302. Editorial Note
On March 5, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence McCone composed a memorandum for the file summarizing his discussions with Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Foster during the previous two weeks on the question of a test ban treaty. He noted that Foster had indicated, in response to his questioning, that under certain circumstances the Soviets could test underground and be free of detection. Therefore, McCone wrote, he told Foster he could not support the treaty and, although he would not oppose it since doing so would not be consistent with his position as part of the Presidentʼs administration, he wanted Foster to understand the position he had taken before Congressional committees and in public speeches, press conferences, and TV appearances, occasions on which he had “called for the suspension of only [Page 641] those tests which could be reasonably verified.” McCone also noted that he had reviewed his position with President Kennedy and expressed his doubt that the Senate would approve such a treaty, a view in which the President concurred. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 653–654.
In an April 8 memorandum, apparently for the record, McCone expressed similar reservations about the verification process but continued: “Of greater importance, however, is the fact that under present political circumstances a test ban between the U.S. USSR, and UK would not, in the final analysis, answer the ‘proliferation’ problem because the Soviets cannot handle the Chinese Communists and we and the British cannot handle the French.” For text, see ibid., pages 668–670.