Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

342. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy⁰

Washington, August 2, 1963, 10 a.m.

The President met with Secretary Rusk in the Cabinet Room to discuss the Secretaryʼs trip to Moscow. Also present were: Messrs. Ball, Harriman, Foster, Thompson, Bundy, Kaysen, Davis, Read. The meeting lasted for approximately 45 minutes.

The Secretary went through the points listed in Mr. Thompsonʼs memorandum of August 1¹ on the agenda for the Secretaryʼs visit to Moscow. The following points received particular emphasis in the discussions:

1. With respect to a ban on bombs in orbit (3e), the Secretary raised the difficulties that might arise if there were bilateral talks on this subject, while the test ban treaty ratification process was going on. The President agreed. However, he urged that we explore the possibility of reaching an agreement, rather than merely resting on independent parallel declarations, in a positive way. A final decision could be reserved for a later time.

2. On Laos (5), the Secretary indicated that his intention was to press the Soviets hard on this issue, pointing out their responsibilities and asking that they discuss with the Poles the need for a more cooperative attitude by their representative in the ICC. The President observed that it might be more useful to warn the Soviets that we will act if necessary in order to preserve the neutralist government. Faced with this prospect, the Soviets may be willing to try to do more under the Accords. In any event, they would be put on notice and have no legitimate basis for complaint or counter-action to any action we feel must be taken by us.

3. On Summitry (7), the President observed that it would be better if Khrushchev didnʼt come to theUN. The Secretary remarked on Gromykoʼs suggestion that the 20th anniversary meeting of the UN in 1965 be held at a Heads of State level. The President indicated this would be preferable to having Gromyko [Khrushchev?] coming this fall.

4. Trade (8). Mr. Ball pointed out the political restrictions on development of trade and the present legislative obstacles to its development. He also said that Russiaʼs desires were limited, but we could well meet them in the fields of technology. In response to the Presidentʼs question on whether there were trade experts in the Secretaryʼs party, the Secretary observed that it would be undesirable for us to appear to be pressing the trade subject with the Soviets at this time. There had already been some newspaper speculation about the connection between the test ban agreement and talks on trade which he thought it undesirable to encourage further. It was his judgment that the Senators in the party might well raise the issue informally, or respond favorably to Soviet questions on it.

5. On bilateral questions, (9) there was some discussion of the civil air agreement. The Secretary pointed out we were essentially committed to concluding the agreement, which we had already initialed, since the atmosphere was sufficiently improved over that of the summer of 1961. Mr. Thompson suggested that we go ahead on this after the ratification process. Mr. Harriman gave Kohlerʼs views on the desirability of concluding the agreement, as well as pointing out the irrelevancy of a bilateral agreement to our arguments with African and Latin American countries against accepting Soviet civil air routes. Our most persuasive argument in these places was the lack of reciprocal advantage to the host countries. Harriman also pointed out that Pan Am would like to wait for spring to begin service, to give time for promotion, which in their judgment was needed to make the route an economic proposition. The Secretary concluded by remarking that he proposed to take a positive attitude in this matter.

6. Cuba (10). The President said that he did not foresee any useful response from Khrushchev if we brought up Cuba again. Khrushchev would only repeat that U.S. and Cuba should normalize their relations. It is clear that while Khrushchev is looking for a detente in Europe, he proposes to increase the pressures in Latin America. (In reviewing this minute, the President said that of course the Secretary should raise the matter with Khrushchev just the same.)

7. The discussion then moved on to non-aggression arrangements (2). The President made a number of points. First, while there appeared to be little in such arrangements for us, we should keep an affirmative position and try to maintain the mood which Harrimanʼs visit created. On the other hand, it was clear that we had to get finished with the test ban treaty before we could do anything further on this subject. It was important to find out what the Soviets saw in this proposition, and whether such arrangements could give us additional security in Berlin.

8. He asked for Mr. Thompsonʼs comments, and Mr. Thompson pointed out the disadvantages of any non-aggression arrangement in its impact on the Allies and in particular the Germans. The President noted that Mr. Harriman had a different view and asked him to state it. Mr. Harriman pointed out the consequences of a detente in permitting a further loosening of ties between the satellites and the Soviet Union. This would apply to East Germany as well, and make more possible an improvement in the East German situation along the lines that Brandt had asked for. He spoke of Khrushchevʼs concern over a possible repetition of the 1953 uprising in East Germany, and urged that we had the same concern. Secretary Rusk commented on the Italian reaction to the proposals for a non-aggression pact in terms of this as a further step in legitimizing the Italian Communist Party.

9. The President observed that while Berlin was not now in trouble and in his judgment, did not seem likely to be in the near future, the connection between an improvement in the Berlin situation and a non-aggression pact was one that was useful for us to maintain in terms of our relations with the Germans. The President said that while it was important to deal with the West German problem, he thought that Kohlerʼs views were too negative, and we should have a more positive attitude. Mr. Thompson pointed out again the difficulties which a non-aggression pact would create in the Alliance and its effect in discouraging hope in East Germany, and suggested that if we ran up against a dead end in our negotiations with the Allies, we might try unilateral NATO declarations. On the other hand, he agreed that if we could make a gain in Berlin, it would be useful, and warned that it is likely that the Soviets will soon incorporate East Berlin into East Germany if they do not get a non-aggression pact. The Secretary doubted whether a mere declaration byNATO would answer Khrushchevʼs needs.

10. Discussion then turned to the problems of getting the Federal Republic to sign the test ban treaty. The President said he thought it is very important to get them to sign, both from a domestic point of view and from the point of view of the Soviets. There were some discussions of the way that the questions raised by the Germans in the last few days could be answered. The Secretary said that these questions reflected as much on Von Brentanoʼs political attitude toward Schroeder² as they did the concerns of the German Government in general. The Secretary pointed out that while Von Brentano was Foreign Minister, Germany had adhered to several conventions to which East Germany had also adhered. Further, Secretary of State Dulles had taken note of East Germanyʼs adherence to the Prisoner-of-War Convention and stated that on this matter, the U.S. was in treaty relations with East Germany.

It was agreed that the Secretary should not say anything on East German adherence at the time the treaty was signed, in view of what the President had already said at his press conference.³ We could make it plain to the Soviets that we would treat East Germany as they proposed to treat Taiwan. It was left unclear as to whether this point should be communicated to the Federal Republic now, or wait till later.

CK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR. Secret. A tape recording of the meeting is ibid., Presidentʼs Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Tape 103/A39.
1. Thompsonʼs memorandum stated that “the primary aim of the Secretaryʼs visit will be to probe Soviet intentions and to try to ascertain in what particular field further progress in resolving issues with the Soviet Union might be made.” (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President) Points 2-10 briefly discussed non-aggression arrangements, disarmament, non-dissemination, Laos, Germany and Berlin, summitry, trade, bilateral questions, and Cuba, respectively.
2. Gerhard Schroeder, West German Foreign Minister, who replaced Heinrich von Brentano in October 1961.
3. For a transcript of the Presidentʼs press conference on August 1, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 612-619./3/