thought Kennedyʼs “going to Russia sometime” would be “worthwhile,” Thompson said, “yes, of course he raised that you know, Khrushchev, that you come over and sign an agreement.” But it “should be a meaningful agreement,” Thompson continued. “I think if you got an agreement on observation posts, this would be very important,” but the Soviets had made it pretty clear this would be “inspection without disarmament, you had to have some disarmament with it, and the things they propose are not acceptable to us.”
Concerning Berlin, Thompson remarked on the Sovietsʼ “mentioning what Gromyko called practical considerations on Berlin. There are about six of them—we ought to pay for every use of the autobahn, we ought to pay for use of the cables, and this business about misuse of air routes.” Thompson thought “their purpose in raising this was chiefly to push us on doing something about it.” On Cuba, Thompson noted that “thereʼs some talk that Khrushchev might go to Cuba.” That would be “helpful,” replied Kennedy sarcastically. The President commented that “they’ve got so many promising things ahead of them in Latin America, I would think they’re pushing, I mean, they donʼt have to keep any troops in Cuba.”
Near the close of the conversation, Thompson offered some observations on Khrushchev: “I think there are two things about Khrushchev, the more and more I’ve watched him. The main thing about him is his interest in production and economics. This comes out in every way. When they talk about ideology, he keeps making them talk about ideologies in support of production. Thatʼs what itʼs for. And the other thing is the German thing. Heʼs really stuck with this.” Thompson continued, “almost every move he makes is related to one of these two things. Heʼs utterly convinced he can beat us [unintelligible] production,” and “he certainly doesnʼt want to put all his money down the drain for arms that he doesnʼt have any need for.” Thompson commented further that “every time he gets strong enough to do it he keeps coming back to this business—surface navies are no good anymore, mass armies are outmoded, itʼs all missiles now”; and “I think heʼll reduce his troops.”