Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

299. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, February 25, 1963, 8 p.m.

2095. Deptels 1668¹ and 1741² to Moscow. Pipeline. I made oral statement to Gromyko on pipeline as per reftels.

Gromyko said he would inform SovGovt and Khrushchev personally of US reply. He said USG obviously considers that threat to cut off export of pipe by certain countries to USSR would sabotage Soviet economic development. Such calculations were groundless. This could in no way weaken Soviet economic potential. USG had brought pressure on FRG, which had in turn brought pressure on its industrialists, some of whom had specially constructed facilities to supply USSR with pipe. Latter were forced to refuse export pipe to USSR. Only FRG industrialists would suffer from this, not USSR. Calculations that Soviet economic potential would be weakened or that it would be damaged were founded on nothing. It was, rather, a question of principle for USSR.

Gromyko said that when Khrushchev meets with President, Soviets hear statements from American side that US is striving for international cooperation, and US reps say same sort of thing in UN and other international bodies on cooperation in economic, political, and cultural fields. At same time, US applies gross pressure to stop trade with USSR, in crude contradiction to those statements. It was hard to reconcile these two things: US statements about improving US-Soviet relations and pressure to force certain countries to stop trade with USSR in peaceful products, “and I emphasized peaceful.”

Gromyko said SovGovt categorically protested this. That was why he had taken advantage of my trip to Washington to bring this to my attention so I could transmit it to USG.

Referring to statement that USG would “continue to keep all aspects this question under consideration,” Gromyko said this was not clear to him. SovGovt hoped there would be substantive change in situation. This sentence sounded as though situation could go on this way for number of years, while US continued keep it under consideration. He would be grateful if I could clarify this sentence.

I said I could. I said our attitude was not directed against Soviet economic potential, but concerned strategic goods of military significance. I said we had restricted list of such goods, which does not affect normal trade. Nor could I accept contention that US had pressured other countries. These countries had made their own decisions. It was of course true that matter had been discussed in NATO. I noted I was not accustomed to hearing that US had pressured Adenauer, since usual accusation was that Adenauer had pressured US.

Specifically as regards his query, I said that two matters we had discussed thus far (i.e., Berlin/Germany³ and pipe) were not unrelated. So long as tension in Central Europe, it would be necessary to take such measures. If there were progress toward real relaxation, this might warrant reconsideration.

Gromyko said he could not regard my clarification as satisfactory; it was fully unsatisfactory. Soviets believed it was a mistake to carry on business with USSR this way.

I said I would report this further discussion of the subject.⁴

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, STR 12-3 USSR. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, London, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels.
1. Printed as Topol 1108, Document 292.

2. In telegram 1741, February 18, Kohler was instructed to make an oral reply along the lines laid down in telegram 1668 and to preface his remarks with the following statement:

   “I am under instructions to assure you that in view of the personal interest of Chairman Khrushchev in this matter, as conveyed by your remarks to me on January 26, the United States will continue to keep all aspects of this question under consideration. I am also instructed to inform you that my statements represent the carefully considered views of the United States Government at the highest levels.” (Department of State, Central Files, STR 12-3 USSR)

3. For a report on this part of the conversation, transmitted in telegram 2094 from Moscow, February 25, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, pp. 492–493.
4. In telegrams 2096-2099 from Moscow, all February 25, Kohler reported that Gromyko had remained unresponsive on the question of communications links for the U.S. Embassy (telegram 2096; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko Talks); had expressed Soviet disappointment over the U.S. reception of its latest proposals on a nuclear test ban (telegram 2097; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 Switz (GE)); had said that the Foreign Ministry would reply soon about Embassy building sites (telegram 2098; ibid., BG 6 Moscow); and hoped that the uproar in the United States over the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba would stop (telegram 2099; ibid., POL 27-5 USSR).