Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

283. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, January 24, 1963, 7 p.m.

1817. Embtel 1814.¹ Communications. During general exchange with which we began discussion, Brezhnev said US and Sov Govts were now talking with each other, in contrast to Stalin period. Perhaps this conversation was not always as pleasant as we would like it to be, but at least we were talking. Even during acute situations, negotiations can help solve problems.

I said President believes, more than any other man I have ever known, in value of communication. Despite rather unhappy Vienna meeting, he continued believe in communication. As result Cuban crisis, President had come to conclusion we do not have rapid enough means of communication between our two govts. We had consequently made proposal for (1) direct teletype line from Moscow to Western Europe, which would speed our communications as do two teletype lines Sov Govt has running into New York, and (2) establishment radio stations in Embassies. I hoped we could quickly agree on this.

Brezhnev merely said he was familiar with matter and understood competent Soviet organizations were studying it.

I said I realized this and had merely wanted to mention it to him in context his statement about two govts talking to each other.

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-2463. Secret.
1. Telegram 1814, January 24, reported that during his courtesy call on Brezhnev, marked by cordiality and repeated expressions of sincere Soviet desire for better relations, Kohler had discussed a test ban agreement. Telegram 1815, January 24, reported on cultural exchanges (ibid., 511.61/1-2463), and telegram 1816, on two personal cases (ibid., 261.1111-Makinen). In a final telegram, 1818, January 24, Kohler added that at the end of the conversation he had asked Brezhnev if he had any message for the President. The Presidium Chairman said he wanted to send his cordial greetings and to let the President know that Soviet leaders hoped to reach a test ban agreement that would clear the way for a solution to the Berlin problem. (Ibid., 611.61/1-2463)