Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

286. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, January 27, 1963, noon.

1849. On assumption we may now move toward nuclear test ban agreement and in light Gromykoʼs January 26 initiative on Germany/Berlin¹—particularly final remark re consideration to be given to “Procedure and means for definitive approval” of agreements reached—I suggest we should ourselves do some advance planning regarding procedural as well as substantive aspects talks with Soviets.

Following are a few preliminary thoughts, which might be discussed further during my visit to Washington.

On whole I see no concrete indication Khrushchev is maneuvering toward summit meeting on basis possible test-ban agreement alone. Believe Soviets realize that, however dramatic tripartite signature would be, many steps would remain, such as ratification and efforts secure adherence others. However, Soviet summit initiative cannot be excluded in this case, and above-cited language with respect to G/B is clear that Soviets have summit in mind in this connection.

In order forestall any Soviet maneuver in first case and provide basis for orderly procedure if progress should be made in second, suggest possibility US initiative at appropriate stage which would comprise proposal that nuclear test-ban treaty be signed at Geneva by Foreign Ministers with concurrent indication that Secretary would be prepared, following signature ceremony, to visit Moscow pursuant to repeated suggestions by Gromyko in course his many unreciprocated visits to Washington.

Atmosphere at time of test treaty signature would perhaps be appropriate for such visit. Signature of itself, however, is obviously not end of road even in [garble], well-defined and limited, area of our relations with Soviet Union or broader East-West relationship, since complicated and extended matter of implementation will probably be beset with many difficulties. Meeting at level higher than Foreign Ministers, therefore, would tend to cast achievement attained in false and exaggerated light.

Visit of Secretary would serve constructive purpose of affording opportunity to investigate post-treaty prospects in Soviet foreign policy without encouraging undue public optimism as to concrete results of visit and without built-in implications which are always present in meetings of heads of state and government. Additionally, Secretary might well conduct further phase discussions on G/B in light of any talks held meanwhile in Washington or Moscow.

If test-ban treaty should be agreed upon and US ratification appeared assured, and if prospects were clearly in view for agreement on modus vivendi on G/B acceptable to US, then consideration might be given to possibility final acceptance and approval of both at top level.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611 GE/1-2763. Secret; Limit Distribution.
1. See Document 285.
2. Printed from an unsigned copy.