Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

323. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)⁰

Washington, May 18, 1963, 3:30 p.m.

During a two hour visit with Ambassador Dobrynin on board the Patrick J the following points emerged. They are not recorded in exact sequence but topically, since the conversation ranged back and forth.

Reappraisal in Moscow

I started by asking Dobrynin what he thought the principal questions are which would be asked of him when he reaches Moscow. He said that the overriding question was whether it is possible to reach any agreement with the United States on any subject. He said there was a dispute on this point going on among the leadership in Moscow and that they were indeed in the middle of a reappraisal. He said he thought it was of great importance that some point be found on which agreement could be reached. He emphasized the psychology of an agreement on something rather than the importance of the subject of agreement itself. For example, although he said he was not speaking on instructions and that the matter was one in which Khrushchev had no interest, he personally thought that even a Civil Air Transport Agreement would be advantageous. The remainder of our conversation was taken up with further exploration of points on which some agreement might be possible.

[Here follow 8 paragraphs on nuclear testing and the non-transfer of nuclear weapons; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 702–705.]

Berlin

There were only glancing references to Berlin. I did mention the possibility of some United Nations presence in Berlin with Soviet token forces in East Berlin and our present token forces in West Berlin. He listened attentively, did not reject the idea, but it was quite clear that no significance ought to be attached to his failure to reject my comment out of hand. I added that I thought an earlier remark of mine to Mr. Gromyko two years ago had proved to be well founded, namely, that more time could serve to reduce tensions in Central Europe and that frictions surrounding the Berlin question could become more manageable. I pointed to the easing of pressures on East Germany after the Wall and to such developments as the improvement of relations between West Germany and Eastern European countries.

NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-aggression Treaty

Dobrynin emphasized very strongly the psychological importance of a NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-aggression Agreement. He said that it did not mean very much in practice but that it could do no harm and that it would be important for those in the Soviet Union who were supporting the view that some sort of agreement with the West is possible. I told him that the Soviet proposal on this subject presented at Geneva¹ had been discussed inNATO and that the general reaction had not been entirely negative. Dobrynin said they understood that there might be some problems about the form of such an agreement because of problems of recognition but that this was something which the Soviets were prepared to discuss. When I asked whether, for example, an exchange of letters between the Secretaries General of the two organizations would present any problem of form for them, he said this was entirely discussable and left the impression that this would be no particular obstacle. I told him that there was considerable skepticism about a pact which might seem to be as empty as the Kellogg-Briand Pact² proved to be and that there were some in the West who felt that if we entered into such an agreement and this were followed by a severe Berlin crisis that we should all look like fools. He said, and I thought with some significance, that such a pact would make such a crisis far less likely. I repeat that Dobrynin pressed this point of a NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-aggression arrangement as though it were now number one priority for those in the Soviet Union who were trying to show that some agreement with the West is possible and that its psychological importance far outweighed its practical insignificance.³

Discussions Within Western Alliance

At one point Dobrynin asked me what was the significance of the discussions of differences among NATO members. I smiled and said whatever the meaning that it had nothing to do with the attitude of the Alliance toward the Soviet Union and that Moscow would make a great mistake if they should misunderstand this. Dobrynin not only admitted that this was so but said that Moscowʼs appraisal was so much in the same direction that they were frankly puzzled about the underlying meaning of the differences being expressed in the West. I commented briefly to the effect that it had much to do with the future internal organization of Europe and some special views of President DeGaulle as to the relative position of France in Western affairs. I added that I thought that it was of great importance to all of us, including the Soviet Union, that Germany be fully integrated into the main body of Western Europe and that this was a development in the general interest of peace.

Our 1964 Election and Cuba

Dobrynin said that he would be closely questioned about how he saw the forthcoming Presidential campaign in the United States and the basis upon which President Kennedy would conduct the campaign on matters affecting the Soviet Union. I told Dobrynin that I could not, of course, speak for the President on a matter which is still more than a year in the future but that I thought that the President would continue to be himself and follow his own deep convictions. In general, I felt that this meant he would recognize fully the solemn obligations which he and Chairman Khrushchev had toward the preservation of peace, that he would continue to strive to maintain close contacts with the Soviet Government in an effort to resolve outstanding issues, and that he would continue his search for particular points at which agreement might be possible. I said the great exception to this general approach was still Cuba, that Soviet military presence in Cuba was not acceptable to the American Government or the American people and that this was a matter of highest sensitivity which deeply impairs an attempt to develop normal and improving relations between our two countries. I said it was not in our mind to invade Cuba last year, that if we had wished to do so with American forces we would have done so in the spring of 1961, and that the Soviet military intrusion into Cuba and the missile episode produced a shock to our relations which will take time and much effort to repair. Dobrynin noted that I said “it was not” our intention to invade Cuba and asked about the present. I said the President had made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that we do not now intend or desire to invade Cuba, that this derived from our own interests and attitudes in our long-term relations with our Latin American neighbors and that fear of any such action could not justify the continued presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. I said that, indeed, there were only two questions of fundamental difficulty between us and Cuba, the one being a military and political affiliation with Moscow and the other being Cubaʼs persistent effort to interfere with the affairs of other Latin American countries. The social system of Cuba or the treatment of American property were not questions which themselves could prevent a peaceful relation between Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere.

Dobrynin then said that there had been very substantial withdrawals of Soviet military personnel from Cuba and that those remaining were on training and technical assistance missions. I asked specifically about the four Soviet battalion combat groups and he said that he was not speaking on instructions but that it was his information that these units had “almost entirely” gone home. He said there had been an argument in the Kremlin about whether to furnish us exact information about the Soviet military personnel but that some had “gotten angry” and they had decided not to do so. I told him he might wish to consider whether there is anything further on this point that he could say to us, even privately, although we would not be able to tie our hands about commenting on our estimate of the situation derived from other sources.

Laos

We had a brief discussion about Laos in which I referred to Mr. Khrushchevʼs comment to Mr. Harriman that he, Khrushchev, had some problems because he had undertaken commitments on behalf of a third party. I told Dobrynin that we were aware of the possibility that Mr. Khrushchev might have some difficulty in exercising a decisive influence on the Pathet Lao on the ground in Laos. I noted that they might now be experiencing some of the difficulties which we ourselves had had with General Phoumi⁴ prior to the Geneva Accords. But I said that it was important to maintain the element of good faith with respect to the understandings reached between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy on Laos; otherwise, we would strengthen the hands of those in the West who say that any agreement with the Soviet Union is simply impossible. I suggested that if Mr. Khrushchev is having difficulty in Laos that this might be something we ought to discuss frankly with each other in order to see whether there is anything which we together can do to give full effect to the agreement we had reached with respect to that country. I said I frankly did not understand the attitude of the Polish member of the ICC because I would suppose that Mr. Khrushchev could at least insure the full cooperation of the Polish representative in supporting fully the Geneva Accords. Dobrynin underlined the importance of the agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy and said that it was important to the Soviet Union because the Soviet peoples are fully aware of the nature of the agreement, the personal commitment of Mr. Khrushchev himself and that they expected the agreement to be carried out. He made no specific comment about the Pole.

Interspersed with the above were occasional comments by Dobrynin about the difficulties “they” have in Moscow in understanding how things can happen in our society without the specific approval and support of President Kennedy. He referred to such things as speeches by leading Senators, leaks of the most confidential exchanges between the two governments, and the general problem of the constitutional limitations upon an American President. Dobrynin mentioned these as a part of his problem in explaining the United States to his own people because he himself and, he added, Mr. Gromyko have a better understanding of how our system works. He underlined, however, the importance of preventing leaks and noted, for example, that the famous Saturday Evening Post article contained specific phrases taken from a most confidential communication of the Chairman himself. I told him that the President was most anxious to preserve the confidential character of exchanges between himself and Mr. Khrushchev, and that we have taken the most strenuous measures from time to time to insure against leaks or to discover how an occasional leak in fact came about.

Dean Rusk⁵

POSTSCRIPT TO MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Latin American Nuclear Free Zone

Dobrynin raised at his initiative our attitude toward a Latin American nuclear free zone and seemed quite interested when I told him that we had encouraged the Brazilian initiative last year.⁶ I reminded him that we would not include U.S. territory such as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. He asked about Guantanamo and I told him that we were prepared to include Guantanamo in any such arrangements and subject Guantanamo to the same inspection procedures that would be used for the rest of Latin America, including Cuba. It is my impression that this is a subject in which the Soviets are interested.

Who is a Great Power?

Dobrynin told me that one of the problems which regularly irritates our relations is the people in Moscow think that United States methods in dealing with particular issues leave the impression that we do not take into sufficient account the Soviet Unionʼs prestige as a great power. I told him that Moscow should recognize that we ourselves know that the Soviet Union is a great power and that the Russian people are a brave people; the heroism at Leningrad, for example, is almost as legendary with us as it is with the Russian people themselves. But I added that it was important for the Soviet Union to bear in mind that the United States, too, is a great power and that the American people are a brave people. This calls for a regular sense of reciprocity in our approach to outstanding issues. He said he felt that the general proposition was understood on both sides but that in details (and he made a general allusion to Cuba) he thought we sometimes overlooked questions of their prestige.

Dean Rusk⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk.
1. See Document 296.
2. For text of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty on the Renunciation of War, August 27, 1928, see Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. I, pp. 153 ff.
3. On May 17 Dobrynin had discussed this question with Ambassador Thompson along similar lines. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 USSR-US.
4. General Phoumi Nosavan, Deputy Prime Minister of Laos.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
6. For text of Brazilian proposal for a Latin American denuclearized zone, introduced as a draft resolution to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on November 15, 1962, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1056-1057.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.