Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

284. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, January 25, 1963.

Soviet Foreign Policy Developments

The publication last week of Khrushchevʼs exchange of letters with President Kennedy on a nuclear test ban,¹ following the moderate treatment of the Berlin and German questions at the East German party congress, reflects Khrushchevʼs desire to improve the international atmosphere and to forestall any hardening of US positions in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis.

Khrushchevʼs 19 December letter, which reverted to Moscowʼs acceptance up to November 1961 of the principle of on-site inspections to enforce a ban on underground testing, was dispatched one week after he had publicly unveiled his latest proposal for a Berlin accommodation. These moves to demonstrate the USSRʼs desire for a resumption of meaningful negotiations with the West were apparently prompted by concern that the outcome of the Cuban crisis might result in a shift in US policy toward the more unyielding posture favored by President De Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer in dealing with the USSR.

In his letter, Khrushchev told President Kennedy that the USSR was ready to “meet you half way” by agreeing to two or three on-site inspections a year. Since November 1961, Moscow had adamantly opposed such inspections, insisting that existing national detection systems were adequate to control a ban on tests in all environments. Khrushchev also repeated his earlier offer to establish three unmanned, automatic seismic stations in the USSR. He contended that the present moment is “eminently suitable” for a test-ban agreement and that this would facilitate negotiations on disarmament and other international problems.

Khrushchevʼs latest “concession” had been foreshadowed by private remarks of Polish and Rumanian diplomats who hinted in late November and mid-December that the USSR might put forward a proposal combining automatic seismic stations with a small number of obligatory on-site inspections.

In the bilateral Soviet-US talks in New York between 14 and 18 January, Soviet representatives took a very restrictive approach, contending that the discussions should focus exclusively on the number of on-site inspections and the number and locations of automatic stations. They maintained that theUSSR would accept no more than two or three inspections annually and three seismic stations.

Foreign Minister Gromyko took a pessimistic view of the New York talks in a private discussion with Ambassador Kohler on 18 January. He complained that the US had not correctly evaluated Khrushchevʼs letters and that it continued to insist on an unacceptable number of inspections and seismic stations.

Soviet disarmament negotiator Tsarapkin also told Ambassador Dean on 21 January that Khrushchev would not drop his rejection of the US concept of nationally manned control stations under international supervision. He said the USSR had 73 such stations which would report to an international commission but that international supervision over their operation was out of the question.

Gromyko also raised another obstacle to a test-ban agreement by stating publicly on 21 January that an agreement is impossible without the adherence of France. Insistence on this condition, which was advanced by Moscow in November 1961, would be tantamount to deliberate stalling in view of President De Gaulleʼs long-standing refusal to associate France with the test-ban negotiations.

Soviet propaganda, however, has greeted the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange as bringing a test-ban agreement nearer than ever before in the past two years and as paving the way for the solution of the “entire” disarmament problem.

Berlin and Germany

Gromykoʼs 18 January remarks to Ambassador Kohler underscored Moscowʼs desire to hold the door open for a resumption of the Berlin dialogue. He repeated several times that the Soviet leaders are operating on the assumption that the US continues to favor further Berlin talks.

Gromyko displayed sensitivity to Western speculation that recent bloc pronouncements had removed the urgency from the Berlin problem. He warned that such a conclusion would be a great mistake. Although he urged that talks should be renewed soon, Gromyko added that the USSR would not set a deadline for their completion or for a peace treaty because this would “complicate” the question for both sides.

Soviet View of Western Developments

Soviet propaganda last week revealed Moscowʼs satisfaction over the strains in the Western alliances. Moscow cited President De Gaulleʼs rejection of the US Polaris missile offer and his opposition to Britainʼs entry into the Common Market as evidence of deep differences within the Western camp. Soviet commentators contrasted President Kennedyʼs “rosy” description of the Atlantic alliance in his State-of-the-Union message with De Gaulleʼs 14 January press conference.²

Beneath this ill-concealed pleasure over rifts in the Western world, however, were signs of Moscowʼs concern that recent events may accelerate West Germanyʼs acquisition of a nuclear capability. Soviet comments on Chancellor Adenauerʼs visit to Paris charged that De Gaulle needed Bonnʼs support in building an independent nuclear force and implied that the French President, in return, would be willing to take an elastic view of the 1954 agreements prohibiting West German possession of nuclear weapons. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik, in a talk with a Western diplomat, took the line that Adenauer would support De Gaulleʼs rejection of Britainʼs membership in the Common Market since Bonnʼs only hope of obtaining nuclear weapons was through cooperation with the French.

Moscow greeted the impasse between France and Britain on the Common Market as providing much-belated confirmation of traditional Communist dogma regarding the inevitable antagonisms among capitalist states. Izvestia declared that the increasingly “acute and complicated” relations among NATO partners “shows once more that inherent in this bloc are the same features which characterized every imperialist grouping.” Moscow forecast an “extremely bitter struggle for markets” among the Western powers.

Soviet propaganda claimed that the Common Market impasse proves that the formation of “exclusive economic blocs” is not the way to stimulate world trade. It recalled Khrushchevʼs proposal for an international trade conference. Moscow also alleged that President Kennedyʼs plan for US cooperation with the Common Market has proved to be “founded on sand.”

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 3-4 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. See footnote 1, Document 281.
2. For text of Kennedyʼs State of the Union address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 15-16. For text of De Gaulleʼs press conference, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964, pp. 208-222. An excerpt from De Gaulleʼs press conference is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 378-380.