298. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the Executive Director of Central Intelligence (Kirkpatrick)0
I continue to be concerned over the objectivity with which our analysts and estimators appraise the developments in Sino-Soviet relations. It is of interest to me that press, radio and TV commentators all seem to interpret various actions by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists as indicating some effort towards rapprochement and reconciliation. In fact some reporting has been very optimistic—probably greatly overstated—on the prospects for reconciliation. On the other hand, the tone of CIA reporting as evidenced by this morningʼs item on Sino-Soviet relations,1 indicates to me that our analysts continue with the conviction that no reconciliation is possible and that new steps in the controversy are in preparation.
A reconciliation or a suspension of the hostility that we have witnessed for the past year or so would have a very considerable effect on our vital interests. It would, for instance, permit the Soviets to take more aggressive action against the West with a confident feeling that they were not exposed dangerously on their southeastern border. Likewise, Sino-Soviet relationships would affect importantly such matters as the India-ChiCom controversy, nuclear testing, disarmament and other current problems.
I raise this question because I feel we must study the indicators with great care and great objectivity and not be influenced by a preconceived conclusion in this matter. It appears to me that it is in Khrushchevʼs interest to find a reconciliation and, with the ChiComs hard-pressed technologically and economically, it might be in their interests to “make up”, even at the cost of setting aside some of their basic ideological positions.