Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

301. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, March 2, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Incoming telegram, Moscow 2124, dated February 27, 1963¹

With reference to Ambassador Kohlerʼs cable (attached), I think there is indeed some possibility that Khrushchev is in some trouble at home. I think it unlikely that this could be serious enough to lead to his removal, although this cannot be excluded, but it is probably serious enough to mean that he will have to be circumspect in his actions during the next few months.

The concrete signs are few, and all of them could have other explanations; for example, the mildness of his campaign speech,² in the light of the vicious Chinese attack upon him. The nature of the Chinese attack on him, personally, must mean one of two things—either the Chinese think there is some prospect of bringing about his downfall eventually, or, they think that there is no prospect whatever of patching up their quarrel with the Russians. Another indicator may be the steps taken by some prominent military figures recently to emphasize that Khrushchevʼs role in the Battle of Stalingrad was chiefly that of a morale-builder, rather than a military strategist. The probable explanation of this is that the military are building a backfire against the possibility of Khrushchev again unilaterally cutting back ground forces.

It is well to remember that throughout his Administration, Khrushchev has taken a number of bold actions which although they have, in general, had broad appeal to the masses, have adversely affected influential segments of the regime. Among these might be mentioned those adversely affected by the abolition of the machine tractor stations, military elements who resent Party control, professional members of the Secret Police, the partisans of those who have been purged during the Khrushchev era—particularly Zhukov, professional educators and members of the Soviet elite who resented the educational reform, members of the Leningrad party setup who resent Khrushchevʼs obvious preference for the “southerners,” the members of the disbanded industrial ministries, the old-line Party apparatchiki who resent both Khrushchevʼs internal and external policies, the intellectuals who resent the continuance of Party control, the Jewish community who are aware of Khrushchevʼs anti-Semitism, the industrial managers and technicians who resent the degree of responsibility given the Party for managing the economy, the Stalinists in the Party who are gradually being eliminated, large segments of the youth who resent the slowness in adapting the regime to modern times and, probably most importantly, large numbers of middle and lower Party professionals who are likely to be adversely affected by the recent decision to bifurcate the Party organization into industrial and agricultural committees.

In all, this makes a rather formidable group, and when viewed in the light of Soviet reverses over Cuba and the split with Red China, must mean a fairly high degree of dissatisfaction with Khrushchevʼs leadership. Offsetting this, is the fact that the Presidium and, to a large extent, the Central Committee are packed with Khrushchev followers.

There was some indication in Khrushchevʼs campaign speech that his problems were beginning to get him down when he referred to his pleasure at renewing his faith by contact with the people. Probably the biggest problem facing Khrushchev is how to deal with the agricultural problem and maintain Soviet goals in other fields. His success or failure in dealing with this problem could well determine his ability to maintain his leadership.

0. Source: Department of State,S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Thompson Memos. Secret. Drafted by Thompson. A copy was sent to Bundy on March 4.
1. In this telegram, which was not attached to the source text, the Embassy in Moscow reported three rumors that had begun circulating in the past week regarding Khrushchevʼs status and a further tightening of controls in Soviet cultural and economic fields. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15-1USSR)
2. For text of Khrushchevʼs February 27 speech see Pravda or Izvestia, February 28, 1963.