287. Editorial Note
At a meeting on February 5, 1963, with Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara, Director of Central Intelligence McCone stated that “if the Soviets wished merely to control Castro and to maintain Cuba as a base for infiltrating Latin America they could do so at much less cost and with much less provocation than the present program.” McCone “therefore warned that in his opinion we could expect a more ominous situation relative to Cuba—perhaps the introduction of offensive weapons again.” In a message to Rusk, February 13, McCone reiterated his “growing concern over the possibility of reintroduction of an offensive capability in Cuba.” For text of McConeʼs memorandum of the February 5 meeting and his February 13 message, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XI, pages 694 and 698–699.
On March 13 McCone reported at a meeting of the National Security Council “that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Cuba,” but “because [Page 619] there appears to be no movement of major items of military equipment, we do not know whether the Soviet troop withdrawal to date has actually affected the Soviet military capability in Cuba.” For text of the summary record, see ibid., pages 715–718. During a discussion with McCone on March 26, President Kennedy stated “that he had once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed.” McCone responded that the indicators as to Soviet intentions were conflicting. Certain information “would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place,” probably over “the balance of the year.” On the other hand, the “building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment” supported a conclusion “that the Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.” For text of McConeʼs memorandum of discussion, see ibid., page 731.