Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva⁰

Washington, February 21, 1963, 7:47 p.m.

Todis 811. Following is Deptʼs assessment Soviet draft nonaggression treaty tabled Geneva Feb 20:¹

1. Obviously this not draft which Sovs expect West to sign because multilateral treaty form would require Western signature along with GDR. As such it is less forthcoming toward West than standing Soviet offer dating back to May 5, 1958² to work out form which would not require Western andGDR signatures on same document.

2. Sovs have long been interested in NATO-Warsaw nonaggression treaty or no-force pledge (their first proposal made in July 1955),³ both as device for creating impression that USSR not a military threat to Europe and as means of securing Western acquiescence to status quo in Eastern Europe and acceptance existence of—if not formal recognition—GDR and its frontiers which would be implied in new formal renunciation of use of force. Sovs may hope nonaggression pledge would embarrass Western response to pressure on Berlin.

3. Sovs apparently believe that public discussion European security topics at this time will spur questioning of Western defense arrangements and contribute to differences among allies. Tabling of nonaggression treaty on heels of draft declaration on bases⁴ suggests Sovs may intend table refurbished versions other European disarmament schemes such as denuclearization (possibly including new emphasis on Balkans), troop withdrawals, and possibly prevention of surprise attack.

4. In context ENDC, tabling draft treaty and declaration on bases suggests Sovs intend use Geneva as platform for propaganda attacks on Western defense arrangements. Draft documents may be designed in part to draw attention away from exclusive focus on test ban issue at Geneva, although even if this supposition accurate move does not shed light one way or another on Soviet intentions with regard to test ban.

5. Soviet move may be intended to remove nonaggression pact from context of talks on Berlin, and may reflect Soviet effort to narrow range of issues to be discussed in any new round of Berlin conversations in order to press for agreement on status, troop-presence and access questions.

6. Soviet draft treaty bears strong family resemblance to earlier Soviet draft treaty language. Most notable difference is duration clause which is not specifically tied to conclusion of general European security treaty. Though new draft would not preclude re-introduction of Soviet proposal for such pact, it suggests Sovs prepared to let that idea lapse.

For USRO: You may use foregoing assessment in POLAD or NAC.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 Switz (GE). Secret. Drafted by Robert Baraz (INR); cleared by Valdes, INR, ACDA, EUR, and BTF; and approved by INR. Repeated to Paris and Moscow.
1. For text of the Soviet draft, which was transmitted in Disto 1105 from Geneva, February 20 (ibid.), see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 57-58. In commenting on the draft, the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee stated that the committee was an inappropriate forum for its discussion since not all of the NATO or Warsaw Pact countries were participants. (Disto 1107 from Geneva, February 20; ibid.) There was no formal discussion of the Soviet draft treaty.
2. For text of this Soviet proposal, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 794-800.
3. For text of this proposal, July 21, 1955, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 454.
4. For text of this declaration, February 12, 1963, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 49.
5. Printed from an unsigned copy.