Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

341. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, July 31, 1963, 2 p.m.

404. Eyes only—Secretary. I believe it may be helpful to you as you prepare for your visit to Moscow to have Embassyʼs estimate as to subjects most likely on Sov agenda, as well as some suggestions on topics you may wish to raise. With this in mind, I submit following checklist of issues, together with an indication of predictable Sov positions and some ideas on how you may wish to respond:

1. NAP. As Khrushchev made clear in his July 26¹ letter to President, this will be likely first item on Sov agenda. I assume that principal point you will wish to make is that consultation with allies now in train and until process completed you have little to add to Harrimanʼs remarks on subject. Meanwhile, you may wish, before your departure, publicly to correct deliberate misinterpretation which Sovs have placed on communiqué² both in Kʼs letter to President and in press commentary subsequent to initialing of test-ban pact—namely claim that in joint communiqué, US-UK agreed continue discussion of NAP following consultation with allies, whereas only commitment in communique is to consult with allies in view to further discussion of Sov NAP proposal. Secondly, you may wish to refer to Kʼs “corns” remarks to Harriman³ and point out irrelevancy of discussion of nonaggression commitments in atmosphere of threats against Berlin in communications of truly aggressive nature. Point here obviously is absence of logic and justice in Sov position which insists on NAP divorced from assurances that commitments would not extend to neuralgic point of Berlin. Finally, you may wish, in view of Kʼs remarks to Harriman on point, to set record straight on US position toward German borders.⁴

2. Partial measures. I think you should be in a position to say something about the partial measures which Khrushchev mentioned in his July 19 speech,⁵ if only to convey our ideas on forum for their further consideration. It seems to me that, while agreeing to preliminary discussion on a bilateral basis of partial measures, you would wish to point out that since they affect number of other countries, perhaps best forum for their systematic consideration would be Geneva 18-Nation Committee.

On first-step measures which we favor, such as nuclear cut-off and reduction stockpiles, you will have noted from Kʼs remarks to Harriman he has no interest whatever in latter and sees little merit in cut-off. It appears tough Sov position on both issues stems from refusal consider any measure which would involve more than bare minimum inspection, if that. On the question of non-dissemination, Sovs would reject any formula which in their view would seem to give their blessing to any German access to nuclear weapons, i.e., MLF and MNF. Thus, it seems clear Sov tactics will be to press for maximum commitment on our part re retention of control and will consider oral assurances on this question more satisfactory to them than any formal agreement.

3. Laos. As Harriman informed bluntly by Khrushchev, the Sov current position on Laos is that the co-chairmen and external signatoriesʼ responsibilities for fulfillment of the Geneva Accords have ended and that the problem in Laos is now an internal one, requiring for its solution agreement among the three Princes without interference from the outside. Obviously we should not permit the Sovs thus to shirk the responsibilities they assumed at Vienna, and I assume you will wish to press them again to deal more firmly with outside forces responsible for the current crisis, principally the North Vietnamese.

4. Cuba. While the Sovs are not likely to raise this subject, you may wish to restate for their benefit US policy toward Cuba and perhaps seek more concrete assurances on removal of Sov troops than thus far received. We should have no illusions on our chances of success in this area. Khrushchev must have paid a price for Castroʼs support of Sovʼs position in their dispute with ChiComs and his commitment in Cuba may permit him little maneuverability. Even so, it may be salutary to remind him that continued Sov attempts to shore up Castro, especially militarily, will inevitably cast deep shadow over US-Sov relations.

5. Trade. Trade is a hardy perennial which Sovs are bound to raise, especially in light of Presidentʼs indication in his letter of Oct 27⁶ US would be prepared to review trade policy in event amelioration international situation. Sovs will undoubtedly argue agreement on test-ban is substantial fulfillment this condition. You will want to stress that it is the arbitrary trade practices of the Sov bloc and lack attractive exports which are primarily responsible for low-level trade and not, as Sovs always allege, US strategic trade controls. You will have noted recent Sov keen interest in development chemical industry, and, toward this end, expression of hopes of obtaining equipment from West. (At Kremlin yesterday, Khrushchev told Freeman he was prepared buy fertilizer, herbicide, and mixed-feed plants from us if price were right.)⁷ It would be helpful if you could here strike a positive note, preferably with some concrete indication shift in US policy with regard export equipment essentially directed to increase in benefits to Sov people, e.g., agricultural and consumers goods production. Moreover, I would think it desirable in our current examination of trade policy to consider how best we might further influence reorientation of Sov economic development, including distribution of resources in directions best calculated to advance long-term interests.

In addition above comments on broad issues, following thoughts on issues of strictly bilateral interest may be helpful:

1. Communications: I recommend you be prepared to follow up Harrimanʼs initiative with Gromyko by stressing importance in interest rapid communications of acquisition by Embassy of leased cable. According to Embassyʼs analysis of traffic during Harriman talks, average time for transmittal Washington-Moscow of messages bearing operational immediate designator was about three hours and for outgoing messages one and half to two hours, with maximum time being four hours in case of incoming messages and five and half hours in case of outgoing messages. In preparation for your discussion this subject, it might be useful for Department to make similar survey of time lag its outgoing and incoming messages. Naturally, our claim to special facilities would be strengthened if you were in a position to infer that unless favorable Sov reaction forthcoming you would regretfully be obliged to take steps to cut off or effect slow-down in US commercial facilities which now guarantee speedy and reliable communications to Sov Mission New York. A gentle hint of retaliation would do no harm, in my view.

2. Civil Air Agreement. As Gromyko has in past, Sovs may link our request for special communications facilities with Civil Air Agreement (see Embtel 1763).⁸ In Sov view—essentially correct, I believe—US is committed to inaugurate civil air service. You may wish confirm this also our understanding and give some indication as to when agreement may be implemented.

3. Exchanges. You may wish note that negotiations for extension current exchange agreement are scheduled for fall and express hope that Sovs will take positive attitude on expansion of program of mutually advantageous exchange of ideas and information. In this connection, you may wish to comment favorably on recent Sov cessation jamming VOA and point out while this encouraging development, much more needs be done in area of information exchange if genuine understanding among peoples, which Sovs profess to support, is to be achieved. Obviously your position on jamming question would be strengthened if, before hand, question of use of 173 kilocycle frequency could be settled satisfactorily (see Embtel 348).⁹

4. Egorov Case. Both Zorin and Kuznetsov have recently expressed to me deep Sov concern over Egorov case and possible repercussions on US-Soviet relations, and I would assume Gromyko will take equally vigorous line with you (see Embtel 241).¹⁰ I think you should be prepared to give detailed exposition US side of issue and, if possible, indicate possibility that once judicial process has run course, case may be disposed of in manner satisfactory to both sides.

5. Miscellaneous issues. I assume that you will wish to refer to our request for allocation of suitable tract for new embassy property, as well as perennial problem of exit visas for relatives US citizens. You may also wish to remind Sovs of our continuing interest in establishment consulates and consular convention, pointing out that we have heard nothing on subject since submitting our comments on Sov draft a year ago.

It has occurred to us that since we so rarely have opportunities for direct presentation our views and positions to Sov people, you may wish to consider desirability of soliciting Sov views on TV appearance. If you think well of idea, I would suggest that I approach Gromyko referring frequent Sov appearances American TV. It might be useful further to refer to usual practice of Secretary of State when abroad to hold press conference, and suggest this also be carried live on Sov TV. If Sovs should concur, I would think it useful for you to take opportunity to set forth in nonpolemical terms our concept of peaceful co-existence, which would mean above all a sincere plea for free exchange of ideas and information in interest mutual understanding. Since Sovs should be given as much advance notice as possible, I would hope you could give this suggestion your immediate attention.¹¹

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Operational Immediate.
1. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 301–302.
2. See Document 338.
3. For a report of Khrushchevʼs remarks about stepping on U.S. corns in Berlin, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, pp. 543–544.
4. From 4:05 to 4:30 p.m., July 31, President Kennedy met with Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, and Kaysen to discuss Khrushchevʼs proposal for a non-agression pact. A tape recording of the meeting is at the Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Tape 103/A39.
5. For text of this speech, see Pravda or Izvestia, July 20, 1963.
6. Reference is apparently to Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 181–182; however, that letter contains no reference to trade.
7. A memorandum of Freemanʼs conversation with Khrushchev on July 30, largely devoted to comparisons of U.S. and Soviet agricultural practices and prospects, was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A-140 from Moscow, August 2. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 AGR)
8. Dated January 18. (Ibid., 911.2161/1-1863)
9. Dated July 26. (Ibid., TEL 8-4USSR)
10. Dated July 21. (Ibid., UN 12 USSR) Ivan Egorov and his wife had been arrested in New York in June for attempting to obtain documents relating to U.S. defense. Telegram 241 reported Kuznetzovʼs representations to Kohler on the case at a reception on July 20.
11. On August 1 Rusk replied that Kohlerʼs suggestions had been “most helpful” and “exactly along the lines” of Washingtonʼs thinking. The Secretary of State, however, demurred on the holding of a formal press conference or appearance on Soviet television. (Telegram 420 to Moscow; ibid., ORG 7 S)